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The contemporary Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon has emerged as one of the 
most significant threats to both regional and international peace, security, and stability.  
As the international community struggles to develop a comprehensive understanding of 
this phenomenon in its present context, the academic community should respond and 
discuss this subject from all relevant disciplinary backgrounds and perspectives.  If 
effective and successful policies, strategies, and tactics are to be developed in order to 
adequately confront these transnational actors, all dimensions of the subject need to be 
explored.  This thesis examines certain aspects of the under-theorized geographical 
dimension of Islamist extremist/terrorism.  Focusing on Al Qaeda and other members of 
the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency, this thesis explores the geographical and 
spatial imagination of the Islamist terrorist subject and deconstructs the geographical and 
spatial imaginings of Islamist extremism/terrorism through critically analyzing the 
diffuse international structure of Islamist terrorism and its related groups, the cultural 
“space” Islamist extremist/terrorist actors occupy, and the function of landscape in the 
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"Once the concept of 'otherness' takes root, the unimaginable becomes 
possible.  Not in some mythological country but to ordinary citizens.  War 
is happening not only at the front, but everywhere and to us all." 
                                                                                                 --Drakulic-- 
 
"The World is a Will to Power and nothing more." 




On the morning of September 11, 2001, when the planes hit the World Trade 
Centres at 8:48 a.m. and 9:06 a.m., and a third plane crashed into the Pentagon at 9:40, 
the most spectacular, tragic, and devastating terrorist attack in US history permanently 
changed the physical and psychological landscape of the United States.  Within minutes 
of the first attack, television, radio, and various internet news agencies quickly began 
transmitting surreal horror to Americans and to others around the world.  By the early 
afternoon, President Bush had declared to a bewildered and paralyzed nation that 
“America was at war with terror.”  Moreover, soon thereafter, the United States identified 
its enemy as Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist network.     
After September 11, 2001 the media inundated the populace with a deluge of 
characterizations, interpretations, and explanations of Islam; Middle-Eastern geography, 
politics, and culture; and the motivations and activities of terrorists in general, and Osama 
bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network in particular.  Many “experts” proffered testimonies 
and explanations as to what had happened and why and what the response of the United 
States should be.  Furthermore, the media continuously replayed the litany of presidential 
addresses that attempted to reaffirm the strength, courage, and innocence of the American 
people and which vehemently assured the US populace that the evil perpetrators of these 





would not go unpunished: “’I don’t care what the international lawyers say, we are going 
to kick some ass’” (Clarke, 2004, pg. 24).1  Consequently, the ongoing conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq ensued. 
 However, the current campaign being waged by the United States, and the 
“Coalition of the Willing”—nations who have pledged support in the War on Terror—
have proven to be relatively ineffective in preventing global Islamist extremist/terrorist 
activity.  Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9-11) there have been many terrorist 
attacks either directly or indirectly associated with Osama bin Laden, the al Qaeda 
network, and other groups that subscribe and adhere to Islamist extremist doctrine and 
teachings.  Some examples are the bombings of foreign compounds in Saudi Arabia; the 
bombing of the British Embassy in Turkey; the Bali Bombings in October, 2002; the 
myriad suicide bombings in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Afghanistan; the devastating 
commuter train bombings in Madrid, Spain; and the recent epiphenomena of beheadings 
of foreigners captured in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.  Although these actions may or may not 
be directly connected to one another and the groups involved may have different 
grievances, ethnic backgrounds, political partisanship, and religious affiliations, the 
traditional divisions are not important.  What is important is the fact that these groups 
share a perceived common enemy and follow an extremist ideology that advocates the 
use of violence and terrorist tactics to achieve particular political, social, and/or religious 
objectives: 
Islamism is a self-consciously pan-Muslim phenomenon.  It is a waste of time 
and effort to try to distinguish Islamist terror groups from one another 
according to their alleged differences along a series of traditional religious, 
ethnic, or political divides (Shi’ite versus Sunni, Persian versus Arab, and so 
                                                 
1 This quote, made by President George W. Bush, was cited by Richard Clarke in his text Against All 





on).  The reason is simple: In the eyes of the Islamist groups themselves, their 
common effort to strike at the West while seizing control of the Muslim 
world is immeasurably more important than whatever differences might be 
seen as “dividing” one another.2 (Boroumand & Boroumand, 2002, pg. 8) 
 
Therefore, to reach an understanding of Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and individual 
actors it is not imperative to investigate their differences (although this is interesting and 
certainly warrants academic investigation) but to investigate their commonalities and 
similarities. 
 What is terrorism?  What is a terrorist/extremist group?  Who are terrorists?  
Where does their power, conviction, and resolve come from?  Why are they willing to 
sacrifice themselves and kill innocent people for what they believe? How do they 
understand themselves and their actions?  Why do they believe violence is necessary? 
What is the identity and subjectivity of Islamist terrorist groups and individual actors? 
These questions are fundamental, but, as Andrew Silke suggests, satisfactory answers to 
these basic questions continue to elude the field because of pervasive conceptual 
confusion (2001, pg. 2-3).  As Ladan Boroumand and Roya Bouramound assert, “this is 
worrisome, for however necessary an armed response might seem in the near term, it is 
undeniable that a successful long-term strategy for battling Islam[ists] and its terrorists 
will require a clearer understanding of who these foes are, what they think, and how they 
understand their own motives” (2002, pg. 5). 
 The objective of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the 
geographical and spatial dimensions of Islamist extremism/terrorism, and to help 
generate a theoretical and practical discussion as to how these organizations and 
                                                 
2 However, it is important to note that Islamist extremist groups will attack other Muslims based upon 
ideological differences, as was the case with the attack of Muslims in Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  If Muslims 





individual actors geographically and spatially operate and “imagine” themselves.  The 
particular question that I seek to answer is: “What are the geographical and spatial 
imaginings of non-state sponsored Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and individual 
actors?3 Throughout this paper, I intend to deconstruct the geographical and spatial 
imaginings of Islamist extremism/terrorism by examining the diffuse transnational 
structure of Islamist extremism/terrorism, the cultural “space” that Islamist 
extremism/terrorism occupies, and the symbolic relationship that exists between Islamist 
extremism/terrorism and landscapes. 
 Before continuing into the main body of my analysis, it is important to define and 
establish an operational/conceptual understanding of Islamist extremism/terrorism.  I use 
the term Islamist opposed to Islamic because the term Islamist more accurately codifies 
the ideological architecture of the phenomenon I am examining.  As Laden Boroumand 
and Roya Boroumand state, “these beliefs are properly called “Islamist” rather than 
“Islamic” because they are actually in conflict with Islam—a conflict that we must not 
allow to be obscured by the ‘terrorists’ habit of commandeering Islamic religious 
terminology and injecting it with their own distorted content” (2002, pg. 9).  The term 
“Islamist” refers to a marginal, insular, and myopic political and cultural discourse that 
has appropriated Islamic theology in order to situate itself within a broader theological 
context and ideological framework.  The term “Islamist” allows one to analyse and 
                                                 
3 In the article “Defining International terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach,” Thomas Badey indicates that 
“two thirds of incidents classified as international terrorism are directly attributed to, and are carried out by, 
non-state actors” (1998, pg. 102).  Although this article refers to incidents within the time period of 1992-
1996, the statistic, in my opinion, is accurate as many of terrorist attacks that have been perpetrated since 






discuss these marginal groups and individuals without erroneously demonizing and 
vilifying the whole of Islam and the people that practice the Islamic faith:   
some Muslim activists would interpret verses of the Qur’an or traditions of 
the Prophet Mohammed to serve their own political ends, however they 
conceive them.  Nevertheless, just as no one in his or her right mind would 
charge all Protestants or Catholics of being terrorists because certain 
Protestant or Catholic groups in Northern Ireland resort to armed action, by 
the same logic, the presence of certain terrorist groups that call themselves 
Islamic does not make Islam and all its adherents potential terrorists and a 
threat to the rest of humanity. (Al Sayyid, 2002, pg. 178) 
 
Now that the term “Islamist” has been defined, it is necessary to define the term 
“terrorism.”  
The conceptual confusion and controversy surrounding extremism/terrorism is 
compounded by what has now become a cliché: one person’s terrorist is another person’s 
freedom fighter.  As Robert Kennedy suggests: 
The question of whether one person’s terrorist is simply another’s freedom 
fighter is perhaps nowhere more starkly perceived than in the ongoing 
struggles in the Middle East, [South Asia, and Southeast Asia], where those 
branded as terrorists by many are frequently viewed as martyrs by others.  
Their pictures hang on local barber shop walls along with those of movie 
stars.  Their faces adorn key chains and the local equivalent of baseball cards.  
They are immortalized in songs.  Children skip down alleyways shouting 
their names. (1999, pg. 2) 
 
Consequently, if one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter, “terrorism” is a 
matter of perspective and interpretation: a perspective and interpretation that is informed 
by the political, cultural, socioeconomic, and quasi-religious mores, dogma, and 
provenance of a particular country, region, or group(s) of people.  Therefore, any 
definition of “terrorism” is tenuous; however, nonetheless, an operational/functional 
definition must be established in order to construct a conceptual and referential 





 For the purpose of my argument, I use Alex P. Schmid’s academic consensus 
definition of terrorism.  The following definition, which I quote at length, is the “product 
of the synthesis of 109 definitions” (Badey, 1998, pg. 91) of terrorism: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action [against non-
combatants], employed by (semi-) clandestine individual group or state actors, for 
idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to 
assassination—the direct targets of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets 
of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target 
population, and serve as message generators.  Threat- and violence- based 
communication processes between terrorists (organization), (imperiled) victims, 
and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning into a 
target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether 
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.4  
(Schmid cited in Badey, 1998, pg. 91) 
 
Although this definition could be construed as excessive and convoluted, it accurately 
identifies and encapsulates many of the elements and characteristics unique to 
extremism/terrorism and its related strategies and tactics.  However, this definition fails 
to explicitly identify one key element and feature of extremism/terrorism: the targeting of 
civilians.  Certainly the term “non-combatants” implicitly refers to civilian targets, but 
without explicitly identifying civilians as targets of extremism/terrorism, a certain degree 
of ambiguity may exist surrounding what constitutes extremism/terrorism.  If a successful 
political and legal normative framework for combating extremism/terrorism is going to 
be established, the definition used to codify acts of extremism/terrorism must explicitly 
identify all of the defining characteristics of this phenomenon.  As a result of the passage 
of UN Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), a definition of terrorism was proposed 
that would strengthen the role and ability of the UN to combat terrorism.  The most 
noteworthy element of the definition is the explicit reference to civilian targets.  The 
                                                 
4 See pg. 28 in Schmid, Alex & Jongman, Albert. (1988). Political Terrorism. New Brunswick: 






proposed UN consensus definition of terrorism for the General Assembly is as follows: 
“any action […] that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-
combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act” (Counter-Terrorism Committee—UN, 2004).  In my opinion, 
together the academic consensus definition and the proposed consensus definition for the 
UN General Assembly formulate a comprehensive and robust conceptual framework for 
interpreting and understanding the contemporary extremism/terrorism phenomenon.  
Now that a conceptual framework and operational/functional understanding of Islamist 
extremism/terrorism has been established, I will proceed to an overview of my analysis 
and then continue into the body of my argument. 
In the first movement of my analysis, I use an Andersonian and a Canettian 
theoretical framework to examine the diffuse organizational structure of the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist constituency and the geographical and spatial imaginings that make it 
possible.  Furthermore, I argue that the forces of globalization have enabled Islamist 
extremist/terrorist groups to develop a transnational structure, which enables the group 
and individual actors to spread globally while remaining ideologically united in an 
imagined community.  
In the second movement, using a Bhabhabian post-colonial theoretical trajectory 
and Soja's "Third space" paradigm, I explore how the identity and subjectivity of an 
Islamist extremist/terrorist actor occupies a liminal cultural third space, resulting in a 
hybridized identity and subjectivity that resists and subverts traditional forms of 





using the Butlerian concept of performativity, I analyse how the hybrid identity and 
subjectivity of an Islamist extremist/terrorist actor is a cultural performance, and that the 
identity and subjectivity of an Islamist extremist/terrorist manifests and is realized 
through an actual violent act.  I then go on to argue that suicide/martyr operations are the 
absolute and ultimate expression of the identity and subjectivity of an Islamist 
extremist/terrorist actor.   
Finally, in the third movement, I analyse the symbolic relationship that exists 
between landscape and the identity and subjectivity of an Islamist extremist/terrorist 
group and individual actor.  I then argue that the landscape, serving as a canvass on 
which the group or actor inscribe their 'language' of political and ideological dissent, 
symbolically becomes an extension of the identity and subjectivity of an Islamist 
extremist/terrorist group and individual actor by producing a permanent landscape of 
terror.       
 Although many geographical and spatial arguments rely on empirical evidence 
and quantitative methods of analysis, my approach relies upon theoretical modes of 
analysis in order to bring my argument into force.  Structurally my argument exists in 
three parts and moves from the macro scale to the micro scale.  First, I examine the 
transnational organizational structure of the Islamist extremist/terrorist movement.  
Second, I move to an analysis of the “space” Islamist extremist/terrorist actors occupy 
after penetrating and infiltrating a particular country, society, and/or population.  Finally, 
I examine the symbolic significance of specific places and spaces (landscapes) that have 






My research draws upon a variety of perspectives representative of a multitude of 
academic disciplines and sub-disciplines.  The majority of my research has focused on 
information and arguments contained within recent academic journals, academic texts, 
government documents, and media e.g. newspapers, magazines, etc.  My research is 
limited to “open source” material and information readily available through the internet, 
university libraries, and book stores.  Certainly, access to “classified” government 
documentation regarding some of the issues I engage would be invaluable for 
understanding the capabilities and capacities of Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and 
individuals, and I am sure would add new dimensions to my argument.  However, again, 
the majority of my research reflects the most current and up-to-date information available 
to students at a “Western” university and/or to individuals who have an express interest in 























The Transnational Geographical and Spatial Imaginings of Islamist 
Extremism/Terrorism 
 
In the post-9/11 era, religious or “sacred” (Islamist) terrorism has become more 
prominent and pronounced as a political threat and international destabilizing force 
(Cronin, 2003, pg. 35).  Although certain forms of terrorism and the groups and 
individuals associated with this phenomenon have been the subject of a long history of 
debate and analysis, the prevailing discourse situates these groups and individuals in 
regions and places and spaces that are over “there,” in countries and cultures that are 
located far from the once believed invulnerable West (Occident) and, in particular, the 
impenetrable United States.  However, “as if from the ether, violent and brutal attacks 
exploded into the consciousness of Western (United States, my focus) nations” (Segaller, 
1986, pg. 7).  The moment the airplanes collided with the World Trade buildings and the 
Pentagon, the United States and Western society became instantaneously aware that 
“they” were no longer over “there”, but were “here”—paradise lost. 
As Alex P. Schmid asserts, “due to globalization, the permeability of borders and 
state interdependence, the internationalization of terrorism (Islamist terrorism) and other 
forms of political violence is a fact” (2004, pg. 201).  Certainly the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist attacks on 9/11, the train bombings in Madrid, the Bali night club 
bombings, the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen, the bombing of a US housing 
complex in Saudi Arabia, and the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania illustrate the 
international reach of Islamist extremism/terrorism and the various groups whom 





the Islamist extremism/terrorism phenomenon and its transnational5 character and 
network poses a significant and unpredictable threat to global security and stability in 
general and to the United States and its perceived allies in particular.  Although regional 
and state-centered threats and conflicts are still significant security concerns, the most 
pressing security challenges facing the international community, such as Islamist 
extremism/terrorism, are deterritorialized, effectively borderless, and global in reach 
(Tuathail, 1999, pg. 119).  As an internationalized and transnational phenomenon, it is 
important, if not imperative, to attempt to penetrate the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
geographical and spatial imagination and develop an understanding of how groups like Al 
Qaeda construct and conceptualize their world view and the internationalized spaces they 
inhabit, both real and imagined.   
Using an Andersonian and a Canettian theoretical framework, I examine how the 
organizational structure of Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and the modern 
extremist/terrorist ideology that function as the foundation of their imagined and 
constructed communities serve a catalytic function in the erosion of the borders of 
sovereignty and nationalism and support and sustain the emergence of a borderless, 
transnational geographical and spatial imagination.  I then argue that the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist ideology has enabled Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist/extremist 
groups to develop a diffuse transnational organizational structure while remaining 
ideologically committed and united in an internationalized imagined community.  
Furthermore, I argue that the processes inherent in globalization facilitate and support the 
                                                 
5 The international connections and interactions between Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and individual 
actors can be characterized as transnational.  In her article “Terrorists as Transnational Actors,” Louise 
Richardson defines transnationalism as “interactions between non-state actors.  That is, international 





internationalization and transnationalization of the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
phenomenon.  
Transnationalizing the Spaces of Islamist Extremism/Terrorism 
 The protracted “War on Terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrates the 
predilection of the United States to conceptualize conflict and develop strategies in 
conventional state-centric terms: “the combined focus of the United States on state-
centric threats and its attempt to cast twenty-first century terrorism into familiar strategic 
terms avoids and often undermines effective responses to this non-state phenomenon” 
(Cronin, 2003, pg. 30).  Indeed, the ambiguous euphemism “War on Terror,” which the 
United States used to characterize and justify its current, and undoubtedly its future, 
political and military activities, is laden with anachronistic and atavistic Westphalian and 
Cold Waresque rhetoric.  The “War on Terror,” however unclear the actual referent, is an 
ideological mechanism that “helps mobilize the populace against an enemy” (Chomsky, 
1988, pg. 29), whether real or imagined, readily identifiable or not, and, because of its 
ambiguity, can be used against any state, group, or individual that the United States 
consider to be a threat to their domestic and/or foreign interests.   
The War on Terror and its accompanying rhetoric—embodied in phrases like 
“axis of evil” and “with us or against us”—seeks to (re)establish a Manichean division of 
space and place into “good” and “evil”, “our” place and “their” place; its political [and 
cultural] function is to incorporate and regulate “us” from “them,” the same from “the 
other’” (Sidaway, 1993, pg. 364).  This division and (re)presentation of space serves to 
establish both real and imagined physical and psychological boundaries that, for the 





locatable and identifiable through specific geopolitical and national/state-centric political, 
cultural, economic, and geographical/spatial characteristics and limits.  However, the 
rhetoric of the “War on Terror” and geopolitical/state-centric discourse represent a 
flawed calculus because the confrontation is with a non-state phenomenon that exceeds 
its immediate terms and boundaries (Passavant & Dean, 2002, pg. 2). 
 Although specific regions and countries—Middle East, North Africa and the horn 
of Africa, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Chechnya, and Indonesia, to 
name a few—may serve as epicentres where Islamist extremists/terrorists receive their 
training and indoctrination, strategically plan international operations and attacks, and 
may serve as provisional havens, Islamist extremists/terrorists do not pledge allegiance to 
a specific country and/or geopolitical unit/sovereign territory.  Rather, they pledge 
allegiance to the Islamist ideology in general and the group/organization they are apart of 
in particular.  Obviously, Islamist extremists/terrorists originate from particular regions 
and countries from around the world and may predominantly operate in a particular 
country or region e.g. Chechnya or Pakistan, depending on the objectives of the 
individual actor and that of the group he is a member of.  Irrespective of the national 
origins, varying political, cultural, and socio-economic objectives and grievances, and 
their specific geographical presence, the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency is 
ideologically unified in a transnational imagined community that is simultaneously 
heterogeneous and homogeneous in nature.  Consequently, the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
groups’ geographical and spatial identity and subjectivity and world view are not 
informed by and constructed through nationalism and its accompanying narratives and 





1998, pg. 3), and an essentialist and reductionist fixed national identity.  Rather, the 
geographical and spatial imaginings of the Islamist extremist/terrorist are developed 
through and fashioned by a particular theological/ideological (Islamist) imagi-nation and 
counter-hegemonic consciousness that resists the singularity of nationalism and the 
sovereign nation-state and espouses the supranational conception and character of the 
Islamist Umma. (Although the term Umma  refers to the world wide community of 
Muslims in general, my emphasis is on the Islamist Umma.)  As Bhabha (1994) states, 
“counter-narratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its totalizing 
boundaries—both actual and conceptual—disturb those ideological manoeuvres through 
which ‘imagined communities’ are given essentialist identities” ( pg. 149).    
 By conceptualizing a supranational Islamist extremist/terrorist Umma that disturbs 
and transcends the boundaries of nationalism and the sovereign nation-state, Islamist 
extremist/terrorist groups and the ideologues whom propagate and promulgate this 
particular theological/ideological dogma, engage in a critical geopolitics that “bears 
witness to the irredeemable plurality of space and the multiplicity of possible political 
constructions of space” (Tuathail & Dalby, 1998, pg. 3).  In effect, as Reicher and 
Hopkins (2001) assert, “in the context where the nation is familiar, those who propose 
alternative self-categories and alternative constructions of interest must, of necessity, 
seek to problematize ‘the nation’ at the same time as advancing this preferred alternative” 
(pg. 68).  Therefore, in order to “problematize the nation” and advance an alternate 
construction of space, the alternative possibilities of space and spatiality, both real and 





of practices that exist automatically without being brought into being” (Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001, pg. 69).  
So, how are the political, cultural, pluralized, fragmented, and 
internationalized/globalized/transnational spaces of Islamist extremist/terrorist groups, 
like Al Qaeda and its affiliates, imagined, constructed, and brought into being?  In order 
to answer this question, I use Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities as an 
interpretive template to assist my argument and analysis.  However, before continuing, an 
understanding of the theoretical precepts of Imagined Communities must be established. 
According to Anderson, “the end of the era of nationalism, so long prophesied, is 
not remotely in sight.  Indeed nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the 
political life of our time” (1991, pg. 3).  However, although “nationalism” and “nation-
ness” are very important political and cultural concepts, Anderson continues: “Nation, 
nationality, nationalism—all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone 
analyse.  In contrast to the immense influence that nationalism has exerted on the modern 
world, plausible theory about it is conspicuously meagre” (1991, pg. 3).  In reaction to 
the “meagre” and relatively small corpus of theories regarding nationalism and nation-
ness, Anderson proposes his own theory of the nation, nationalism, and/or nation-ness. 
         Anderson defines the nation as: “an imagined political community—and imagined 
as both inherently limited and sovereign.  It is imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear 
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (1991, pg. 6).  
Anderson goes on to state that “communities are not to be distinguished by their 





nations are imagined and subsequently constructed becomes the central theme to 
Anderson’s understanding and theory of the nation, nationalism, and nation-ness. 
 As stated previously, Anderson’s imagined community is conceptualized as 
spatially and psychologically “limited”: “the nation is imagined as limited because even 
the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if 
elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (1991, pg. 7).  Furthermore, as 
Anderson maintains, the nation “is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the 
actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived 
as a deep, horizontal comradeship.  Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, 
over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as 
willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (1991, pg. 7).  There are several historical 
factors and processes that Anderson contributes to the formation and construction of the 
‘nation’ as an imagined community, including an imagined community’s geographical 
and spatial limits.  However, for the purpose of my argument, I primarily focus on three 
of Anderson’s lenses of analysis, which he terms: Cultural Roots; The Origins of 
National Consciousness; and Old Languages, New Models (Anderson, 1991). 
 An important dimension in the development and construction of the imagined 
community and its physical and psychological geography and spatiality is the cultural 
system in which the imaginings occur.  In the section Cultural Roots, Anderson describes 
two cultural systems which he believes are relevant to his argument: “the Religious 





 The nation, nationalism, and nation-ness serve an important ontological function 
in the development of a collective unifying identity and subjectivity, similar to the 
historical role religion played, and for many still plays:   
Like the great transcendental religions in earlier historical periods, 
nationalism also forms the framework of today’s characteristic identity [and 
subjectivity]—national identity [and subjectivity].  This identity [and 
subjectivity], which reflects the cognitive framework provided by nationalism 
and the image of social order implied in it, differs in several important 
respects from identities [and subjectivities] fostered by religious cultures.  To 
begin with, nationalism is secular.  It locates the sources of ultimate meaning, 
law, and authority, which religious consciousness identifies with 
transcendental forces, in this world, specifically, in social reality (Greenfeld, 




I am not claiming that the appearance of nationalism towards the end of the 
eighteenth century was ‘produced’ by the erosion of religious certainties, or 
that this erosion does not itself require a complex explanation.  Nor am I 
suggesting that somehow nationalism historically ‘supersedes’ religion.  
What I am proposing is that nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, 
not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural 
systems that preceded it, out of which—as well as against which—it came 
into being (Anderson, 1991, pg. 12). 
 
As suggested above, Anderson partially locates the rise and development of nationalism, 
the nation, and nation-ness within the historicity of “the religious community” (1991, pg. 
12).   
From Anderson’s perspective, “few things are more impressive than the vast 
territorial stretch of the Umma Islam […] Christendom […] and the Buddhist world […]” 
(1991, pg. 12).  Although certain regions of the world may be predominantly Islamic, 
Christian, or Buddhist, etc., the Islamic, Christian, and Buddhist religious communities, 
both in a historic frame and a contemporary frame, have transcended enormous 





the world view and consciousness of billions of people whose provenance is as varied as 
the geographical, spatial, political, cultural, and socio-economic diversity of these 
immense religious communities.  Despite the differences I have previously listed, 
Anderson argues that these immense communities were imaginable largely because of the 
unifying effect of sacred languages and written script (1991, pg. 13).  For example, in the 
instance of Islam, “if Maguindanao met Berbers in Mecca, knowing nothing of each 
other’s languages, incapable of communicating orally, they nonetheless understood each 
other’s ideographs, because the sacred texts they shared only existed in classical Arabic.  
In this sense, written Arabic functioned like Chinese characters to create a community out 
of signs, not sounds” (1991, pg. 13).  Anderson goes on to state that “all the great 
classical communities conceived themselves as cosmically central, through the medium 
of a sacred language linked to a superterrestrial order of power.  Accordingly, the stretch 
of written Latin, Pali, Arabic, or Chinese was, in theory, unlimited” (1991, pg. 13).  In a 
sense, all literate and educated individuals i.e., clergy, had access to a pure world of 
signs—a unique sacred language—and the theological and ideological system and 
spatiality these signs created and constructed (1991, pg. 13).   
  However, as Anderson maintains, “if the sacred silent languages were the media 
through which the great global communities of the past were imagined, the reality of such 
apparitions depended on an idea largely foreign to the contemporary Western mind: the 
non-arbitrariness of the sign.  The ideograms of Chinese, Latin, or Arabic were 
emanations of reality, not randomly fabricated representations of it” (1991, pg. 14).  For 
example, until recently “the Qur’an was literally untranslatable (and therefore 





signs of written Arabic” (1991, pg. 14).  Therefore, “in effect, ontological reality [was] 
apprehensible only through a single, privileged system of re-presentation” (1991, pg. 14) 
and its related tenets.  Consequently, in a historical context, sacred and privileged 
systems of re-presentation and absolutism served as the impetus not only for creating 
imagined communities—unified through a collective theological/ideological 
consciousness and world view—but for the territorialization and solidification of 
particular geographical and psychological spaces divided and differentiated by sacred 
languages and the political and cultural hegemonic systems these sacred languages and 
systems of re-presentation created and constructed i.e., Islam runs into Christianity, 
Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc.—a powerful force in the emergence and 
development of nationalism, the nation, nation-ness, and individual and collective 
identities and subjectivities.  Although the sacred religious communities, whether real or 
imagined, were gradually pluralized, fragmented, and decentred by the emergence of 
nationalism and national consciousness, the function and impact of a sacred language 
serving as a unifying ideological apparatus is exemplified by contemporary Islamist 
extremist/terrorist groups and organizations (Al Qaeda and their ideological affiliates). 
 The second factor Anderson attributes to the development of nationalism, the 
nation, and nation-ness, is the geographical and spatial imaginings precipitated by the rise 
of national consciousness.  According to Anderson, the rise of national consciousness 
was facilitated by the development and emergence of print-capitalism: “print-capitalism 
made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to 
relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways” (1991, pg. 36).  Print-capitalism 





amounts of information to the masses, but also made it possible for the secularization and 
vernacularization of print languages: “nothing served to ‘assemble’ related vernaculars 
more than capitalism, which, within the limits imposed by grammars and syntaxes, 
created mechanically reproduced print-languages capable of dissemination through the 
market” (1991, pg. 44).  Subsequently, as Anderson argues, print-languages provided the 
foundation for a national consciousness in three ways:  First, print-languages created a 
unified field of exchange and communication below the sacred languages and above the 
spoken/oral vernaculars and dialects.  People who may have found it difficult to 
communicate with one another via the spoken word, because of the variability of 
vernaculars and dialects, were able to comprehend and understand one another through 
the written word—standardization of communication and language-field translates into 
the unification a collective consciousness.  Consequently, people became aware that they 
were connected to hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people whom belong to the 
same print/language-field: “these fellow-readers, to whom they were connected through 
print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally 
imagined community” (1991, pg. 44). 
 Second, Anderson states that “print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, 
which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective 
idea of the nation” (1991, pg. 44).  The documentation of history into a fixed form 
enabled information, whether authorized or unauthorized, to assume permanence through 
virtual infinite reproduction, both temporally and spatially (1991, pg. 44). 
Third, Anderson states that “print-capitalism created languages-of-power of a kind 





print-language and dominated their final forms” (1991, pg. 45).  Therefore, certain 
dialects assumed a “politico-cultural eminence” (1991, pg. 45) and correspondingly were 
elevated to the official language of the state.  Consequently, as Anderson maintains, 
particular subordinate and unofficial dialectics created sub-national groups who, using 
psychoanalytic terminology, felt effectively ‘castrated’ and ‘decapitated’ and broke away 
and formed their own regions and imagined communities dominated by their particular 
languages and associated linguistic manipulations.  As Anderson outlines, “the fate of the 
Turkic-speaking peoples in the zones incorporated into today’s Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and the 
USSR is especially exemplary.  A family of spoken languages, once everywhere 
assemblable, thus comprehensible, within an Arabic orthography, has lost that unity as a 
result of conscious manipulations” (1991, pg. 45).  Furthermore, in a modern context, 
various sub-national and dissident groups, in an effort to change their subordinate status, 
attempt to penetrate print and radio medias giving their particular group official 
recognition and prominence—equanimity through linguistic (ideological) parity e.g., the 
Basque Separatists, the Taiwanese nationalists, the Chechnyan rebels, the Kurdish 
Workers Party, and Islamist groups attempting to depose regimes whom they believe to 
be apostate and/or infidel, whether on an international and/or national scale. 
 Print-capitalism and its impact on language “created the possibility of a new form 
of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern 
nation” (1991, pg. 46).  Although historically the geographical and spatial expansion of 
these communities was limited, imperialism and colonialism and advancements in 
communications technology significantly increased the expansion of specific imagined 





 The third factor Anderson attributes to the emergence of the nation and its 
associated imaginings is what he designates “Old Languages, New Models.”  As 
Anderson states, “national ‘print-languages’ were of central ideological and political 
importance” (1991, pg. 67), and provided models and templates from which others could 
ostensibly imagine communities and forge physical and psychological boundaries for a 
nation, nationalism, and nation-ness.  National print-languages and their associated 
histories provided geopolitical, political, cultural, and ideological references from which  
particular nations and communities could justify and substantiate their ontological and 
epistemological claims to a unique, homogeneous, and official national consciousness 
designated by the limited geographical and spatial boundaries of a particular region.  As 
Anderson argues: “The nation became something capable of being consciously aspired to 
from early on, rather than a slowly sharpening frame of vision.  Indeed […] the ‘nation’ 
proved an invention on which it was impossible to secure a patent.  It became available 
for pirating by widely different, and sometimes unexpected hands” (1991, pg. 67).  For 
instance, as we shall see, on the contemporary transnational stage, the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist imagined Umma has used this principle in an attempt to create a pan-
Islamist ‘nation.’ 
 National print-languages served an important mimetic function in the 
development, dissemination, promulgation, and ultimate solidification of the national 
consciousness particular to a nation and its resultant identity and subjectivity, which 
manifested in the imagined realities of: “nation-states, republican institutions, common 
citizenships, popular sovereignty, national flags, anthems, etc., and the liquidation of 





subjecthoods, inherited nobilities, serfdoms, ghettoes, and so forth” (1991, pg. 81).  
Moreover, in order to support the mimesis of national consciousness and to enforce its 
various tenets enshrined in the national and official print-language, nation-states utilized, 
what Louis Althusser terms, ideological state apparatuses e.g. religious institutions, 
universities and schools, etc.  These apparatuses not only inculcated the mass populace 
with the specific imaginings of the nation, nationalism, and nation-ness, these apparatuses 
were integral to educating the masses, regardless of class, and elevating literacy rates: “in 
fact, as literacy increased, it became easier to arouse popular support, with the masses 
discovering a new glory in the print elevation of languages they had humbly spoken all 
along” (1991, pg. 86).   
 In effect, national print-languages operating in conjunction with ideological state 
apparatuses created a “model” for the development and propagation of a collective 
national consciousness and the independent national state.  As previously stated, this 
‘model’ could be pirated by other groups and communities and used to develop their own 
imagined communities, national identities and subjectivities, and independent political, 
cultural, economic, and spatial systems.  The consequence of which, on a macro scale, 
led to the creation of other nations and nationalisms and, on a micro scale, lead to the 
circumstances where sub-national groups wanted to (re)assert their position as an 
independent group not only geographically and spatially but politically and culturally—
autonomous imagined communities conceived of as an equal and/or as a superior system 
of (re)presentation.  I argue that an important attribute of the pirating of this model was 





popular/dominant national movements of particular ‘nations’, regions, locations, places, 
and spaces. 
 Now that an understanding of Anderson’s theoretical precepts that I utilize in my 
argument has been established, I will continue with my analysis and interpretation of the 
imagined and constructed community of Islamist extremists/terrorists.  Although 
Anderson situates his argument of “imagined communities” and the emergence of the 
modern ‘nation’ in a historical context, the imaginings he expounds are indispensable for 
accessing the contemporary Islamist extremist/terrorist geographical and spatial imagi-
nation and world view. 
 The historical cultural systems of Anderson’s limited imagined religious 
communities and the importance of a “sacred” language (Qur’an) as a powerful unifying 
mechanism has not diminished in relevance for the Muslim Umma in general and the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency in particular.  However, the limited imagined 
communities of the past are no longer limited geographically and spatially.  The imagined 
religious communities in a contemporary context are unlimited in geographical and 
spatial character and have established a global presence, while remaining relatively 
unified.  Indeed, the present day population of the Muslim diaspora—a population of 
approximately 1.1 billion followers: the world’s second largest religion (Williams, 2002, 
pg. 45)—which, geographically, stretches from North America—an estimated six million 
Muslims are dispersed throughout the United States (Haddad, 2001, pg. 91)—to 
Southeast Asia, is indicative of the relative growth, influence, and power of a “sacred” 
language and its ability to construct an imagined community (Umma) that is global in 





Islamist extremist/terrorist Umma (Al Qaeda and affiliated groups) and its constituents 
are equally as internationally diffuse and bound together by a particular “sacred” 
language and ideology.  For Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
constituency, the imagined religious communities of yesterday have not passed, but 
remain in, what I term, a historicized present.  However, perhaps ironically, “whatever 
their specific antecedents, these [Islamist] movements have emerged from modern 
economic, social, political, [cultural, spatial, and geographical] conjunctures” (Sidaway, 
1993, pg. 361).  This historicized present, which partially informs, albeit significantly, the 
world view of Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency, 
serves as a powerful mobilizing force through which their particular geographical and 
spatial identity and subjectivity is framed, refracted, realized, and actualized.   
According to Islamist dogma and its Qur’anic manipulations, the world was and is 
divided into two spheres: dar al-islam (the abode or sphere of Islam) and dar al-harb (the 
abode or sphere of war (i.e non-Islamic lands) (Ruthven, 2002, pg. xvi).  However, Al 
Qaeda and its affiliates not only perceive the non-Islamic world as dar al-harb and 
infidel, they perceive specific Islamic states to be apostate and, therefore, legitimate 
targets and enemies of their cause and objectives: “Al Qaeda’s position, and the position 
of other [Islamist] fundamentalists, purists, and militants, is that the enemy of true belief 
is not only outside the Islamic world, it is within it, that the majority of Muslim’s in 
today’s society have become shirks, or “faithless ones” (Williams, 2002, pg. 47).  For 
example, Al Qaeda and its affiliates perceive the governments of Turkey, Egypt, Libya, 





According to Islamists, “if Muslims return to faith in the infallible teachings of 
the Qur’an, the people of Allah can preserve, restore, and extend their power throughout 
the world” (Williams, 2002, pg. 47-48).  Consequently, Al Qaeda and its ideological 
affiliates are dedicated to the establishment of Islamist governance—strict adherence to 
the rule of Shari’ah law—throughout the Islamic world and beyond.  As Knight, Murphy, 
and Mousseau (2003) assert in their article entitled “The Sources of Terrorism,” Osama 
bin Laden, his Al Qaeda associates, and other Islamist extremist/terrorist groups “are 
dedicated to the establishment of Islamic (Islamist) governance throughout the Muslim 
world, and their main activity has been training and deploying jihadist military (terrorist) 
cadre in direct support of this goal” (pg. 193).  Therefore,  the Islamist dichotomous 
world view and the expressed goals and objectives of the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
constituency serve as the impetus for creating, nurturing, fostering, and sustaining “a 
distinctive collective self-definition” (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001, pg. 63) and a unified, 
transnational geographical and spatial identity and subjectivity.    
The Islamist dichotomous world view creates a particular reality as much as it is a 
reaction and response to reality.  For Al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates, the political, 
cultural, geographical, and spatial reality they have created—dar al-islam/dar al-har—is 
the unifying and mobilizing force behind the development of a transnational imagined 
religious community of Islamist extremists/terrorists.  However politically, culturally, 
economically, geographically, and spatially disparate and incongruent Al Qaeda, its 
ideological affiliates, and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency may be, and even if 
they never formally interact, the Islamist doctrine unifies them in a collective 





unlimited in its geographical and spatial imaginings.  This is evident in the transnational 
structure and network of Al Qaeda and the Islamist extremist/terrorist diaspora.     
 Before the War on Terror and Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 
functioned as the base of operations for Al Qaeda.  In Afghanistan, Al Qaeda was 
hierarchical and centralized, and could plan and execute regional and international 
terrorist operations with relative impunity.  However, the post-9/11 security environment 
has caused Al Qaeda and its Islamist extremist/terrorist affiliates to assume a 
decentralized, amorphous, nebulous, and fluid network and structure that is transnational 
in character and is not limited to the geopolitical borders of sovereign states, the 
imaginings of their particular brand of nation, nationalism, and nation-ness, or the 
national and international laws governing the conduct of recognized and official nation-
states.        
 It is estimated that the amorphous Al Qaeda network has a presence—dormant or 
active cells providing financial and/or logistical support to others in the network or are 
actively planning to carry out an attack—in approximately eighty countries around the 
world (Schanzer, 2004, pg. 23).  Some of the countries where Al Qaeda has a presence 
and operates include: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Canada, 
Chechnya in Russia, Croatia, Egypt, England, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Ivory 
Coast, Jordon, Kashmir in India, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, 
Tunisia, Uganda, the United States, Uruguay, and the Yemen (Bergen, 2001, pg. 196).  





approximately 70, 000-110, 0006 trained operatives and fighters (Williams, 2002, pg. 6), 
but, because of the high-quality recruits it seeks, it is speculated that approximately  
3, 000 operatives were invited to join Al-Qaeda’s elite ranks7 (Byman, 2003, pg. 145).  
Obviously, given the clandestine, covert, and inconspicuous nature of Islamist 
extremism/terrorism, accurate numbers of the Islamist extremist/terrorist movement are 
very difficult to determine: “what makes numbers so elusive is that Al- Qaeda is 
simultaneously a small core group and a broader network linking various Islamist groups 
and causes.  Al-Qaeda has spun a web of relationships with Islamist groups that espouse 
similar, though not always identical, goals” (Byman, 2003, pg. 145).   
Islamist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda contribute to the transnational 
geographical and spatial diversity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist mosaic: “today, while 
there are numerous cells and informal Al Qaeda clusters working around the globe, Al-
Qaeda’s affiliates are thought to number between 30 and 40.  The average affiliate has 
about five hundred fighters, which means that there are thousands of fighters in their 
ranks” (Schanzer, 2004, pg. 24).  Some of the Islamist extremist/terrorist groups believed 
to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda include:  The Jihad Organization of Jordon; The Pakistani 
Al-Hadith Group; The Lebanese Partisans League; The Bayt al-Imam Group of Jordon; 
Asbat al Ansar (Lebanon); Harakat al-Ansar/Mujahadeen (Pakistan); Al-Badar 
(Pakistan); Talaa al Fath; The Groupe Roubaix (Canada/France); Harakat ul Jihad 
(Pakistan); Jaysh-e-Mohammed (Pakistan); Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI/Pakistan); 
                                                 
6 According to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), it is estimated that approximately  
100, 000 individuals from around the world passed through Al Qaeda training camps (Bell, 2005, pg. 110).  
7 According to Mohammed Mansour Jabrah, a Canadian citizen and highly trained Al Qaeda operative who 
personally met with Osama bin Laden and other key individuals in the Al Qaeda organization, Al Qaeda 
has a membership of approximately 3, 000-4, 000 dedicated members who have pledged allegiance to 





Hizballah (Lebanon); Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; The Jihad Group of Bangladesh; 
The Jihad Group of Yemen; Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Pakistan); Lebanese Partisans Group; 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines); The Partisans Movement (Kashmir); Abu 
Sayyaf (Philippines); Al-Ittihad (Somalia); Ulema Union of Afghanistan; Takfir wal 
Hijra (Algeria, Egypt); Jemaah Islamiya (Indonesia); the Armed Islamic Group (Algeria); 
Ansar al-Islam (Iraq); and the Islamic Army of Aden (Yemen) (Williams, 2002, pg. 81-
82; Schanzer, 2004, pg. 25; Singh, 2004, pg. 47)8.  As the geographically and spatially 
dispersed character and informal relationship of Al Qaeda and its affiliates conveys, Al 
Qaeda and its affiliates represents a heterogeneous, fragmented, “decentralized network 
structure” (Jordon and Boix, 2004, pg. 2) with a rather wide constellation of Islamist 
extremist/terrorist organizations that exist in a transnational imagined community that is 
composed of individuals oriented on the same ideological trajectory and who respect no 
boundaries or frontiers—imagined religious (Islamist) community par excellence.  In 
fact, “the peculiarity of this organizational scheme increases Al Qaeda’s [and its 
affiliates’] efficiency, makes it less vulnerable to being decapitated, and gives it a greater 
chance to [further] spread world wide” (Jordon & Boix, 2004, pg. 2).    
 The psychological architecture that supports Al Qaeda and the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist constituency provides the ideological space necessary for the 
development of the Islamist imagined community.  As Jordon and Boix suggest, unlike 
terrorist groups like Hamas, IRA, LTTE, ETA or FARC, for Al Qaeda nationality and 
ethnicity are not important factors in the Islamist extremist/terrorist transnational 
network.  Rather, Al Qaeda derives its ideology from a combination of elements:  
                                                 
7 Several of the groups identified in this list were designated Middle Eastern Al Qaeda affiliates as outlined 
in U.S. Executive Order 13224 (23 September 2001)—Blocking Property And Prohibiting Transactions 





Muslim traditions; radical Islamist writers such as Qutb and Faraj; the 
personal interpretations of Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda members; 
and the special demands of different groups and individuals drawn into the 
network.  It thus forms a generic ideology, which might be taken up by 
anyone from any country or ethnic group.  (Jordon & Boix, 2004, pg. 2) 
An important dimension in creating and sustaining the Islamist imagined community 
and the transnational and internationalized space they occupy is disseminating their 
particular ideology to the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency.  Using Anderson’s 
theoretical precepts regarding the imagined communities made possible by print-
capitalism as an interpretive template, I argue that the imaginings generated by print-
capitalism, the development of a language-of-power, and the pirating of the national 
print-language template model have made the emergence of the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist imagined community possible. 
 Print-capitalism, although significantly transformed because of various 
technological advancements e.g. World Wide Web, Satellite communications, and mass 
media, still serves an invaluable function in unifying and mobilizing people, and 
advancing a particular collective ideology and identity and subjectivity.  Whereas 
previously the Qur’an was untranslatable from its original Arabic, and consequently 
limited who had access to its teachings, print-capitalism and its related technological 
advancements, have enabled translated copies of the Qur’an and its various Islamist 
interpretations to reach audiences of varying vernaculars, nationalisms, and political and 





by various spiritual leaders and ideologues have positioned this ‘sacred’9 language-of-
power as an international instrument, used to influence and consolidate people into an 
imagined community irrespective of geopolitical, political, cultural, and socio-economic 
boundaries.  Advanced communication technologies have rendered territoriality and 
temporality relatively meaningless.  Consequently, technological advancements have 
provided the foundation for a transnational space where the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
teachings of Sayyid Qutb, Osama bin Laden, and other fervent and zealous ideologues 
can disseminate their ideologies and develop a collective imagined Islamist 
extremist/terrorist community/consciousness of like-minded followers and actors, united 
like a “nation,” but without the limitations of sovereignty, nationalism, and nation-ness.  
Although the delivery mechanism is instrumental and integral to the development and 
growth of the transnational Islamist extremist/terrorist imagined community, more 
important is the actual message and information being delivered and communicated to 
this constituency.  After all, the message and information being communicated informs 
the imagi-nation of the Islamist extremist/terrorist community and its understanding of 
itself and the world that it opposes. 
  As previously stated, Al Qaeda’s Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology, and by 
proxy the Islamist extremist/terrorist groups ideologically affiliated with Al Qaeda, are 
informed by and derive their ideology from two prominent ideologues: Sayyid Qutb 
(deceased member of the Egyptian Brotherhood) and Osama bin Laden (Leader of Al 
Qaeda).  It may be obvious, but nevertheless worth stating, that there is a definite 
                                                 
9 Although the Qu’ran has been translated from its original ‘sacred’ Arabic, the teachings of the Qur’an, 
irrespective of the vernacular in which the teachings appear, are still held to be ‘sacred’ and remain a 
language-of-power.  In effect, the Qur’an itself is the sacred language-of-power and the vernacular in which 





correlation and consonance between the ideologue and the constituency/community the 
ideologue is attempting to unite and mobilize (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, pg. 75).  In this 
instance, Sayyid Qutb and Osama bin Laden are purveyors of a particular normative 
ideology and identity and subjectivity that is strategically designed to mobilize en masse 
the Islamist Umma, appeal to their values and sensibilities, and ultimately determine the 
nature of the interactions with one another and their enemies.   
 Sayyid Qutb has been identified and acknowledged as the intellectual architect of 
the modern extremist/terrorist Islamist movements, including Al Qaeda.  The French 
Arabist Gilles Kepel describes Qutb as ‘the greatest ideological influence on the 
contemporary Islamist movement’” (Zimmerman, 2004, pg. 222).  Moreover, Saad al-
Fagih, a prominent Saudi dissident, echoes Kepel’s sentiment as he describes Qutb’s 
discourse and writings as “’the most important’ for the militant Islamist movement” 
(Bergen, 2001, pg. 200). However, prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, Qutb 
was relatively unknown to the West (Zimmerman, 2004, pg. 222). 
As Zimmerman (2002) suggests, Qutb serves three important functions for 
contemporary extremist/terrorist Islamist movements: 
First, his writings provide an intellectual justification for extreme anti-
Western sentiment on a cultural as well as political level.  Second, he 
provides justification for establishing an Islamic society based on Sharia, 
Islamic Law [….] Third, he formulated a justification for overthrowing all 
world governments, including those governed by Muslims, by means of a 





It is important to mention that Qutb was significantly influenced by his experiences and 
observations during his visit and education in the United States from 1948-1951:  “Qutb’s 
outlook on the West changed dramatically after his visit to America, where he was 
repulsed by Americans’ materialism, racism, promiscuity, and feminism” (Stern, 2004, 
pg. 264).  Moreover, as Stern later continues, Qutb “saw the West as the historical enemy 
of Islam, citing the Crusades, European colonialism, and the Cold War as evidence” 
(2004, pg. 264-265).  Therefore, in order to defend Islam, as he understood it, “Qutb 
emphasized the need to cleanse Islam from impurities resulting from its exposure to 
Western and capitalist influence” (2004, pg. 265).  These cumulative experiences, 
observations, and beliefs fermented Qutb’s anti-Western fervour, and provided the 
foundation for his writings and Islamist activism.     
 Qutb returned to Egypt with “an uncompromising hatred of the West and all its 
works and promptly joined the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, which by the 1940s was 
already a significant mass movement with perhaps half a million members and which 
opposed the regime of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who took over in a 1952 coup” 
(Bergen, 2001, pg. 199).  As Bergen (2001) later identifies, “the slogan of the 
brotherhood was resounding and unambiguous: ‘The Koran is our constitution, the 
Prophet is our Guide.  Death for the Glory of Allah is our greatest Ambition’” (pg.199). 
 Within a very short period, Qutb emerged as one of the most radical and 
influential spiritual and intellectual leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (Laqueur, 2004, 
pg. 33): 
He taught that Islam was the only true religion; that all other religions and 
civilizations were barbarian, evil, and animal-like, and that any contact with 
them was to be shunned.  The West was the enemy par excellence of the 





it, there could never be peace with the West.  The struggle was not about 
territory but about truth and which truth should prevail in the world. 
(Laqueur, 2004, pg. 33) 
 
Between 1954 and 1966, Qutb, along with many other members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, spent time in prison (Bergen, 2001, pg. 199); and, while there he produced 
two of his most influential works: Fi zalal al-Quran (In the Shade of the Qur’an) and the 
tract Ma ‘alim fi’l-tariq (“Signposts on the Road”)—a text that articulates the rage and 
revolutionary zeal of the Islamist movement (Ruthven, 2002, pg. 84).  According to 
Ruthven, ““Signposts” has been usefully compared to Lenin’s What is to be Done?, the 
tract which, in combination with the Communist Manifesto (1848) of Marx and Engels, 
stoked the fires of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia” (2002, pg. 85). 
 Qutb begins “Signposts” by outlining what he believes to be the crisis not only 
facing the Muslim world, but the entire world as a whole: “Mankind today is on the brink 
of a precipice, not because of the danger of complete annihilation which is hanging over 
its head—this being the symptom and not the real disease—but because humanity is 
devoid of those vital values for its healthy development and real progress” (Qutb quoted 
in Ruthven, 2002, pg. 85).  Qutb believes his interpretation of Islam and the Qur’anic 
teachings to be the answer to humanities sordid demise and humanities ultimate and 
absolute source of salvation.  As Qutb understood it, Islam is a complete and 
comprehensive system that should govern all aspects of life and anyone who does not 
subscribe to his interpretation of the Qur’an and his Islamist ideology, whether Muslim or 
non-Muslim, in considered to be in a state of Jahiliyyah (the period of ignorance or 
paganism prior to the revelation of Islam, which is used by Islamists as a term of abuse 





(Ruthven, 2001, pg.xviii-xix)).  For Qutb, the historical Jahiliyyah exists in the present—
a historicized present—and generally defines the state of contemporary society: 
Today too we are surrounded by jahiliyya.  Its nature is the same as during 
the first period of Islam, and it is perhaps a little more deeply entrenched.  
Our whole environment, people’s beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and 
law, is jahiliyya, even to the extent that what we consider to be Islamic 
culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought are also 
constructs of jahiliyya!  This is why the true Islamic values never enter our 
hearts. (Qutb quoted in Ruthven, 2001, pg. 87) 
 
Therefore, in order to emancipate humanity from its depraved, corrupt, and un-
Islamic/un-Islamist state of existence, Qutb advocates the development of an Islamist 
revolutionary vanguard that will lead humanity and eventually attain the position of 
world leadership.  In order to achieve this lofty ideal, Qutb believes that “Signposts” will 
equip the vanguard with the tools and instruments necessary to develop and achieve 
worldwide pan-Islamist governance: 
The Muslims in this vanguard must know the landmarks and the milestones 
on the road to this goal ….  They ought to be aware of their position vis-à-vis 
this jahiliyya, which has struck its stakes throughout the earth.  They must 
know when to cooperate with others and when to separate from them; what 
characteristics and qualities they should cultivate ….  How to address the 
people of jahiliyya in the language of Islam; what topics and problems to 
discuss with them; and where and how to obtain guidance in all these matters.  
I have written Signposts for this vanguard which I consider to be a waiting 
reality about to be materialized.  (Qutb quoted in Ruthven, 2001, pg. 87) 
 
Moreover, Qutb believes that violence and conflict are justified instruments in this 
campaign against jahiliyya and the dar al-harb (these concepts are virtually synonymous 
with one another because they both refer to any space, either physical or psychological, 
that is un-Islamic/un-Islamist): “’there can be no ground for dissension or dispute among 
believing people …’.  Islam allowed Muslims to fight ‘in order to propagate the oneness 





his omnipotence’.  There could be no peace ‘by abstaining from war when there is 
oppression, corruption, despotism and denial of God’s supremacy’” (Zimmerman, 2004, 
pg. 230).  Through “Signposts” and his other works, Qutb created an ideological 
blueprint for Islamist extremist/terrorist movements. 
After his execution in 1966, Qutb was revered and extolled as a martyr by 
Islamist extremists/terrorists.  His writings were subsequently devoured by Islamists 
throughout the Muslim diaspora (Bergen, 2001, pg. 200); it is estimated that “hundreds of 
thousands, perhaps millions, of his works were printed throughout the Islamic world” 
(Laqueur, 2002, pg. 34).  As previously mentioned, Qutb’s works had a profound 
influence and impact on Al Qaeda in general and Osama bin Laden in particular. 
 Osama bin Laden, the personification of contemporary Islamist 
extremism/terrorism, is a very important ideologue and contemporary architect of the 
transnational Islamist extremist/terrorist network and movement.  Two of Osama bin 
Laden’s most notable and influential fatwas (edicts) are: the 23 August 1996 fatwa (edict) 
“Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Lands of the Two Holy 
Mosques”; and the 23 February 1998 fatwa (edict) “International Islamic Front for Jihad 
on the Jews and the Crusaders” (Williams, 2002, pg. xv-xvi).   These fatwas are 
instrumental in both mobilizing and unifying the Islamist extremist/terrorist diaspora in 
an imagined community that shares a collective consciousness and a common operational 
directive and objective. 
 In his “Declaration of War” fatwa (1996), Osama bin Laden proclaims that it is 
the duty of every Muslim, righteous (Sunni) and non-righteous (Shiite), to fight against 





the lands of the two holy mosques.  This fatwa is significant as it justifies and legitimates 
the collective use of violence and force against their perceived enemy: the Zionists and 
the Crusaders.  As this fatwa is of great importance for the development and deployment 
of contemporary Islamist extremism/terrorism, I quote a portion of this fatwa at length: 
“If there is more than one duty to be carried out, then the most important one 
should receive priority. Clearly after Belief (Imaan) there is no more 
important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land. No 
other priority, except Belief, could be considered before it; the people of 
knowledge, Ibn Taymiyyah, stated: "to fight in defence of religion and Belief 
is a collective duty; there is no other duty after Belief than fighting the enemy 
who is corrupting the life and the religion. There is no preconditions for this 
duty and the enemy should be fought with one’s best abilities. (ref: 
supplement of Fatawa).  
If it is not possible to push back the enemy except by the collective 
movement of the Muslim people, then there is a duty on the Muslims to 
ignore the minor differences among themselves; the ill effect of ignoring 
these differences, at a given period of time, is much less than the ill effect of 
the occupation of the Muslims' land by the main Kufr. Ibn Taymiyyah had 
explained this issue and emphasized the importance of dealing with the major 
threat on the expense of the minor one. He described the situation of the 
Muslims and the Mujahideen and stated that even the military personnel who 
are not practicing Islam are not exempted from the duty of Jihad against the 
enemy [….]  
 
The ultimate aim of pleasing Allah, raising His word, instituting his religion 
and obeying and pleasing his messenger (Allah’s blessings and salutations 
upon him) is to fight the enemy in every aspect and in a complete manner; if 
the danger to religion is greater than that of fighting, then it is a duty to fight 
them even if the intention of some of the fighters is not pure—i.e. fighting for 
the sake of leadership, [personal gain]—or if they do not observe some of the 
rules and commandments of Islam.  To repel the greatest of these two dangers 
on the expense of the lesser one is an Islamic principle which should be 
observed.  It was the tradition of the people of the Sunnah to join and 
invade—fight—with the righteous and the non-righteous men [….] 
 
Today your brothers and sons, the sons of the two Holy Places, have started 
their Jihad in the cause of Allah, to expel the occupying enemy from of the 
country of the two Holy places. And there is no doubt you would like to carry 
out this mission too, in order to re-establish the greatness of this Umma and 
to liberate its' occupied sanctities. Nevertheless, it must be obvious to you 
that, due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy 





light forces that work under complete secrecy. In other word to initiate 
guerrilla warfare, where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, 
take part in it….  
 
The Mujahideen, your brothers and sons, request that you support them in 
every possible way by supplying them with the necessary information, 
materials, and arms.  Security men are especially asked to cover up for the 
Mujahideen and to assist them as much as possible against the occupying 
enemy; and to spread rumors, fear, and discouragement among the members 
of the enemy forces. 
 
The regime is fully responsible for what has been incurred by the country and 
by the nation; however, the occupying American enemy is the principal and 
the main cause of the situation.  Therefore efforts should be concentrated on 
destroying, fighting, and killing the enemy until, by the grace of Allah, it is 
completed defeated.  The time will come—by the permission of Allah—when 
you’ll perform your decisive role so that the word of Allah will be supreme 
and the word of the infidels will be the inferior. (Marlin, 2004, pg. 5-7, 9-10)  
 
In a similar effort to unify Muslims in general and Islamist extremist/terrorist groups 
in specific into a real and imagined transnational community, Osama bin Laden issued a 
fatwa that was responsible for the creation and inauguration of the World (International) 
Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders—an umbrella organization designed 
to strategically amalgamate Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other previously excluded 
Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and position them in an ideological space constructed 
by a singular world view and extremist doctrine.  According to Bergen (2001), “the 
World Islamic Front is the key text that set the stage for al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks” (pg. 
95).  Because of its significance in constructing the ideological space of Islamist 
extremists’/terrorists’ world view and subsequent transnational operations and activities, 
it is worth quoting at some length:  
“The Arabian Peninsula has never – since Allah made it flat, created its 
desert, and encircled it with seas – been stormed by any forces like the 
crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its 
plantations. All this is happening at a time in which nations are attacking 





situation and the lack of support, we and you are obliged to discuss current 
events, and we should all agree on how to settle the matter [….]  
 
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is 
an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it 
is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy 
mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of 
all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in 
accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, “and fight the pagans all 
together as they fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no more 
tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah.”  
 
We – with Allah’s help – call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and 
wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah’s order to kill the Americans and 
plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on 
Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan’s 
U.S. troops and the devil’s supporters allying with them, and to displace those 
who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson [….]” (Marlin, 2004, pg. 
19-21) 
 
Osama bin Laden’s fatwas, like the works of Qutb, have been widely disseminated 
throughout the international Islamist diaspora.  However, unlike Qutb, whose works were 
initially disseminated on a regional scale because of the limitations imposed by time, 
space, and the relative limited reach of print-media, Osama bin Laden has been able to 
exploit the effects of globalization, the advancements in telecommunications and 
information technology, and the relatively instantaneous flow of information provided by 
the mass media.  Consequently, Osama bin Laden’s particular brand of Islamist 
extremism/terrorism and his works that detail his particular ideology have successfully 
breached the temporal and spatial boundaries his predecessor(s) were once, wittingly or 
unwittingly, confronted with. (However, obviously, Qutb’s works now can be circulated 
through the same channels Osama bin Laden exploits to deliver his message.)  
Although print-capitalism has evolved, in my opinion, into 





capitalism and print-languages and print-capitalism’s effect on the development and 
emergence of Anderson’s imagined communities and the modern nation have not, in 
theory, changed.  Similar to print-capitalism, information/communications capitalism 
have enabled the rise of a collective consciousness given fixity through the extremist 
ideologies of Sayyid Qutb and Osama bin Laden.  Moreover, as with print-capitalism, 
information/communications capitalism have created a unified field of exchange and 
communication through which  people of different political, cultural, and socio-economic 
backgrounds, and geographical locations and spatial positionings, can relate to one 
another and remain connected in an imagined community governed by a particular 
ideology—the Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology propagated by ideologues like Sayyid 
Qutb and Osama bin Laden.  However, whereas Anderson argues that print-capitalism 
provided the “imaginings” that enabled the emergence of a limited nation, nationalism, 
and nation-ness, I contend that print-capitalism and its corresponding 
information/communications capitalism have enabled the “imaginings” for the emergence 
and realization of an unlimited transnation, transnationalism, and transnation-ness, 
defined and/or shaped by a virtually borderless ideological geographical and spatial 
imagination. 
The diffuse transnational space Islamist extremist/terrorist groups occupy and the 
imagined communities that unify and consolidate these groups under one ideological 
umbrella enables groups like Al Qaeda and their affiliates to export their collective jihad 
around the world.  However, in addition to understanding the ‘unlimited’ geographical 
and spatial imaginings made possible through the Islamist extremist/terrorist imagined 





transnational, decentralized, and diffuse network, is to examine how groups like Al 
Qaeda structure, organize, and interact in the transnational space they occupy. 
Transnationalizing Crowds and the Constructions of Power   
 Although the ideological framework Islamist extremist/terrorist groups operate 
within is the primary vehicle for mobilizing these transnational actors and incites them to 
action, the organizational and structural forces of these groups serve an important 
strategic and tactical function in maintaining operational unity and focus, especially after 
various cells and groups have been dispersed and deployed to a selected theatre of 
operations.  One of the most important characteristics about this type of terrorist activity 
and violence is its collective mentality: “war requires group co-operation, organization, 
and approval” (Byles, 2003, pg. 210).  This co-operation, organization, and approval are 
required at the macro scale, including the entire network, and at the micro scale, 
including individual cells and groups.  Indeed, the structural and organizational dynamics 
of groups like Al Qaeda and their ideological affiliates serve as a tremendous source of 
strength and power and are necessary for the success of their operations and objectives.  
In order to access the structural and organizational space of the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist network in general and Al Qaeda in particular, and to analyse the 
physical and psychological cell/group dynamics which serve as a significant source of 
strength and power, I use Elias Canetti’s text Crowds and Power as a theoretical 
framework and interpretive mechanism. 
 “There is nothing that man fears more than the touch of the unknown.  He wants 
to see what is reaching toward him, and to be able to recognize or at least classify it” 





incisive and illuminating exploration of the human condition and the human propensity to 
form groups and crowds as a means of controlling this fear and maintaining a sense of 
power, control, and superiority.  According to Brill (2003), “[Canetti’s] experiences, 
research, and reflection led him to conclude that a foundation block of the human psyche 
rests on our impulse to come together into crowds and to extend them through time.  A 
universal fear motivates that impulse: the terror of an unknown touch that threatens 
predatory seizing, tearing, dismembering, and incorporation” (pg. 87).  As the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist movement continues to proliferate and political and cultural 
antagonisms and enmity intensify, Islamist groups and “crowds” will continue to grow 
and proliferate in an attempt to aggressively prevent an “unknown touch,” and the 
“predatory seizing,” “dismembering” and “incorporation” of the United States and the 
West.  
The organization and structure of the Islamist extremist/terrorist network, 
including individual cells and groups, represent and reveal a coterminous physical and 
psychological space that is constructed to create the effect of a unitary system of strength 
and power, both real and imagined.  However, before an analysis of the organization and 
structure of the Islamist extremist/terrorist network can be initiated, it is necessary to 
establish an understanding of the physical and psychological qualities and dynamics 
associated with groups and cells (or what Canetti terms “crowds”) and how these 





According to Canetti, there are four fundamental attributes and qualities of a 
crowd.10  The first attribute and quality of a crowd is its desire to grow.  As Canetti states, 
“there are no natural boundaries to its growth” (1960, pg. 29); the limits and boundaries 
of a crowd (cell and/or group) are always artificially constructed.  Canetti characterizes 
the growth of crowds through, what he terms, the “open” crowd and the “closed” crowd.  
The open crowd can grow indefinitely and move in any direction; however, the open 
crowd’s existence is contingent upon its continued growth.  The moment the open crowd 
ceases to grow and expand it eventually disintegrates and dissipates (1960, pg. 16) e.g., a 
riot, public protest, etc.  In contrast, the “closed” crowd “renounces growth and places it 
emphasis on permanence” (1960, pg. 17).  As Canetti continues, “the first thing to be 
noticed about it is that is has a boundary.  It establishes itself by accepting its limitation.  
It creates a space for itself which it will fill.  The entrances to this space are limited in 
number [.]  The boundary prevents disorderly increase, but it also makes it more difficult 
for the crowd to disperse and so postpones its dissolution.  In this way the crowd 
sacrifices its chance of growth, but gains in staying power” (1960, pg. 17).  Furthermore, 
the controlled space, entry, and membership of the “closed” crowd prevents or 
significantly reduces the risk of outside influences and/or individuals that may seek to 
subvert the objectives of the crowd (cell or group) from infiltrating and penetrating the 
crowd.  This is especially important if the aims, goals, and objectives of the crowd (cell 
or group) are counter-hegemonic in design and are intended to challenge and subvert a 
dominant system of political, cultural, socio-economic, and geographical and spatial 
order i.e. Islamist extremist/terrorist groups. 
                                                 
10 Although Canetti examines the physical and psychological attributes and qualities of a “crowd,” I believe 
that the same “crowd” attributes and dynamics can be used to describe Islamist terrorist groups and the 





The Islamist extremist/terrorist network and the various groups and individuals 
that comprise its membership represent the quintessential “closed” crowd Canetti 
describes.  The extremist/terrorist network, which I conceptualize as a 
transnational/globalized crowd, engendered by the creation of the World Islamic Front, 
desires to grow and expand by admitting like-minded extremist/terrorist groups and 
individuals from around the world into its space.  Like wise, individual groups like Al 
Qaeda tacitly desire growth through their recruitment of individuals into their elite ranks 
and appeals to the Muslim Umma to collectively join their jihad.  However, access to and 
membership in the network and individual extremist/terrorist groups is limited and 
strictly controlled.  For instance, “Al Qaeda is an organization composed of elites; few 
who are not capable of leadership are invited to join.  Its membership of many 
nationalities11 makes it far more able to engage in global operations, giving it the ability 
to blend in wherever its adherents find themselves” (Byman, 2003, pg. 153)—a diverse 
“closed” crowd.  Although many Islamist extremist/terrorist groups may not exercise the 
same level of sophistication and discipline as Al Qaeda, entry to the groups is still limited 
to actors who are dedicated and committed to the Islamist extremist/terrorist cause, 
whether local, regional, or global in orientation. 
                                                 
11 As stated by the Anonymous author of Through Our Enemies Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, 
and the Future of America, “Bin Laden’s organization is larger, more ethnically diverse, more 
geographically dispersed, younger, richer, better educated, better led, an more military trained and combat 
experienced than any other terrorist groups in history (2002, pg. 18).  According to Bell (2005), Al Qaeda 
is comprised of individuals from the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, North Africa, Western 
European and North American (Western) countries.  Some of these nationalities include, but are not limited 
to: Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Britain, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, United States, and the Yemen.  Moreover, 
according to Bell, in a manual seized by police in Manchester, England, the necessary qualifications and 
characteristics for the Organization’s members include: must be Muslim; committed to the group ideology; 
mature and obedient; willing to undergo the work and become a martyr; trustworthy and honest; be in good 
health and patient; intelligent, cautious, and prudent; strong observation and critical analysis skills; must 





A related quality and feature of the closed crowd is what Canetti terms the crowd 
crystals—the group within the group.  Canetti defines crowd crystals as: “the small, rigid 
groups of men, strictly delimited and of great constancy, which serve to precipitate 
crowds.  Their unity is more important than their size.  Their role must be familiar; 
people must know what they are there for.  Doubt about their function would render them 
meaningless” (Canetti, 1960, pg. 73).  Canetti goes on to state that “the crowd crystal is 
constant; it never changes its size.  Its members are trained in both action and faith.  They 
must be allotted different parts, as in an orchestra, but they must appear as a unit [.]  
Their life outside the crystal does not count.  Even where the unity is merely a 
professional one, as with orchestral players, no one thinks of their private existence; they 
are the orchestra” (1960, pg. 73-74).  Although the closed crowd and the crowd crystals 
share similar qualities and features e.g. limited entry and controlled growth, Canetti 
delineates several differences between the two assemblages of people (I include 
ideologically related organizations and/or groups/cells in this rubric).  Whereas the closed 
crowd is larger, more spontaneous, fluid, unexpected changes in behaviour amongst its 
members are always possible, and the allocation of specific and material functions is 
difficult to delegate, the crowd crystal is entirely constructed by limits and boundaries.  
Furthermore, the activities within crowd crystals are prescribed and “it remains precisely 
conscious of all of its utterances and movements” (1960, pg. 74).  Al Qaeda and its 
functionaries are a prime example of the crowd crystal. 
Not only is Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network responsible for 
precipitating the development of the World Islamic Front (a closed crowd), Al Qaeda is a 





compartmentalized hierarchy.  As outlined by Williams (2002, pg. 6) and Stern (2004, 
pg. 250), the organizational structure of Al Qaeda is as follows: Osama bin Laden (Emir 
or Leader); Chief Council to Osama bin Laden (Ayman al-Zawahiri); Consultation 
Council (Shura Council—consisting of approximately thirteen members who oversee 
various committees); The Islamic Study Committee (issues fatwas and other religious 
rulings); The Military Committee (responsible for establishing training camps and 
procuring weapons); The Finance Committee (responsible for funding operations and 
soliciting financial support through Osama bin Laden’s businesses, various international 
charities, and from individual supporters and donors); The Travel Committee 
(responsible for the procurement of travel documents and making travel arrangements); 
The Media Committee (responsible for publishing and publicizing newspapers, etc.); and 
the cells and groups dispersed internationally.  Furthermore, within the various 
committees and the cells and groups deployed regionally and internationally, there exists 
a hierarchy of commanders, managers, and cadres.  As this organizational structure 
illustrates, “Al Qaeda is remarkably bureaucratic, with myriad committees of specialists 
whose expertise ranges from military operations to publicity” (2003, pg. 147).  Although 
a hierarchical organizational structure exists within Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda functions as an 
organic unit with collective goals and objectives.  Indeed, this level of structural and 
organizational sophistication is a significant factor in Al Qaeda’s operational success, 
potency, virulence, and transnational presence.12         
                                                 
12 The Post 9/11 War on Terror in Afghanistan significantly disrupted Al Qaeda’s ‘base’ of operations and 
forced Al Qaeda to disperse throughout South Asia, the Middle East, and beyond.  However, because Al 
Qaeda and its ideological affiliates already established a strong diffuse transnational network, the Post 9/11 
War on Terror catalyzed Al Qaeda’s metamorphosis from a hierarchical organization and centralized 
network structure to a decentralized network structure characterized by “de-territorialization” (no definite 
territorial location) and “disappearance” (rather than institutional presence) (Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005, pg. 





 The second attribute and quality of the crowd is the feeling of equality generated 
from belonging to a specific crowd (cell or group).  As Canetti states, “this absolute and 
indisputable and never questioned by the crowd (cell or group) itself” (Canetti, 1960, pg. 
29).  Canetti characterizes this crowd dynamic as the discharge: “before this the crowd 
does not actually exist; it is the discharge which creates it.  This is the moment when all 
who belong to the crowd get rid of their differences and feel equal” (1960, pg. 17).  
However illusory, in effect, the individuality of the crowd (cell or group) members is 
jettisoned and the distinctions that previously defined them as individuals e.g. occupation, 
rank, socio-economic status, nationality and ethnicity, gender, etc., evaporate and 
condense into a collective organic whole with one unified identity and subjectivity.   
 The discharge of a crowd, the equanimity it portends, and the fusion of the 
individual actor with the body of a group/cell is a salient quality and dimension of 
Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations and the individual groups and cells that 
constitute the Islamist extremist/terrorist transnational constituency.  As indicated in the 
article “The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle 
Eastern Terrorists,” once a recruit is initiated into an organization there is a clear and 
irrefutable fusion of individual identity and subjectivity and group identity and 
subjectivity.  This is particularly evident among the more extremist elements of each 
organization: “as an individual succumbs to the organization, there is no room for 
individual ideas, individual identity and individual decision-making.  As this occurs, 
individual measures of success become increasingly linked to the organization and stature 
and accomplishments within the organization” (Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003, pg. 176).  
                                                                                                                                                 
institutional foundation in Afghanistan,  Al Qaeda has become more diffuse and less visible since 9/11 (pg. 





As the individual and the group fuse, personal goals and objectives become 
undistinguishable from the goals and objectives of the group.  The success or failure of 
the group becomes the success or failure of the individual and the struggle of the group 
becomes a deeply personal struggle for the individual (2003, pg. 176).   Moreover, the 
overwhelming sense of the collective that consumes the individual member serves an 
important function for the justification and substantiation of the group’s actions and 
operations: “this fusion with the group seems to provide the necessary justification for 
their actions with an attendant loss of felt responsibility for the individual member—if 
the group says it is required and justified, then it is required and justified.  If the authority 
figure orders an action, then the action is justified” (2003, pg. 176).  As the Post, 
Sprinzak, and Denny continue, “guilt or remorse by the individual is not tolerated 
because the organization does not express it.  Again this is intensified among Islamist 
groups who feel they have a religiously sanctioned justification—indeed obligation—for 
their actions” (2003, pg. 176).  In effect, the discharge and the attendant fusion of the 
individual and the group represents a transgression of boundaries, a movement beyond 
the physical and psychological limits of the Self.  A once inhibited and relatively 
powerless individual becomes an uninhibited and powerful member of an organization 
and/or a group/cell. 
 The third fundamental quality and feature of the crowd that Canetti identifies is 
density.  As Canetti asserts, “the crowd loves density.  It can never feel too dense.  
Nothing must stand between its parts or divide them; everything must be the crowd itself” 
(Canetti, 1960, pg. 29).  Moreover, as Canetti continues, “the feeling of density is 





in its physical sense—the crowd itself located in the same place and occupying the same 
space—density, as Brill suggests, “in an era of world-wide mass communications is 
easily achieved without actually needing to bring people physically together” (2003, pg. 
88).  Advanced communications technologies have enabled a sense of density to 
transcend the fixity and physicality of a particular place and space, allowing crowds 
(groups and cells) to maintain a sense of unity and closeness irrespective of geographical 
location and spatial proximity.  This is especially important for groups like Al Qaeda, 
whose diffuse and decentralized network structure depends on advanced communications 
in order to successfully plan, implement, and execute attacks against designated targets.   
 Furthermore, I argue that a sense of density and the ability to preserve density, 
physically or psychologically, real or imagined, is also achieved through what Canetti 
terms the double crowd.  As Canetti asserts, “the surest, and often only, way by which a 
crowd can preserve itself lies in the existence of a second crowd to which it is related.  
Whether the two crowds confront each other as rivals in a game, or as a serious threat to 
each other (my emphasis), the sight, or simply the powerful image of the second crowd, 
prevents the disintegration of the first” (1960, pg. 63).  Canetti continues:  
people are in physical [or psychological/ideological] proximity to their own 
kind and acting within a familiar and natural unit.  All their curiosity and 
expectation, meanwhile, is directed towards a second body of men divided 
from them by a clearly defined distance (ideological, political, cultural, etc.).  
This sight fascinates them and, if they cannot see it, they can still hear it (the 
mass-media and advanced communications technology have virtually 
disintegrated the barriers of distance and time), and all their actions turn on its 
actions and intensions.  The confrontation calls for a special kind of 
watchfulness, raising the specific density within each group.  Neither can 
disband until the other does.  The tension between the two groups exerts its 
pressure on everyone belonging to either […].  [I]f the enemy threatens them 
(real or imagined), if it is really a matter of life and death (a matter of 
perception), then the pressure transforms itself into the armour of united and 






Given the current international security and threat environment, the type of double crowd 
that is most relevant to my argument is the existence of the double crowd in war. 
Canetti suggests that “the outbreak of war is primarily an eruption of two crowds” 
(1960, pg. 72).  The declared “War on Terror” places in direct conflict and opposition the 
United States and its allies against Al Qaeda, its ideological affiliates, and the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist constituency.  However, indirectly, the War on Terror(ism) places in 
conflict and opposition two “crowds” constituted by much larger divisions and bi-
partitionings:   
there is a clear trend towards the formation of enormous double crowds, 
named after whole quarters of the globe—East and West.  These contain so 
much within themselves that there is less and less remaining outside them; 
and what there is seems powerless.  The rigidity of these opposed double 
crowds, the fascination each has for the other, the fact that they are both 
armed to the teeth and rivals for the moon, have awakened in the world an 
apocalyptic fear: war between them could be the end of [human]kind. 
(Canetti, 1960, pg. 466) 
 
For the United States and its allies, the War on Terror(ism) is a battle between Us and 
Them, Civilization and Barbarity, Freedom and Oppression, the Just and the Unjust, and 
Good and Evil.  Conversely, for Al Qaeda, its ideological affiliates, and the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist constituency, the actions of the United States and its allies have been 
purposefully and cunningly been interpreted and construed as a War on Islam.  
Consequently, the war Al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates are fighting is at once a 
perceived defence of Islam in general and a conflict between the faithful and infidels and 
apostates that threaten Islam.  The result, as I have mentioned previously, is a bi-
partitioning of the world into two “crowds”: dar al-islam and dar al-harb.  As Canetti 





to fight each other” (1960, pg. 142).  Through envisioning each other as “crowds” that are 
at war, both crowds form, in effect, a masochistic co-relationship, where the existence of 
one ensures the existence of the other, providing each other with the energy and stamina 
required to remain united in conflict over the long term (Brill, 2003, pg. 89).  According 
to Canetti, “as long as the war lasts they must remain a crowd, and the war really ends as 
soon as they cease to be one” (1960, pg. 73).  However, the nature of the War on 
Terror(ism) prohibits the dissolution of these two crowds because the goals and 
objectives of each crowd are absolute: the systematic surrender, conversion, or 
eradication of the other.  The consequence of this is two fold.  First, until the long-term 
objectives of either crowd are achieved, the existence and permanence of each crowd is 
almost certainly guaranteed.  Second, the bi-partitioned internecine war crowd creates a 
physical and psychological space where the participants in the conflict can unite in a real 
or imagined fashion and collectively fight against their common and shared enemy, while 
maintaining the density necessary for a crowd to maintain its potency. 
 The final fundamental attribute and quality of the crowd is that all crowds must 
have motives, objectives, and an overall direction.  According to Canetti, the goals, 
objectives, and direction of the “crowd” are “essential for the continuing existence of the 
crowd” (1960, pg. 29).  Canetti believes that “the crowd needs a direction.  It is in 
movement and it moves towards a goal.  The direction, which is common to all its 
members [(which includes ideologically affiliated organizations and groups)] strengthens 
the feeling of equality” (1960, pg. 29).  Canetti goes on to state that “a goal outside of the 
individual members and common to all of them drives underground all the private 





goals, objectives, and direction the crowd, including Islamist extremist/terrorist 
organizations, groups, and cells) would dissipate because their reason for existing would 
no longer serve a defined purpose.   
Jessica Stern echoes Canetti’s position on the importance of the objectives and 
direction (mission) of terrorist organizations:  
the most important aspect of the organization is the mission.  The mission is 
the story about Us versus Them.  It distinguishes the pure from the impure 
and creates group identity.  The organization’s mission statement—the story 
about its raison d’etre—is the glue that holds even the most tenuous 
organizations together [e.g. the fatwas and edicts issued by the leader of Al 
Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, which I have referred to earlier, are the equivalent 
of a mission statement for Al Qaeda’s members and its ideological 
adherents].  Without this mission statement, the organization is little different 
from an organized criminal ring. (2004, 143) 
 
However, the mission, direction, and objectives of a terrorist organization are not 
necessarily fixed and inert.  Rather, they are dynamic and can change depending on the 
circumstances a terrorist organization is confronted with: 
a professional terrorist chooses his mission carefully.  He is able to read 
popular opinion and is likely to change his mission over time.  Astute leaders 
may find new missions—or emphasize new aspects of the mission—when 
they realize the can no longer “sell” the old one to sponsors and potential 
recruits, either because the original mission was achieved or, more 
commonly, because the impossibility of achieving the mission has become 
obvious. (Stern, 2004, pg. 262) 
 
The following are examples of Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations that have 
changed their mission and objectives in response to the changing environment the 
organizations and its leaders found themselves in: 
1. Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ): The original mission of the EIJ was to change Egypt 
into an Islamist state.  However, many of the spiritual leaders and commanders 





proper infrastructure in place to achieve their objectives, Ayman al-Zawahiri, one 
of the groups leaders and chief strategists, and who is now the chief counsel to 
Osama bin Laden and purported mastermind of the September 11, 2001 attacks, 
formed an alliance with Osama bin Laden and shifted his mission from fighting 
the “near enemy” (Egypt) to fighting the “far enemy” (the West and the United 
States) (Stern, 2003, pg. 266).  As Ayman al-Zawhiri states: “The battle today 
cannot be fought on a regional level without taking into account the global 
hostility toward us” (Stern, 2004, pg. 267). 
2. Islamic Army of Aden Abyan (IAA): Primarily operating in Yemen, the IAA 
began with a domestic agenda and evolved into a terrorist organization with 
global targets.  Initially, the organization/group, under the leadership of Zein al-
Abidin, began issuing communiqués criticizing the Yemeni government’s policies 
and advocated the overthrow and dissolution of the Yemeni government.  
However, through its contacts with Al-Qaeda, its operational mandate enlarged to 
include foreign targets.  The most high-profile operation carried out by the IAA 
was the attack against the U.S.S. Cole in October of 2000.  Members of the IAA 
are believed to be fighting the United States and its allied forces in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Schanzer, 2004, pg. 76-80). 
3. Al Qaeda: Initially operating as a proxy force in Afghanistan under the name of 
the Mujahidun, its primary mandate was to fight the invading Russian forces.  
However, after the defeat of the Russian forces, the Mujahidun transformed into 





The operational activities of Al Qaeda are varied and are international in scope, 
and its presence is equally geographically dispersed.               
Incidentally, all three of these Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations are signatories of 
the World Islamic Front edict and subsequently are ideological affiliates.  Although their 
operational activities may be concerted or different, they share a collective mission and 
objective: the ultimate destruction of the West in general and the United States in 
particular.  The willingness and ability of Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations to 
change missions is indicative of a strategic resilience and versatility.  
 Although some of the goals and objectives of Islamist extremist/terrorist 
organizations may be short term—carrying out attacks on specific targets and engaging in 
conflicts in various areas around the world—an important element of their success is the 
nature of their collective mission and ultimate objective.  The nature of the goal is critical 
to the crowd dynamic and its ability to sustain itself over an extended period of time, or 
perhaps, in the instance of Islamist extremism/terrorism, even assure itself a perpetual 
existence.  According to Canetti, the nature of the goal/objective/mission can be 
conceptualized through what he terms the quick crowd and the slow crowd (my focus).   
The quick crowds have an immediate goal and are temporally short lived.  These 
crowds are conspicuous and readily distinguishable, and examples of each appear in 
every day modern-life e.g. the political crowd, the sporting crowd, the protesting crowd, 
etc (1960, pg. 30).  Conversely, the slow crowd is much different than the quick crowd in 
that the goals of the slow crowd are spatially and temporally distant.  According to 
Canetti, religious (Islamist) crowds are the quintessential slow crowd: “their goal is 





country or to another world (paradise).  Of these slow crowds we actually only see the 
tributaries [(Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations, groups, and martyrs)], for the end 
they strive after is invisible and not to be attained by the unbelieving.  The slow crowd 
gathers slowly and only sees itself as permanent in a far distance” (1960, pg. 30).  As 
Canetti later continues, the individuals that comprise the slow crowd move with great 
persistence towards their ultimate goal/objective and keep together in all circumstances 
regardless of the obstacles and the dangers that threaten them (1960, pg. 39).  Stern 
illustrates this point through an interview she conducted with an Islamist extremist/ 
terrorist.  In response to the question, “Are you afraid of fighting?, the interview subject 
responded: “’What is there to be afraid of? I pray for death every day.  During my 
studies, reading the Koran, I decided to sacrifice my life for jihad.  If I die in jihad, I go to 
paradise.  Allah will reward me’” (2004, pg. 123).  Time and space are irrelevant, so long 
as the mission and objectives/goals are eventually reached.     
 A variant of the slow crowd, which I believe pertains to the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist organizations and groups, is one that makes reference to an ultimate 
invisible goal, not immediately attainable in this life.  As Canetti explains, the invisible 
goal that this variant of the slow crowd seeks to attain is a “well-defined goal and belongs 
to the faithful alone.  They see it clearly and distinctly in front of them; they do not have 
to be satisfied with a vague symbol.  Life is a pilgrimage towards it, but between them 
and their goals stands death (1960, pg. 40).  Canetti goes on to state that for the members 
of this slow crowd “the way ahead is difficult to know, for it is nowhere marked; many 
go astray and many get lost.  But the hope of the world beyond still colours the life of the 





followers of a faith [(the Islamist interpretation of Islam is my emphasis)] belong in 
common” (1960, pg. 40).  Furthermore, as with the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
constituency, “the anonymity of this crowd is particularly impressive” (1960, pg. 40-41).  
The members of this variant of the slow crowd are not necessarily acquainted or in 
physical proximity to one another; instead, they can be geographically dispersed 
throughout various cities, countries, and regions around the world while remaining united 
in the same theological/ideological (Islamist) framework and striving to achieve the same 
collective objective and goal: sacrifice, death, and a place in paradise.  
The significance of this form of invisible goal/objective is that, regardless of the 
short-term goals/objectives that may be achieved, the slow crowd will persistently and 
relentlessly continue moving towards its ultimate aim and objective until it is achieved, 
neither recognizing boundaries of time and space nor the sanctity of their own life and 
that of others: “no concession, however great, would be enough to [assuage] or end  
bin Laden’s ‘mission’ because, unlike many previous terrorist organizations, it does not 
intend to create a state nor does it wish to introduce political reforms.  Its objective is 
metaphysical: a titanic struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ forces, in which any means can 
be used to achieve the end” (Delpech, 2002, pg. 38-39).  Therefore, the invisible 
goal/objective of the Islamist extremist/terrorist slow crowd, and for others who subscribe 
to this system of prophetic doctrine, virtually guarantees the indefinite perpetuation of 
their struggle.  So long as Islamist extremists/terrorists understand their actions, which 
are “grounded on divine truth as represented in a complex and evocative holy text” 
(Barth, 2000, pg. 59), to be in defense of Islam and sanctioned by Allah, the Islamist 





continue irrespective of the strategic and tactical successes Al Qaeda and the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist constituency achieve as a result of their conceived metaphysical 
struggle. 
 The crowd and its related fundamental qualities and dynamics create a controlled 
physical, psychological, and ideological space where the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
constituency/Umma in general and individual groups like Al Qaeda and their ideological 
affiliates remain unified as a collective organic unit.  Moreover, the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist crowd and the space it constructs and functions within systematically 
produces and fashions a uniform, homogeneous, and normative identity and subjectivity, 
which is necessary to sustain the focus and resolve required to successfully plan, 
implement, coordinate, and execute transnational operations over long periods of time in 
myriad geographical locations.   
The Islamist extremist/terrorist crowd and the dynamic physical and 
psychological space it has constructed are powerful instruments in maintaining the 
polycentric and geographically and spatially fragmented decentralized network structure 
of Al Qaeda, the umbrella organization embodied by the World (International) Islamic 
Front, and other directly or indirectly connected ideological affiliates who comprise the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency.  Indeed, the Islamist extremist/terrorist crowd 
dynamic and the strength and power it provides is especially important given that  
Al Qaeda’s base of operations in Afghanistan has been disrupted and displaced, and other 
countries, which initially may have provided Al Qaeda and other similar groups with 
provision of safe haven, can no longer provide asylum to these organizations and groups 





allies.  However, Al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates have proven their ability to adapt 
their methods and structures in response to the setbacks they have endured as a result of 
the War on Terror(ism).  While Al Qaeda and several of its ideological affiliates have 
“often drawn on several regional hubs for plotting global operations, they have proved 
willing to move these hubs, shifting responsibility from one country to another in 
accordance with changes in the security environment” (Byman, 2003, pg. 146).  As the 
Al Qaeda and the Islamist extremist/terrorist network becomes more virtual and 
geographically and spatially dispersed, the importance of the physical, psychological, and 
ideological connectivity that results from the Islamist extremist/terrorist crowd dynamic 
exponentially increases. 
 The Islamist extremist/terrorist crowd and the controlled growth, equality, 
density, and mission, goals, and objectives inherent in its structure are integral to the 
geographical and spatial imaginings required to further develop and sustain Al Qaeda and 
the Islamist extremist/terrorist transnational network.  The transnational geographical and 
spatial imaginings made possible by the Islamist extremist/terrorist crowd and the space it 
constructs and occupies are attributable, I argue, to two dimensions of the crowd: the 
physical and the virtual.  The physical dimension of the Islamist extremist/terrorist crowd 
allows individual organizations and their subsidiary groups and cells to deploy regionally 
or globally while maintaining the physical and psychological unity, force, and power the 
spatiality of the crowd generates.  The virtual dimension of the crowd encapsulates the 
entirety of the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency, regardless of geographical 
location, spatial proximity, or organization/group affiliation, and allows the constituency 





Subsequently, the physical and virtual dimensions of the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
crowd, operating in tandem, cultivate and nurture a potent and powerful geographical and 
spatial imagination that supports and informs the development, growth, and expansion of 
a progressive and dynamic transnational network that is effective, versatile, adaptable, 
and essentially limitless in geographical reach and operational capability and ambition. 
The forces of globalization and the emergence of advanced Information 
Technology and communications systems and devices are an integral element in the 
transnationalization of the Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon.  As I have briefly 
alluded to in my argument, advancements in information and communications 
technologies have significantly increased the capacity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
network to not only geographically and spatially expand and extend its presence around 
the world, but to coordinate, plan, and successfully perpetrate acts of terror and violence.  
It is to this subject that I now turn.        
Globalization, the Infosphere, and the Advance of (Islamist) Extremism/Terrorism 
 The forces of globalization consist of a complex array of processes: “globalisation 
is political, technological and cultural, as well as economic” (Giddens, 2003, pg. 10).  As 
Giddens suggests, however, the forces and processes of globalization have been 
influenced above all by developments and advancements in systems of communication 
(2003, pg. 10).  Information technologies and advanced communications systems and 
devices have revolutionized, or perhaps even radicalized, the way nations, corporations 
and institutions, and people interact.  Information technologies and advanced forms of 
communication have created a global reality that is becoming increasingly integrated, 





become a seamless and indivisible web of interconnected parts despite all the borders that 
divide its many states” (Nassar, 2004, pg. 2). Although globalization and its related 
forces will not supplant the relative power or relevance of geopolitics, the nation-state, 
nationalism, geostrategy, and geographical thought in general, the contours of 
geopolitics, the nation-state, nationalism, geostrategy, and geographical thought are 
shifting and transforming. 
 Information Technology and advanced communications systems have 
dramatically impacted the way governments, corporations, and people in general imagine 
the world in which they inhabit.  Geographical, spatial, and temporal barriers and 
boundaries have become virtually obsolete as people can instantaneously transfer, 
receive, and share information, as well as communicate with virtually anybody, at any 
time, in any location.  As a result, the technological forces inherent in globalization have 
caused a perceptual and conceptual shift in the collective geographical and spatial 
imagination of people from around the world: the world has become virtually smaller, 
and experiences and activities once thought unimaginable have become imaginable.  
Moreover, the integration, interdependence, and interconnectivity inherent in 
globalization, facilitated by advanced information and communications systems, have 
enabled governments, corporations, and people to organize and coordinate themselves in 
ways not possible before the advent of the internet, satellite communications, fiber optics, 
cellular telephones, laptop computers, and other mobile and wireless forms of 
communication: “globalisation is not incidental to our lives today.  It is a shift in our very 





Although in principle the globalization phenomenon and the geographical and 
spatial constructions and imaginings it makes possible should, in theory, benefit all 
people and have a positive impact on international political, cultural, economic, and 
social relations and cooperation—as envisaged by McLuhan’s utopian global village—
the reality is much different.  As Giddens asserts, “globalization, of course, isn’t 
developing in an even handed way, and is by no means wholly benign in its 
consequences.  To many living outside Europe and North America, it looks 
uncomfortably like Westernisation—or, perhaps, Americanisation, since the US is now 
the sole superpower, with a dominant economic, cultural and military position in the 
global order” (2003, pg. 15).  Consequently, the forces and processes of globalization—
including perceived political, cultural, and theological homogenization, increased 
economic and social inequality, and environmental degradation—have been met with 
protest, resentment, fear, anxiety, and resistance, both non-violent and violent, as 
characterized by the emergence of counter-hegemonic entities such as the anti-
globalization movement,  nationalist movements and groups, and various 
extremist/terrorist organizations and groups.                                    
The contemporary manifestation of Islamist extremism/terrorism and the resultant 
transnational network that has emerged are a result of, as much as it is a reaction to, the 
forces and processes of globalization.  Although some groups may predominantly operate 
or be engaged in conflicts in particular regions or specific countries, the transnational Al 
Qaeda network “is not guided by territorial jurisdiction—its theatre of support, as well as 
its operations, is global.  Instead of resisting globalisation, its forces are being harnessed 





world-wide” (Gray, 2003, pg. 77).  By embracing the forces of globalization and the tools 
of advanced information and communications technologies and devices, Al Qaeda and its 
ideological affiliates have been able to not only imagine, but develop, construct, and 
organize a polycentric, diffuse, and dispersed transnational network that is limited in 
reach and scope only by the limits of its own geographical and spatial imagination and 
technological sophistication.   
In addition to exploiting satellite phones and disposable cellular phones, laptop 
computers, encrypted communications and websites, internet cafes, forged passports and 
supporting documentation, and various modes of transportation for long distance travel 
for mobilizing, planning, communicating, coordinating, and escalating its capacity to 
perpetrate regional and international physical acts of terror (Gunaratna, 2002, pg. 169), 
Al Qaeda and its transnational network of ideological affiliates are using this technology 
to extend their terror operations and activities into the virtual dimension.  Not only is the 
internet and cyberspace used to extend the Islamist extremist/terrorist network, it is also a 
weapon of the network.  In effect, they are using the forces of globalization to attack the 
very systems that make globalization possible: advanced information and 
communications technologies.  Cyberspace, and its characteristic ‘placelessness’ 
(Lonsdale, 1999, pg. 139), has become a powerful strategic and tactical dimension of 
unconventional and asymmetric warfare—the virtual environment enables Islamist 
extremists/terrorists to be geographically and spatially everywhere and nowhere.  
Consequently, “the information age produces a reach and power almost unparalleled for 





The development and spread of advanced information technologies and 
communications systems has revolutionary and radical implications for the War on 
Terror.  Advanced information technologies and communications systems have not only 
empowered Islamist extremist/terrorists and other nefarious groups by enabling them to 
more effectively carry out strategic and tactical operations in conventional environments: 
land, sea, and air, but has created what can be termed a “fifth dimension”13 for strategic 
power and tactical operations—the “infosphere” (1999, pg. 139).  As stated in the text, 
“due to its ethereal nature the infosphere does not take easily to any concrete definition” 
(1999, pg. 139).  However, the infosphere can be best conceptualized as “a polymorphous 
entity where information exists and flows.  Although clearly not a medium in the same 
vein as the other dimensions of strategy, an information dimension can be identified.  
Weapons, in the form of malicious software, can flow through the infosphere, and in this 
sense the fifth dimension acts as a medium for [and space of] strategic power” (1999, pg. 
139).  As governments, corporations, and individuals increasingly rely and depend on the 
infosphere for their day to day activities, the strategic power and importance of the 
infosphere, and its subsequent attractiveness as a tool and target of terrorism, 
proportionately escalates. 
 The infosphere and the potential ability to control, disrupt, and manipulate 
information that it presents, serves as a very powerful force in operational activity and 
capability.  The infosphere can be used for intelligence gathering and dissemination; 
terrorism (my emphasis); strategic warfare; symbolic raids; small wars; political and 
cultural warfare; economic warfare; logistical support; interdiction; and in the direct 
                                                 
13 As outlined in the text edited by Gray & Sloan, there are four conventional dimensions of strategic 
power: sea, land, air, and space.  However, according to the contributing author of the text, Information 





support of conventional and unconventional warfare” (1999, pg. 145).  Furthermore, the 
geographical and spatial flexibility and accessibility of the infosphere increases its 
potency, as it can be accessed from almost anywhere at anytime in order to support 
individual or multiple operations and/or be used as a weapon to attack individual or 
multiple targets that rely on and are supported by the infosphere.  As groups like  
Al Qaeda become more technologically advanced and sophisticated, the use of the 
infosphere (fifth dimension) as a strategic and tactical space and weapon will grow (Gray, 
2003, pg. 83). 
Terrorism is an invasive enterprise that seeks to penetrate, exploit, and terrorize 
any space that is available to advance its cause and message.  As Susan L. Cutter, 
Douglas B. Richardson, and Thomas J. Wilbanks note in their text, The Geographical 
Dimensions of Terrorism: “Terrorists (and terrorism) seek to exploit the everyday—
things that people do, places that they visit, the routines of daily living, and the 
functioning of institutions.  As previously stated, terrorism in general and Islamist 
extremist/terrorism in particular is an adaptive threat which changes its target, timing, and 
mode of delivery as circumstances are altered” (2003, pg. 2).  Ironically, Islamist 
extremism/terrorism has adapted to the information age and has infiltrated the fifth 
dimension; consequently, the infosphere has created a digital battlefield where 
extremists/terrorists are using  “bites” as well as bombs and bullets to attack the 
technologically advanced United States and the West: “the soldiers (terrorists) in this war 
are invisible figures buried deep inside [computer systems and networks], ‘hacking’ there 
way into computers in enemy territory” (Nacos, 2002, pg. 106).14 
                                                 
14 According to Gray (2003), Zapatista Rebels in Mexico have used the infospace to disrupt financial 





 The Internet/information highway/World Wide Web (www) is a pervasive 
information network that has a powerful ability to communicate mass amounts of 
information and is precisely why the Internet is assuming a growing role in the “terrorist 
calculus” (Nacos, 2002, pg. 105).  Nacos notes that the “World Wide Web proves to be 
an ideal vehicle for terrorists to send their messages to the world during and after their 
violent actions” (2002, pg. 105).  Terrorists can send messages to each other and their 
supporters or sympathizers, send messages to their enemies, and provide information 
about their cause and motivations to neutral people and organizations by email, websites, 
chat-rooms, web-casts, etc., and all of this can be done at a relatively low cost and with 
minimal levels of risk: “the World Wide Web has become a very effective propaganda 
instrument since it allows terrorist organizations to spread their message globally by 
providing background information and updated information about their struggle” (Valeri 
and Knights, 2000, pg. 16).  Cyberspace has created a vehicle for terrorists to “publicize 
their own propaganda” (Nacos, 2002, pg. 104).  Moreover, “terrorists are using these 
technologies in the same way they have exploited the telegraph, telephone, radio, and 
television” (Valeri and Knights, 2000, pg. 16). 
  Extremist/terrorist attacks perpetrated in or via the infosphere and cyberspace can 
potentially cause serious and detrimental impacts to the critical physical and information 
infrastructures post-industrialist societies, like the United States and the West, are 
increasing becoming dependent upon. Extremists/terrorists can sabotage the operations of 
information systems and networks, thereby, depending upon the target, cause myriad 
problems.  The infosphere and cyberspace could be used to severely damage or impact 





or shut down power grids, disrupt telecommunications and transportation routes, and alter 
environmental control mechanisms at water treatment facilities, sewage plants, etc.  As 
well, the infosphere and cyberspace could be used to perpetrate acts of physical violence.  
In the article, “Weapons of Mass Disruption and Terrorism,” Bunker lists several possible 
scenarios that a computer and cyber-terrorism could be used to perpetrate.  Some these 
examples and scenarios include: 
• Attack the next generation of air traffic control systems, cause two large 
civilian aircraft to collide, causing a mass casualty incident. 
• Remotely set-off a series of conventional bombs, or Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, strategically placed to cause mass casualty and [physical and 
information] infrastructure disruption/destruction. (Bunker, 2000, pg. 40). 
What these examples indicate is that the potential destruction/disruption that an 
extremist/terrorist could cause includes a vast stratum of scenarios that appear to be 
limited only by the extremists’/terrorists’ level of technological sophistication and 
imagination. 
In a world that is increasingly becoming more dependent on technology, 
extremists/terrorists will continue to become more technologically proficient and 
sophisticated and will utilize and exploit the infosphere and cyberspace to carry out their 
nefarious and clandestine campaigns of violence: “considering the reach of the World 
Wide Web—the unfettered content of and access to its sites, and the opportunities for 
propaganda, recruiting, and fundraising—Internet utilities confirm that the Web of hate 





propaganda of extremists and in the terrorist schemes of tomorrow” (Nacos, 2002, pg. 
127).  
Where terrorism perpetrated in or through the infosphere and cyberspace and 
traditional terrorism converge, what emerges is a hybridized form of extremism/terrorism 
and terrorist strategies, tactics, and weaponry.  Hybridized terrorists organizations and 
networks, like Al Qaeda, can utilize both traditional forms of terrorism e.g. bullets and 
bombs, and infosphere/cyberspace based acts of terrorism e.g. “bites” and “electrons” in 
terrorist campaigns and attacks, which, as a consequence, could dramatically enhance the 
impact threshold of a terrorist attack and can cause significant damage to both critical 
physical and information infrastructures simultaneously.  As Bunker states: “weapons can 
be combined in what has been termed a hybrid attack or hybrid threats which combine 
modes of attacks as a force multiplier/disruption enhancer, as in the case of a 
conventional power plant bombing taking place in tandem with an information attack on 
electric transmission, distribution, and/or control systems” (2000, pg. 44).  This method 
of terrorism is conceivable given the rapidity of terrorists to assimilate new strategies and 
tactics for carrying out their operations.  The hybrid terrorist—a combination of the 
conventional and digital/cyber terrorist—is on the avant-garde of an emerging terrorist 
class that use both physical (human) space and the infosphere (digital space) to exploit 
and attack their perceived enemy.   
 The Infosphere and cyberspace are e-merging as spaces of terror.  Cyber-terrorism 
is a virus that will continue to grow and proliferate, transforming the body of terrorism in 
general and Islamist extremism/terrorism in particular into a cybernetic entity that could 





 The advanced technological forces of globalization and the strategic and tactical 
importance of the infosphere and cyberspace have revolutionized and radicalized not only 
the geographical and spatial imagination of the Islamist extremist/terrorist network, but 
has revolutionized and radicalized the geographical and spatial relationships of the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist network.  Advanced forms of Information Technology and 
communications systems have enabled the Islamist extremist/terrorist network to assume 
an organization structure that is both physical and virtual in nature.  Consequently, the 
geographical and spatial barriers that once inhibited or prevented this network from 
effectively and forcefully mobilizing beyond the borders of particular countries or 
regions have virtually dissipated.  The result is the development of a powerful diffuse 
transnational network that is virtually borderless and barrier free.  As illustrated through 
the numerous successful terrorist strikes preceding and following the monumental attacks 
of September 11, 2001, in various geographically dispersed locations, the “fifth 
dimension” has significantly enhanced the international virulence and capacity of Islamist 
extremism/terrorism.           
I have argued that the geographical and spatial imaginings made possible through 
the imagined community, the dynamics of the crowd, and the forces of globalization have 
constructed a space that has significantly enhanced the ability of Al Qaeda, the World 
(International) Islamic Front, and other Islamist ideological affiliates to develop a 
transnational organizational style and dynamic that is on the avante garde of 
organizational structures today—a network of networks (Stern, 2004, pg. 279).  
According to Stern, this network of network includes hierarchical structures; resisters 





logistical or monetary support in return for participation in operational activities; and 
free-lance agents—Richard Reid, the convicted “shoe bomber,” who attempted to blow 
up a plane—who may or may not be associated with any group affiliated with the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency/Umma (2004, pg. 279).  The network as a whole 
and its sub-networks, as previously stated, are predominantly united by their common 
mission; however, some groups, like Hamas, Hezbollah, Moro Islamic Front, Jemmah 
Islamiah, and the GIA, may pursue multiple missions e.g. locally oriented, nationally 
oriented, or regionally oriented agendas that may be of little interest to other members of 
the network (2004, pg. 279).   
The result of this diverse, varied, and dynamic organizational style is the 
development of a resilient cluster system that varies in size and complexity.  As Stern 
states, “with each cluster, every node is connected to every other node in what is known 
as an “all channel” network.  But only certain members of the cluster communicate with 
other clusters, and the ties between clusters are weak, to minimize the risk of penetration” 
(2004, pg. 271).  Moreover, this decentralized organizational style and the tightly 
controlled communication between nodes reduces the risk of the entire network 
collapsing if one or several clusters or nodes are infiltrated or apprehended while 
operating in a law-enforcement rich environment.  Unlike the static nation-state, the 
dynamic international/transnational organizational structure of the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist network of networks makes locating, situating, personifying, and 
identifying it much more difficult.  Instead, the Islamist extremist/terrorist network of 
networks can only be located and identified in sequence, one site of violence and/or 





established superstructure may increase the efficiency and capacity of a network, this 
system increases the resilience, effectiveness, and ability of the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist network of networks to carry out surreptitious international operations 
without detection and subsequent impunity. 
 The transnational Islamist extremist/terrorist network of networks, and its ability 
to penetrate geographical, spatial, political, cultural, and social barriers, represents an 
undeniable threat to sovereign power and its ability to protect its citizens and national 
interests.  As Andreas states in his article entitled “Redrawing the Line: Borders and 
Security in the Twenty-First Century:”  
The close links between territory and the state are breaking down….  In the 
political realm … authority is simultaneously being relocated upward toward 
supranational entities, sideward toward transnational organizations and social 
movements, and downward toward sub-national groups and communities….  
These shifting tendencies are diminishing the competence and effectiveness 
of states and rendering their borders more porous and less meaningful. 
(Andreas, 2003. pg. 80) 
 
Consequently, the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency and its network of networks 
are assuming a power that once was reserved for the sovereign nation-state.  Whereas 
sovereign nation-states historically had the power to: execute people; grant life or death; 
pass laws which increased the freedom of some and reduced the freedom of others; to 
control its borders and the people entering its sovereign territory; declare war on other 
sovereign nations; sanction, under the auspices of war, mass scale killing and high-scale 
casualty rates; and carry out the destruction of physical infrastructure and landscapes; the 
transnational Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency/Umma, through their mode of 
organization and action, has the ability and the power to make these decisions (Milbank, 





transformed by the geographical and spatial forces of the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
constituency and its diffuse transnational network structure.  
The codifications once associated with the sovereign nation-state and its related 
national imaginings are eroding.  As a result, the codifications of belonging are being 
contested and are forcing new interpretations of identity and subjectivity, especially as 
the codifications relate to organizations and individual actors who understand themselves 
to occupy an ideological space that transcends and exists beyond the borders of any 
particular geographical, geopolitical, and national unit (Delanty & O’Mahony, 2002, pg. 
171).  The Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency and its related network of networks 
signify the rise of a recalcitrant and intractable force that occupies a space that is both 






























(Dis)Locating the Islamist Extremist/Terrorist Subject 
 
In the wake of September 11, 2001 the need to identify and understand the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist subject has become a matter of urgency.  Speaking of and 
analysing Islamist extremists/terrorists as actors participating only in conflicts in a "far 
off country and between people of whom we know nothing" (Segaller, 1986, pg. 7) is no 
longer tenable; the theories and analysis that emerge must engage terrorism and the 
terrorist actor as a force that has penetrated and infiltrated “Western” society and culture.  
A critical understanding must be established with regards to how “they” operate “here.”  
However, what does “here” mean?  The term “here” certainly denotes a place, a position, 
a location, indeed a space—physical and/or psychological and/or social.             
 For the purpose of my analysis, I focus on the events of September 11, 2001, and 
the purported Islamist terrorist group that is responsible for this tragic attack: Al Qaeda 
and the leader of the organization, Osama Bin Laden.  In particular, I examine the 
cultural “space” an Islamist extremist/terrorist organization/cell or individual actor 
occupies after successfully infiltrating and penetrating the borders of the “West” in 
general and North America in particular. 
 My (dis)locating of the “cultural” space—identifying and (de)constructing 
“here”—of an Islamist extremist/terrorist consists of three movements.  Using a 
Bhabhabian post-colonial theoretical trajectory and Soja’s concept of “Thirdspace,” I 
explore how the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject occupies the liminal thirdspace 
between the Dominant/Other or Subject/Object, resulting in a hybridized 





identification through cultural mimicry.  In the second movement, I utilize the Butlerian 
concept of performance to analyse how the hybrid identity/subjectivity of a terrorist is a 
cultural performance, and that the identity and subjectivity of an extremist/terrorist 
manifests and are realized through committing/perpetrating an actual terrorist act.  
Finally, I discuss the phenomenon of suicide bombing/martyr operations, and argue that 
suicide bombing/martyr operations represent the absolute identity and subjectivity of 
Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations and the individual extremist/terrorist actors.   
(De)Constructing a Third Space: the Liminal, the Hybrid, and the Mimic Man 
 In order to begin to construct the liminal thirdspace that the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist subject occupies and to develop an understanding of the identity and 
subjectivity that emerges from that space, it is important to explain the processes of 
cultural assimilation that the terrorist undergoes upon entering Western Society (the 
United States in my focus).  The terrorist subject must transgress the cultural boundaries 
(real or imagined) that exist between the Dominant/Other and the Subject/Object, and 
occupy a space that is 'in-between' these dichotomous binaries in order to remain 
undetected and effectively invisible to the Dominant.   
The Islamist extremist/terrorist, upon penetrating and infiltrating Western society, 
in effect becomes the archetypal postcolonial subject and actor:  
Whereas both colonial and counter-colonial configurations operate in the 
 medium of division and conflict, the postcolonial is generally associated with 
a more consensual, more harmonious domain of 'multiple identity, travelling 
theory, migration, diaspora, cultural synthesis, and mutation. 
The [terrorist], [like the] postcolonial, is an open-ended field of discursive 
practices, characterised by boundary and border crossings. […] Nothing is so 
typically and so insistently postcolonial as the refusal of all binaries. 





The Islamist extremist/terrorist subject uses cultural synthesis and cultural transformation 
as a strategy and a tactic to deconstruct the antagonistic binary systems that help identify 
the extremist/terrorist subject as Other.  The terrorist moves in-between the 
Dominant/Other and Subject/Object and occupies a liminal cultural thirdspace. 
 In order to further understand what the liminal thirdspace is, it is important to 
establish definitions of the terms liminal and thirdspace.  The term liminal is defined as: 
"namelessness, absence of property, nakedness or uniform clothing, transvestitism, sexual 
continence, [heterogeneity], minimized distinctions of sex, [race], rank, and wealth, 
humility, obedience, and silence" (Makaryk, 1993, pg. 578).  It is the space of the 
"dislocation and confusion of identity" (pg. 579).  By occupying the liminal space 
between the Dominant/Other and the Subject/Object, the terrorist subject becomes an 
indeterminate and mutable figure who does not readily align with the Dominant or the 
Other, or the Subject and the Object, and, therefore, assumes a position of unrecognizable 
and unnoticed otherness.   
 The liminal space between the Dominant/Other is a thirdspace where “Western” 
(Occidental) and the “Eastern” (Oriental) cultural hegemonies converge, and what 
emerges is the in situ counter-hegemonic identity and subjectivity of the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist subject.  In this liminal cultural thirdspace, the extremist/terrorist 
subject temporarily assimilates and exhibits the characteristics, ideologies, and values of 
both the West (Dominant) and the East (Other), which results in the identity and 
subjectivity of a terrorist becoming a cultural hybrid production: 
The stairwell as liminal space, in-between the designations of identity, 
becomes the process of symbolic interaction, the connective tissue that 
constructs the difference between upper (Dominant) and lower (Other), and 





thither (they) of the stairwell, the temporal movement and passage that it 
allows, prevents identities [and subjectivities] at either end of if from settling 
into primordial polarities.  This interstitial passage between fixed 
identifications opens up the possibility of a cultural hybridity [.] 
(Bhabha, 1994, pg. 4) 
 
Similar to liminality, the concept of thirdspace conceptualizes identity as 
occupying a space that is “unstable, shifting, multiplicitous, situational, refractory, 
hybridizable, always being negotiated and contested, never static or fixed” (Soja, 1996, 
pg. 113).  However, unlike liminality, thirdspace is not just a position or a space that one 
benignly occupies, thirdspace, as Soja suggests, is a space of political and cultural choice 
and agency: “[a] site where one’s radical [identity] and subjectivity can be activated and 
practiced in conjunction with the radical [identities] and subjectivities of others” (1996, 
pg. 99)—“others” in this context refers to Islamist extremist/terrorists: figures who 
consciously situate themselves in a marginal spatial matrix where resistance, struggle, 
dissent, and subversion are covertly nurtured and eventually deployed.  Therefore, to 
actively occupy and appropriate thirdspace is necessarily a counter-hegemonic political 
and cultural act where one “works toward a multiple, pluralized, and radical [self-
reflexive] conceptualization of agency, identity [and subjectivity]” (1996, pg. 91), 
contesting “existing power relations at the source” (1996, pg. 89)—from within the 
Dominant system.   
 Before continuing, I believe it is prudent to provide a more elaborate definition 
and conceptualization of thirdspace and its theoretical precepts, especially as it relates to 
the spatiality of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject/actor.  According to Soja, “in its 
broadest sense, thirdspace is a purposefully tentative and flexible term that attempts to 





appearances, and meanings” (1996, pg. 2).  Moreover, Soja suggests that thirdspace “is a 
space where issues of race, class, and gender (to this list I add varying political, cultural, 
and religious ideologies) can be addressed simultaneously without privileging one over 
the other; where one can be Marxist and post-Marxist, materialist and idealist, 
structuralist and humanist, disciplined and transdisciplinary at the same time” (1996, pg. 
5).  Soja continues, “thirdspace itself […] is rooted in just such a recombinational and 
radically open perspective” (1996, pg. 5).  Soja attempts to open up a new space of 
critical thinking and discourse, where he challenges the spatial imagination and attempts 
to open it up to “ways of thinking and acting politically that respond to all binarisms, to 
any attempt to confine thought and political action to only two alternatives, by 
interjecting an-Other set of choices” (Soja, pg. 5).  Thirdspace is a mode of thinking that 
seeks to transcend the ontological, epistemological, and theoretical boundaries of 
modernist cultural-political binaristic logic engendered by essentialist, reductionist, and 
totalitizing dualisms: We/They, Us/Them, Dominant/Other, Subject/Object, West/East, 
Occident/Orient, Civilized/Barbaric, Progression/Regression, Modern/Primitive, etc.  
Thirdspace, as a radical postmodern perspective, deconstructs and subsequently 
reconstructs and restructures the bifurcated modernist mode of knowledge formation, and 
attempts to expand the way one understands, perceives, and conceives space and 
spatiality—an Other set of choices.  However, it is important to note that concept of 
thirdspace does not advocate the dissolution of binary logic, but, rather, reaches beyond 
the limits of the identities and subjectivities entrenched within this ontological and 
epistemological system, “renewing its strengths and shedding its weaknesses” (1996, pg. 





spatial imagination that is necessary for the development and conceptualization of a 
radical/extremist/hybridized postmodern cultural-politico identity and subjectivity: 
“thirding introduces an “other-than” choice that speaks and critiques through its 
otherness.  That is to say, it does not derive simply from an additive combination of its 
binary antecedents but rather from a disordering, deconstruction, and tentative 
reconstitution of their presumed totalization producing an open alternative that is both 
similar and strikingly different” (1996, pg. 61)—almost a new space, but not quite. 
 As previously stated, Soja (de)constructs and (re)constitutes thirdspace through 
revising and reevaluating particular ontological and epistemological assumptions.  Soja 
utilizes two “trialectic” models, a base and a superstructure to use Marxian terms, to 
develop thirdspace into something at least linguistically concrete (a brief encounter with 
these models will help further develop the concept of thirdspace).  The first trialectic 
model is an ontological model.  According to Soja, “the trialectics of being” are 
constituted by Historicality (the Historical), Spatiality (the Geographical), and Sociality 
(the Social): Historicality-Spatiality-Sociality: “although primarily an ontological 
assertion, the trialectics of Spatiality, Historicality, and Sociality (summary terms for the 
social production of Space, Time, and Being-in-the-World) apply at all levels of 
knowledge formation, from ontology to epistemology, theory building, empirical 
analysis, and social practice (1996, pg. 71).  Soja maintains that there has been a 
persistent tendency over the last half century to “over privilege” the dynamic relations of 
Historicality and Sociality, which has resulted in the marginalization of Spatiality as a 
critical component of ontological investigation and theory.  Subsequently, Soja’s 





“involves the reassertion of Spatiality against this pronounced tendency in Western 
philosophy, science, historiography, and social theory (including its most critical 
variants) to bifocalize on the interactive Historicality and Sociality of being” (1996, pg. 
71).  Consequently, the trifocalizing of Soja’s thirding-as-Othering establishes the 
foundation for an epistemological orientation that (re)positions Spatiality not only as a 
primary dimension of the geographical imagination, but as a primary tool for the critical 
analysis of political and cultural spaces—real and imagined. 
 The second trialectic model is an epistemological model and provides a 
framework for the trialectics of Spatiality.  According to Soja, Spatiality consists of three 
dimensions: Perceived/Physical space (Firstspace); Conceived/Psychological space 
(Secondspace); and Lived/Social space (Thirdspace).  However, as Soja asserts: 
No one of the three forms of spatial knowledge is given a priori or ontological 
privilege, but again there is a strategic privileging of the third term, in this 
case Thirdspace, as a means of combating the longstanding tendency to 
confine spatial knowledge to Firstspace and Secondspace epistemologies and 
their associated theorizations, empirical analyses, and social practices. (1996, 
pg. 74)  
 
Similar to the emphasis on the bifocalization of Historicality and Sociality in the past, 
Soja suggests that the Firstspace-Secondspace dualism has predominated spatial modes of 
thought and discourse.  Through introducing Thirdspace into the spatial mode of 
discourse, Soja deconstructs and reconstitutes the Firstspace-Secondspace duality—
thirding-as-Othering: “such thirding is designed not just to critique Firstspace and 
Secondspace modes of thought, but also to reinvigorate their approaches to spatial 
knowledge with new possibilities heretofore unthought of inside the traditional spatial 
disciplines” (1996, pg. 81).  Thirdspace opens up a landscape of possibilities that does 





epistemological frame to include a Thirdspace epistemology that generates an 
epistemological imbalance that challenges the traditional spatial modes of knowledge 
production and analysis. 
 Now that a comprehensive and robust definition and conceptualization of 
Thirdspace has been established, I will discuss how Thirdspace lends itself to the 
theorization and interpretation of the spatiality (my focus is on the cultural and political 
spatiality) of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject.  Thirdspace, or the thirding-as-
Othering, (de)constructs a site/space of resistance that rejects the systematic encoding 
processes embedded within a dominant symbolic order that traditionally codifies cultures 
using a dichotomous system of binary logic e.g. Dominant/Other, We/They, Us/Them, 
etc.  Thirdspace opens up a new space of ontological and epistemological possibilities, a 
space not outside of the binary system but within it.  Thirdspace enables the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist subject to occupy a counter-hegemonic cultural space that is at once 
mutable, metamorphic, adaptable, heterogeneous, pluralistic, and, as stated above, 
hybridized.  As the hegemony of the Dominant system seeks to identify the Other in 
symmetrical terms (systemic binaries), Thirdspace enables a hybridized asymmetrical 
cultural position to emerge “in-between” these polarized dichotomous binaries.  This 
assertion is echoed by Bhabha: 
All forms of culture are continually in a process of hybridity.  But for me, the 
importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original moments from 
which the third emerges, rather hybridity is the “third space” which enables 
other positions to emerge.  This third space displaces histories that constitute 
it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are 
inadequately understood through received wisdom [….]  The process of 
cultural hybridity gives rise to something different, something new and 
unrecognizable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation. 





Consequently, the “new and unrecognizable” asymmetry of Thirdspace, figuratively and 
literally, enables the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject to assume and maintain a 
hybridized radical identity and subjectivity that resists traditional modes of codification 
and identification.  The result, as will be elaborated upon later, is the emergence of a 
performative space of resistance and subversion where the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
subject can plan and execute their activities both within and without the Dominant 
system—asymmetrical/hybridized cultural and political terror.  
 In the liminal cultural Thirdspace, the Islamist terrorist subject/actor occupies a 
position with the productive capacity to actively nurture the processes of cultural and 
political hybridity and mimicry.  That is, the provenance of Thirdspace enables the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist subject/actor to reconstitute or re-present themselves as an “in-
between” translation of the cultural and political politics of polarity and its related 
inscriptions and articulations.   
I will now move on to discuss the significance of the cultural and political 
mechanisms of hybridity and mimicry, and their importance in understanding the 
processes the Islamist terrorist subject/actor undergoes in a liminal cultural Thirdspace.       
The hybridization of the extremist/terrorist subject results in the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist subject becoming a 'double' self with "doublevoicedness" (Bakhtin, 
1981, pg. 429): "hybrids can be read as belonging simultaneously to two or more 
systems" (1981, pg. 429).  The hybridized extremist/terrorist subject becomes a 
confluence of the Dominant (West) and the Other (East), exhibiting, as stated above, 
qualities and characteristics of both cultural systems, thereby, in effect, becoming a third 





extremist/terrorist subject represents a site of vacillation between the Dominant and the 
Other, and this constant movement between these two cultural systems represents "the 
idea of culture-in-action, of culture growing within the [terrorist] like a new organ" 
(Artaud, 1958, pg. 8).  The liminal cultural Thirdspace of the hybridized 
extremist/terrorist subject is a space of agency.  The identity and subjectivity of the 
extremist/terrorist is always actively transforming “in-between” the Dominant and the 
Other—a hybridized figure.  Consequently, as a cultural hybrid production, the 
extremist/terrorist subject is never static or stable.  The Islamist extremist/terrorist actor is 
cognizant of the cultural space he occupies, and constantly and actively reacts to the 
changing conditions within this liminal cultural Thirdspace. 
The subversive power of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject occupying and 
positioning himself within a liminal cultural Thirdspace can be further explained through 
Bhabha's concept of mimicry.  Bhabha defines mimicry as "[…] the desire for a reformed, 
recognizable Other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite" 
(1994, pg. 86).  Bhabha goes on to state, "mimicry is thus the sign of a double articulation 
(double self); a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which 
'appropriates' the Other as it visualizes power" (1994, pg. 86).  Although Bhabha 
discusses mimicry in the context of colonization, and the relationship between the 
Colonizer and the Colonized, Bhabha's concept of mimicry translates well into explaining 
the Dominant/Other dichotomy because the same power relations are being described.  
The Dominant (West—my emphasis is the United States) seeks to appropriate the Other 
(East—includes country or region that is “alien” to the West), so that the Other becomes 





through, as Bhabha points out, Macaulay's Minute on Indian Education, where Bhabha 
identifies Macaulay as wanting to develop a "class of interpreters between us and the 
millions whom we govern—a class of persons Indian (Middle-Eastern, Islamic, Arabic, 
or Oriental) in blood and colour, but English (USA) in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and 
in intellect" (1994, pg. 87).  The double articulation or double self (Thirdself) that is 
created through the process of mimicry is a hybridized subject who is Other in 
appearance, but adheres and conforms to the cultural hegemony of the Dominant.  
Subsequently, through the process of mimicry, the Islamist extremist’s/terrorist's 
otherness is significantly diminished and assumes an identity and subjectivity that is 
authorized—almost the same, but not quite.  Therefore, the process of mimicry enables 
the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject to transgress the boundary of the Dominant/Other 
and open up a liminal cultural Thirdspace that is both resemblance and menace.      
Like the colonized subject, the Islamist terrorist subject/actor can use the process 
of mimicry to his advantage.  Although the Dominant (USA) has the Other assimilate and 
conform to the governing ideology in order to establish a culturally and politically 
authoritative position over the Other, the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject can use the 
Dominant's cultural hegemony against itself.  The more the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
subject resembles the Dominant, the more the watchful gaze and surveillance of the 
Dominant is displaced.  Mimicry becomes a powerful mechanism for displacing the gaze 
and surveillance of the Dominant because mimicry serves as a cultural camouflage: 
mimicry reveals something in so far as it is distinct from what might be called 
an itself that is behind.  The effect of mimicry is camouflage [….] It is not a 
question of harmonizing with the background, but against a mottled 
background, of becoming mottled--exactly like the technique of camouflage 





The Islamist extremist/terrorist, by assuming the camouflaged and mottled identity and 
subjectivity of an "authorized version of otherness (1994, pg. 88), is able to evade the 
panoptical surveillance of the Dominant and maintain the effect of invisibility and 
concealment.  The extremist/terrorist, through the process of mimicry, "is at once 
resemblance and menace (1994, pg. 86).” 
 By actively resembling the Dominant and subsequently occupying the liminal 
cultural Thirdspace, the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject is able to reverse the gaze of 
surveillance and observe the Dominant (USA): "the observer becomes the observed" 
(1994, pg. 89).  The Islamist extremist/terrorist, as the observer, "mimes the forms of 
authority at the point at which [the Islamist extremist/terrorist] deauthorizes them" (1994, 
pg. 91).  The Dominant is deauthorized and destabilized through the subversive and 
undermining act of the reversal of surveillance.  The menace of the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist subject/actor is precisely that “they” are watching “us” from within.   
 The act of observation and the reversal of surveillance empowers the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist subject because of his other ability to learn more and more about the 
Dominant, which, therefore, enables the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject, through 
cultural and political knowledge, to penetrate deeper and deeper into the recesses of 
Western Society: "the intended victim has to be watched for a certain time, his habits and 
movements studied to establish the most promising place and time for the action (terrorist 
act)" (Laqueur, 1987, pg. 93).  Furthermore, as Laqueur states, "the success of terrorist 
operations depends on reliable information about the targets to be attacked and the 
movements of the victims to be killed or abducted” (1987, pg. 109-10).  The power of 





hybridity and mimicry, provides the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject with the 
knowledge necessary to successfully adapt, resist, subvert, and attack the Dominant not 
only from outside Western political and cultural boundaries but from within them (my 
focus): “the terrorist networks rely on hidden of silent members, members so hidden and 
silent that they are not yet terrorists.  They are the “sleeper” or “dormant” terrorists who 
live among us, adopting “Western” practices of life, working, going to school, and 
generally disguising themselves as good neighbours” (Passavant & Dean, 2002, pg. 3).  
An example of this tactic is illustrated through the devastating events of September 11, 
2001.   
The nineteen Islamist extremists/terrorists who hijacked the four U.S airplanes 
and attacked the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon and crashed into a field in 
Shanksville, Pennsylvania (potentially on route to Washington, D.C) executed the attack 
after years of planning and living in Europe and the United States.  Although the attacks 
of September 11, 2001 represent the most ambitious attack planned by Al Qaeda to date, 
the events, perhaps more importantly, are significant because of the tactics and strategies 
used in order for the attacks to be successful.  The individuals who carried out the attacks 
“were not individuals who acted foolishly on the spur of the moment, but a coterie of 
several determined individuals who acted in unison to carry out a simultaneous series of 
hijackings for which they had been groomed for years” (Israeli, 2003, pg. 6).  
Furthermore, the individuals selected to carry out the attacks were not Arab Afghans, 
“but were members of another group of recruits who belonged to the Arab diaspora in 
Europe or had been educated in Europe or America” (Laqueur, 2004, pg. 58).15  
                                                 
15 The Hamburg, Germany contingent: Mohamed Atta (Egyptian), Ramzi Binalshibh (Yemeni), Marwan al 





According to Laqueur, selecting non-Afghan veterans was necessary because conducting 
operations in America and Europe required individual actors with backgrounds and 
training that were different than that offered in Pakistani and Afghani training facilities.  
In order for the operation to be successful, the Islamist recruits required the skills 
necessary to assimilate and adjust to Western society: “a higher education, a working 
knowledge of languages, and some experience with how to behave in alien societies” 
(2004, pg. 58).  Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehi, Nawaq al-Hamzi, and Ziad Jarrah, 
some of the individuals responsible for carrying out the 9-11 operation, lived in the 
United States for almost two years, took flight lessons, availed themselves of prostitutes, 
and, according to reports, drank alcoholic beverages and played video games in a bar in 
Florida.16  This behaviour, seemingly anti-Muslim, especially for individuals whose 
resolve and conviction caused them to carry out the terrorist attacks, reflects the strategies 
and tactics—a cultural schizophrenia—used to plan and execute the events of September 
11, 2001 (Ruthven, 2002, pg.10, 13, 16).  That is, occupying an authorized cultural 
position that would not arouse suspicion and displace the watchful gaze of the Dominant.  
These strategies and tactics (hybridity and mimicry) used by the Islamist 
extremists/terrorists of September 11, 2001 indicate with violent evidence the fact that 
Islamist extremists/terrorists have located a cultural space—a Thirdspace—that is beyond 
                                                                                                                                                 
various universities and preparing for jihad (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States, 2004, pg.160-164). 
16 Even before entering the United States, this group of individuals began preparing for their attack through 
making clear efforts to avoid appearing radical.  After leaving Afghanistan, they distanced themselves from 
conspicuous extremists (individuals known to espouse violent jihad who made public anti-American and 
anti-Western exhortations) in order to avoid unwanted attention.  According to the 9/11 Commission 
Report, the entire Hamburg contingent changed their appearance and behaviour.  For example, Atta wore 
western clothing (he previously dressed in traditional Arab clothing), shaved his beard, and no longer 






the symmetry of the Dominant/Other binary and have revealed its exploitative and 
destructive capabilities.                       
The Islamist extremist/terrorist subject, as someone who appears to be almost the 
same but not quite, can subvert the Dominant from within.  The extremist/terrorist uses 
mimicry as a powerful subversive mechanism; the objective for the terrorist, unlike 
Fanon's Negro, is not to become "like the white man" (Fanon, 1967, pg. 229)—resemble 
the Dominant—and be recognized as an equal, but to become almost white so as to 
become unrecognizable and attack the Dominant from a liminal Thirdspace authorized by 
the Dominant: “[The Islamist terrorist and] terrorism, like viruses, are everywhere.  There 
is a global perfusion of terrorism, which accompanies any system of domination as 
though it were its shadow, ready to activate itself anywhere, like a double agent.  We can 
no longer draw a demarcation line around [the Islamist terrorist or terrorism]” 
(Baudrillard, 2002, pg. 10). 
 The identity and subjectivity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject that is 
produced through hybridity and mimicry is not passive, but is active.  The Islamist 
terrorist subject must actively participate in the processes of hybridity and mimicry in 
order to occupy the liminal Thirdspace cultural and political position, and to maximize 
the effectiveness of this mechanism of concealment and weapon of subversive activity.  
In effect, the terrorist subject must perform and function like an actor on a stage, adapting 








The Islamist Extremist/Terrorist Theatre 
 The identity and subjectivity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject is an active 
performance. Using Judith Butler's theory of performativity, I examine the relationship 
that exists between the identity and subjectivity of the Islamist terrorist subject and 
performance.  The Islamist extremist/terrorist must perform their identity and subjectivity 
as an authorized, conforming form or otherness, and must incorporate a performance—
terrorist activity—of some form in order for their true identities and subjectivities to be 
realized and actualized. 
 Although Judith Butler model of performativity and performance relates to gender 
identity, the notion of gender identity as a performance, in its operational sense, works 
well describing the act of performing (mimicing) an identity and a subjectivity as a 
racialized Other and more specifically an Islamist extremist/terrorist Other.  As Judith 
Butler contends, the theory of performativity and its transposition to matters of race has 
been explored by scholars such as Bhabha whose emphasis on the “way minority 
identities are produced and riven at the same time under the conditions of domination” 
(Butler, 1999, pg. 192), closely correlates with her theory of performativity and gender.  
Furthermore, Butler suggests that the categories of gender and race always work “as a 
background for one another, and [that] they often find their most powerful articulation 
through one another” (1999, pg. xvi).  However, my interest in the relationship between 
gender and race is limited to the notion that identity and subjectivity, whether one is 
analyzing gender, race, sexuality, etc., is an active cultural construct and that the 
conforming identity and subjectivity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist, like gender and 





relations" (Mahtani, 2002, pg. 426).  Through performing mimicry, the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist actor superficially allows himself to be interpellated17 by the 
Dominant, and adheres and conforms to the cultural and political demands prescribed by 
the hegemony of the Dominant power structure. 
 The Islamist extremist/terrorist actor uses cultural performance to construct an 
identity and subjectivity that are an authorized version of otherness.  As an authorized 
subject of otherness, the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor is not recognized as a terrorist 
by the host community, but, rather, is recognized by the host community as an authorized 
citizen who has been appropriated by the Dominant.  The art of mimicing the Dominant 
is an active process because the Islamist extremist/terrorist must be constantly cognizant 
of his cultural and political space and react accordingly, so as to exude the appearance of 
being an authorized and acceptable form of otherness.  In effect, the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist is always in the process of "doing identity" (Mahtani, 2002, pg. 426).  
The Islamist extremist/terrorist, while situated in alien cultures i.e. the United States, is 
performing or "doing" the language, mannerisms, sensibilities, traditions, and social 
mores associated with the Dominant.  Through assuming and mimicing, indeed 
performing, the hegemonic ideology of the Dominant, the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
adopts an identity and subjectivity that is "'strategic, tactical, mobile, multifaceted, 
blurred, awkward, and ambivalent'" (2002, pg. 425).  Therefore, the identity and 
subjectivity that  
                                                 
17 “Interpellation, or hailing, is a term that is associated with the French Marxist philosopher Louis 
Althusser, who employs it as part of his theory of ideology in order to explain how ideology constitutes and 
‘centres’ subjects in the social world. […] “Althusser develops the term in order to demonstrate how 
ideology is not simply an illusion or false consciousness masking the ‘real’ nature of society but is instead a 
material system of social practices producing certain effects upon individuals and providing them with their 





emerges within the matrix of power relations is not a simple replication or 
copy of the [Dominant] itself, a uniform repetition of a [Dominant] economy 
of identity [and subjectivity].  [This cultural performance and its associated 
productions] swerve from their original purposes and inadvertently mobilize 
possibilities of “subjects” that do not merely exceed the bounds of cultural 
intelligibility, but effectively expand the boundaries of what is, in fact, 
culturally intelligible. (Butler, 1999, pg. 39) 
 
Consequently, as Gregory (2004) states, “performance creates a space for which it is 
possible for ‘newness’ to enter the world.  Judith Butler describes the conditional, 
creative possibilities of performance as a ‘relation of being implicated in that which 
one opposes, yet turning power against itself to produce alternative [cultural] and 
political modalities [of contestation]” (pg. 19).  Performance enables the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist subject/actor to assume a cultural and political identity and 
subjectivity that is both an authorized and unauthorized form of otherness that 
operates within the boundaries of Dominant cultural and political codes. However, 
through operating within the Dominant system and using its own cultural and political 
codes against itself, the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject/actor expands the cultural 
and political boundaries of the Other and simultaneously destabilizes the cultural and 
political intelligibility of the Dominant.  As a result, the performance of the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist subject creates a space where cultural and political modalities of 
contestation can be mobilized and deployed.             
The identity and subjectivity of the performative Islamist extremist/terrorist 
subject are "strategic, tactical, blurred, and ambivalent," because the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist actor assumes an identity and subjectivity that allows him to appear 
and perform one thing, while, in reality, be or perform something else: terrorists "use the 





suburbs, reading and studying with their families, before activating themselves suddenly 
like time bombs" (Baudrillard, 2002, pg. 19-20).  In a sense, and to pick up on Judith 
Butler's terminology, terrorists appear in cultural "drag" or perform a cultural 
“masquerade” (Butler, 1991, pg. 21).  These two terms are significant because drag and 
masquerade suggest two contradictory meanings.  On the one hand, drag and masquerade 
suggest that identity and subjectivity are a play of appearances.  On the other hand, drag 
and masquerade suggest that beneath the play of appearances there exists an alternate 
identity and subjectivity that precedes appearances, a fixed subject or being that promises 
to emerge and disrupt and displace the hegemonic economy of the Dominant through 
violent disclosure (Butler, 1999, pg. 60).  The Islamist extremist/terrorist actor, as 
someone who is in effect performing “drag” or participating in a cultural “masquerade,” 
exists as a cultural and social double.  The Islamist extremist/terrorist actor appears to 
possess characteristics of both the Dominant and the Other, and represents the public and 
the private, the external and the internal, the body and the mind, and appearance and 
reality—where these binaries converge, the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor emerges.   
In effect, the Islamist extremist/terrorist, as a cultural and social double self, 
performs both a public function and a private function.  The public self of the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist actor can be characterized by the external and the visible space the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist actor occupies.  In the public space, the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist actor performs the authorized and sanctioned functions, sensibilities, 
attitudes, and behaviours of otherness.  The Islamist extremist/terrorist, in effect, allows 
his body to become a site of inscription, on which the Dominant inscribes their cultural, 





cultural masquerade, reflects the cultural and sociological ideologies of the society the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist has infiltrated; therefore, the body serves as a signifier, 
signifying that the Islamist terrorist actor has tacitly assumed an authorized, Westernized 
or Americanized identity and subjectivity:  
Words, acts, gestures, and [perceived ideological acceptance] produce the 
effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this on the surface of the 
body, through the play of signifying absences that suggest, but never reveal, 
the organizing principle of identity [and subjectivity] as a cause.  Such acts, 
gestures, enactments, generally construed, are peformative in the sense that 
the essence or identity [and subjectivity] they otherwise purport to express are 
fabrications manufactured and sustained through [active and self-reflexive 
cultural inscription]. (Butler, 1999, pg. 173)  
 
The “public” self (social body) of the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor deceives the 
Dominant and conceals the subversive activities, violent tendencies, and destructive 
objectives of the Islamist extremist/terrorist group/individual actor.  Consequently, the 
body (public self) of the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor becomes a potent strategic and 
tactical weapon.  However, beneath this fabricated and manufactured identity and 
subjectivity—cultural drag and cultural masquerade—is the private self of the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist subject.   
 The “private” self of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject is what the public 
cannot physically observe: the mind, motivations, and objectives of the real Islamist 
extremist/terrorist subject.  The private self is the disaffected, dispossessed, dislocated, 
decentered, disenchanted, resolute, and highly motivated Islamist extremist/terrorist.  
Unlike the public self, the private self of the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor does not 
possess an ideological orientation that is expressible in American/Western dominant 
culture: “the unthinkable is thus fully within culture, but fully excluded from dominant 





assumes the ideology of the Dominant in order to gain further access into the cultural, 
social, and political fabric of their host nation and society—elevating acceptance as an 
authorized version of otherness.  However, the ideology that is performed and practiced 
by the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor in the public space does not function as a tool of 
representation and expression for the private self.   
The private self, like Gayatri Chakravorty Spivaks's subaltern, does not possess a 
voice or a language that can be heard.  However, unlike Spivak's subaltern, the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist subject consciously chooses not to speak in order to help maintain the 
Islamist extremist’s/terrorist's cultural, political, and social façade.  The private Islamist 
extremist/terrorist actor performs silence in order to provide a voice for the authorized 
public self.  Silence is conducive to concealment and produces the illusion of conformity, 
supplication, and subordination.  The public and private that constitute the double self of 
the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject function in a reciprocal relationship: the private 
and individual ideological space informs the public and social ideological space, and the 
public and social ideological space informs the private and individual ideological space.  
In other words, the public and private identities and subjectivities help to construct the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist subject. 
 Through performing cultural drag and masquerade and remaining effectively 
silent, the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor can position himself in a liminal cultural 
Thirdspace where the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor can plan and eventually perform 
an act of terrorism: "power is not uniform.  It takes on many forms and can be exercised 
in my different ways.  One does not have to be extremely well-armed to be powerful: one 





 The actual identity and subjectivity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor 
emerges and is realized by performing a terrorist act—the invisible enemy becomes the 
visible enemy.  Performing an act of terrorism becomes a poignant rhetorical device that 
translates into an ideology and a language of political and cultural dissent, resistance, 
subversion, and abjection.  In effect, extremist/terrorist activity and the damage and 
destruction it causes becomes an extension of the identity and subjectivity of the terrorist 
and functions as a violent language, promulgating their political and cultural position to 
the individuals, groups, and government they are attacking.  
 Terrorism and terrorist activity can appear in a multitude of forms, places, and 
spaces.  For example, terrorist activity can include kidnapping, expropriation (robbery), 
car bombs, hijacked planes, assassinations, or mass destruction.  (My focus will be on the 
destruction of the World Trade Centres on September 11, 2001.)   However, regardless of 
the type of extremist/terrorist activity, the objectives of extremism/terrorism are all 
generally related:  
Terrorist acts or campaigns have two levels of objective.  Tactically, the goal 
is publicity, and recognition of a problem or claim.  For the terrorist with a 
cause to promote, the advertisers' apocryphal saying holds true: all publicity 
is good, and bad publicity is better than none.  Terrorism without publicity is 
a weapon firing only blanks.  At the strategic level, the goal is absolute 
change—freedom, independence or revolution.   
(Segaller, 1986, pg. 11) 
 
Furthermore, regardless of how perverted the political agenda of Islamist 
extremists/terrorists and related extremist/terrorist organizations, the objectives of 
terrorism are always politically motivated and challenge existing power structures: 
"terrorism is a system-wide challenge to power, in addition to being a specific and 





pg. 39).  Consequently, for the political objectives of the Islamist extremist/terrorist to be 
made public, it is necessary for Islamist extremists/terrorists, indeed any terrorists, to 
perpetrate an act of terrorism.  Islamist extremists/terrorists eventually want to reveal 
themselves and be identified by the Dominant; subsequently, action and performance 
become an intrinsic and mandatory component of the identity and subjectivity of the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist subject. 
 Terrorist acts and activity communicate the message of the individual Islamist 
terrorist or Islamist terrorist group.  As mentioned previously, the action of a terrorist 
operates like a language and, like a language, the louder the voice the more attention 
someone commands.  For the Islamist extremist/terrorist, the decibels of the voice and the 
strength of the message being communicated are measured through the level of violence 
and collateral damage caused by an act of terrorism.  The more theatrical, sensational, 
and spectacular an act of terrorism is, the more attention they elicit, which increases the 
power and strength of the message of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject.  Violence, 
for the Islamist extremist/terrorist, is the language and the medium of communication: 
“the violence of terrorism is positively verbose: always accompanied by threats, 
communiques and manifestos, and succeeded by historical argument and political 
reaction.  First the violence, then the claim; first the blood, then the bluster.  Violence is 
the megaphone for terrorists and their claims” (Segaller, 1986, pg. 1). 
  The terrorist subject/actor uses violence as a source of power and a measurement 
of conviction: "the most feared terrorists are arguably those who are the most successful 
in translating thought into action: ruthless and efficient, demonstrating that they are able 





pg. 178).  If a terrorist or terrorist group threatens violence but does not actually commit a 
terrorist act, can that individual or group actually be codified or categorized as terrorist?  
I suggest that a terrorist must perform an act of terrorism before that individual or group 
they represent can assume the actual identity and subjectivity of a terrorist or be codified 
as a terrorist.  If terrorist threats remain idle, the threats only remain symbolic and, 
consequently, are impotent.18  However, where threats become active and violent, the 
threat and fear of terrorists becomes real and potent.  Therefore, thoughts must always be 
"translated into action" and violence.  Violence is the vehicle that turns symbolic power 
(thought) into real power (action).  In effect, action and violence bring the 
extremist/terrorist subject into being.  One is not born, but rather becomes a terrorist, and 
the process of becoming necessarily requires nascent, nefarious, and insidious actions and 
violence.  For Islamist extremists/terrorists, Rene Descartes’ statement, 'I think therefore 
I am,' becomes 'I destroy therefore I am.'  Indeed violence and "action [are] the 
undeniable cynosure of all terrorists" (Hoffman, 1998, pg. 175). 
 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the consequent destruction of the 
World Trade Centres and the damage to the Pentagon, certainly represent the apotheosis 
of contemporary Islamist extremist/terrorist activity and violence.  These attacks 
represent the movement of symbolic power to real power and the substitution of dialogue 
for literal forms of violent communication:   
the collision of the hijacked planes with the twin towers was an ugly 
metaphor of how violent confrontation has substituted for dialogue and 
meaningful communication.  Public policy, at least in theory, is presumed to 
enable such communication.  Yet, unless the United States [and the West] 
reexamines [their] foreign policies and goals, public policy will have been 
reduced to propaganda that marginalizes and dehumanizes “the other,” 
                                                 
18 Although threat of terrorism can frighten and terrorize a target population, if an actual attack is never 





consequently precluding meaningful dialogue and communication. (Andoni, 
2002, pg. 85) 
 
Don DeLillo, in his book Mao II, describes the dynamics of terrorism and the substitution 
of violence for passive discourse and dialogue in the following terms: “It’s confusing 
when [terrorists] kill the innocent.  But this is precisely the language of being noticed, the 
only language the West understands.  The way they, [the Islamist terrorists], determine 
how we see them” (DeLillo, 1991, pg. 157).  For Islamist terrorists, violence as a mode of 
expression is the only meaningful form of dialogue and communication and is 
inextricably linked to their identity and subjectivity.  John Michael reinforces this 
position in his article, “Beyond Us and Them: Identity and Terror from an Arab 
American’s Perspective.”   
In his article, Michael argues that,   
identity [and subjectivity] emerge not as an organic expression of preexisting 
traditions and timeless belief, but as a reactive formation to challenges and 
assaults perceived as external to the self and the group in question (Islamist 
terrorists).  Identity and [subjectivity] are ineluctably linked expressions of an 
inherently intercultural and conflicted process, the mark of [one’s] often-
unhappy engagement with rather than retreat from the world.  For Maalouf, 
identity [and subjectivity] and violence questions appear so often conjoined 
because identity [and subjectivity] emerge as an expression […] of conflict. 
(2003, pg. 76)              
  
The events of September 11, 2001 poignantly symbolize not only the mode of violence as 
intrinsic to the identity and subjectivity of the Islamist terrorist actor, but violence as a 
precipitate of the contested power relations of the United States (the West) and the 
Islamist terrorists—violence embodies the message. 
At the precise moment of the attacks, the "shock, anger, and sense of impotence" 
(Segaller, 1986, pg.2) that was experienced by the people in New York City, Washington 





cultural discourse (language) of Al Qaeda and the individual Islamist extremist/terrorist 
actors acting on its behalf.  Moreover, the moment of an attack is significant because it is 
in this precise moment where the Dominant/Other dichotomous binary is temporarily 
inverted or reversed.  The Other, however temporarily, becomes the Dominant, which is 
evident in the destruction, the death, the blood, and the shocked citizens and government 
who are left effectively powerless.  It is only after the government and citizens can direct 
their blame to an identified Other/enemy that the pre-existing power relations between 
the Dominant and the Other are restored.  The violence of the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
subject becomes an empowering performance that subverts the Dominant and allows the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist subject to emerge brandishing his/her true identity and 
subjectivity.  At this moment the private becomes the public, the internal becomes the 
external, the mind (thought) becomes the body (action), and the deceptive authorized 
Other transforms into the real Islamist extremist/terrorist subject/enemy. 
Suicide Terrorism/Martyrdom Operations: The Expression of Absolution  
 The repertoire of terrorist tactics is extensive and varied: assassinations, the 
hijacking of airplanes, kidnappings and the taking of hostages, the use of car bombs and 
other mobile delivery devices, cyberterrorism, and suicide bombings/martyr operations.  
Although all terrorist activities and the tactics previously mentioned can prove to be 
devastating and can dramatically impact the political, social, cultural, and psychological 
stability of the targeted group, society, and nation, the “most politically destabilizing and 
psychologically devastating form of terrorism” (Atran, 2004, pg. 67) is the use of suicide 
bombings/martyrdom operations.  Certainly the phenomenon of suicide 





diachrony of terrorist operations; however, “there is something novel about the type of 
terrorism in which the terrorist’s death is a necessary and essential part of his/her act, not 
just an incidental cost” (Economist, 2004).19  Therefore, as I will argue, the definitive 
performance of the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor and the absolute and ultimate 
measure and expression of their identity and subjectivity is revealed through what the 
United States and the West has rhetorically characterized as “suicide” terrorism. 
In a modern context, to date suicide bombings have occurred in more than 20 
countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Chechnya, China, Colombia, Croatia, Egypt, 
India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine, 
Panama, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, the 
United States, Uzbekistan, and the Yemen (http://www.worldhistory.com/wiki/s/Suicide-
bombing/htm).  According to data compiled by Robert Pape, from 1980 to 2003 a total of 
315 suicide attacks/martyrdom operations have occurred worldwide (Pape, 2005, pg. 3).20  
Furthermore, the contemporary use of suicide operations as a terrorist strategy and tactic 
has significantly increased:     
At the same time that terrorist incidents of all types have declined by nearly 
half, from a peak of 666 in 1987 to 348 in 2001, suicide terrorism has grown, 
and the trend is continuing.  Suicide terrorist attacks have risen from an 
average of three per year in the 1980s to about ten per year in the 1990s to 
more than forty each year in 2001 and 2002, and nearly fifty in 2003.  These 
include continuing campaigns by Palestinian groups against Israel and by Al 
Qaeda and Taliban-related forces in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, as well as 
at least twenty attacks in Iraq against U.S. troops, the Untied Nations, and 
Iraqis collaborating with the American occupation. 
                                                 
19 For an historical account of the use of suicide terrorism/martyrdom operations refer to Bernard Lewis 
(1967). The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (2nd ed.). Great Britain: Weidenfeld & Nicolson., and Emiko 
Ohnuki-Tierney. (2002). Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.  
20 According to data collected by Pape, approximately half of the suicide attacks that have occurred 
between 1980 and 2003 were associated with Islamic Fundamentalism.  As is evident in Afghanistan, 
Indonesia, and Iraq, the use of suicide terrorism/martyrdom operations as a strategy and tactic is continuing 





(Pape, 2005, pg. 6) 
 
The increase in the use of suicide operations by various extremist/terrorist groups is 
attributable to the fact that extremists/terrorists have learned that it works (Pape, 2005, 
pg. 61).   
According to Pape, “although many Americans have hoped that Al Qaeda has 
been badly weakened by U.S. counterterrorism efforts since September 11, 2001, the data 
show otherwise.  In 2002 and 2003, Al Qaeda conducted fifteen suicide terrorist attacks, 
more than in all of the years before September 11 combined, killing 439 people” (2005, 
pg. 8).  As Atran suggests, “the past three years saw more suicide attacks than the last 
quarter century” (2004, pg. 67).  In fact, “from 2000 to 2003, more than 300 suicide 
attacks killed more than 5, 300 people in 17 countries and wounded many thousands in 
addition” (2004, pg. 68).  Moreover, as Atran later asserts, 2003 witnessed more suicide 
attacks than any other year in contemporary history with a higher and higher percentage 
of suicide attacks being religiously motivated—since 2000 Al Qaeda and its affiliated 
groups were responsible for over 100 suicide attacks and are responsible for the majority 
of casualties (9/11) related to suicide terrorism (2004, pg. 68, 70).21   
As the number of “religiously” motivated suicide bombings increases and its 
popularity as an effective terrorist strategy and tactic gains momentum, a central question 
                                                 
21 “Religiously” motivated terrorism does not simply denote that religion is the primary motivational force 
behind suicide campaigns.   Religion, in this case Islamist extremism, provides an ideological framework 
within which the acts of “martyrdom” are justified and substantiated.  However, as Pape suggests, “the 
targets that Al Qaeda has attacked, and the strategic logic articulated by Osama bin Laden to explain how 
suicide operations are expected to help achieve Al Qaeda’s goals, both suggest that Al Qaeda’s primary 
motive is to end foreign military occupation of the Arabian Peninsula and other Muslim regions” (2005, pg. 
51).  As Paper later continues, “the taproot of Al Qaeda’s animosity to its enemies is what they do, not who 
they are” (2005, 2001).  According to Pape, Al Qaeda suicide terrorists are twice as likely to come from 
Muslim countries with a strong Islamic fundamentalist population compared to Muslim countries with 
marginal Islamic fundamentalist populations.  However, Al Qaeda suicide terrorists are ten times more 
likely to come from Muslim countries where there is a U.S. military presence, and 20 times more likely to 
come from Muslim countries with both a U.S military presence and a strong Islamic fundamentalist 





to understanding this phenomenon and ultimately the identity and subjectivity of the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist actor ad extremis is: what motivates Islamist individuals 
and/or Islamist groups to perform a suicide attack/martyrdom operation against a 
seemingly innocent population? 
 As a point of departure into the complex phenomenon of suicide terrorism, a brief 
analysis of the language deployed to describe this activity will permit entry into the 
Islamist frame and the ideological architecture that support this extremist ideology.  The 
terms suicide terrorism, suicide bombing, and/or homicide bombing are Western political 
and sociological constructs used to denigrate, malign, demonize, and vilify the 
individual(s) and the group(s) responsible for perpetrating these acts of self-immolation.  
The term “suicide” connotes despair, anguish, hopelessness, maladjustment and social 
dysfunction, depression, and in the case of killing others before or while killing oneself, 
some form of psychopathology.  However, as Atran states in his article “Mishandling 
Suicide Terrorism:”  
suicide terrorists on the whole have no appreciable psychopathology and are 
often wholly committed to what they believe to be devout moral principles.  
A report on the The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism used by the 
Central and Defense Intelligence Agencies (CIA and DIA) finds ‘no 
psychological attribute or personality distinctive of terrorism.’  Recruits are 
generally well adjusted in their families and liked by peers and often educated 
and economically better off than their surrounding population. (2004, pg. 73) 
 
Raphael Israeli contributes to and reinforces this position by arguing that Islamist 
terrorists who kill themselves or who are prepared to die for their convictions are not 
motivated by what Western psychiatry defines as the “requisite steps of the regular and 
“normal” suicide type: 





2. The presence of a plan—how to proceed, what the precise steps to be taken, 
their sequence and timing and so forth—all concocted in solitude and single-
handedly. 
3. The suicidal individual must have a certain energy level, that is, the capacity 
to carry out the plan” (2003, pg. 72). 
 
In contrast, as Israeli argues, the determination and driving force of Islamist 
extremists/terrorists is to kill their perceived enemy.  Moreover, “the plan relates to 
killing others and it is often prepared by the [terrorist’s] superiors, not independently on 
his/her own initiative” (2003, pg. 72).  Lastly, the plan of the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
is not individualistic, but, rather, is part of a broader schema “for which they are trained 
and prepared, together with others who share their convictions, and are prepared for 
arduous and long-term studies and physical and mental training and preparations (2003, 
pg. 73).  Another significant difference between an individual who commits suicide and 
the Islamist terrorist, who is prepared to die for convictions in the service of an entity 
greater than the individual, is the social acceptance of the act of self-immolation.  
Whereas in Western culture suicide is a source of embarrassment and sadness to family 
and friends, Islamists and others who subscribe to this extremist ideology perceive the 
terrorist’s selected for and who carry out the operations as models of adulation.  They are 
worshipped and celebrated like heroes by their families, friends, and community, and are 
honoured for what is understood as a sacrifice (2003, pg. 73-74). (I do not wish to 
insinuate that Islamic people as a whole condone this type of activity.  I refer only to 
those that support Islamist extremism/terrorism and extremist ideologies that advocate the 
use of suicide terrorism.) 
 The term “sacrifice” is significant in understanding the motivations for 





and groups were plan and execute this extreme form of physical and psychological 
violence.  It is important to note that Islam strictly forbids suicide and is “therefore 
looked down upon, shunned and discouraged in Muslim tradition, and consequently 
provokes reactions of horror, disbelief, fear, outrage, dismay and anger, especially when 
it is performed en masse, like on 11 September, 2001” (2003, pg. 71).  However, 
“martyrdom in the struggle for Allah is not [forbidden]; on the contrary, it is a religious 
duty” (Laqueur, 2004, pg. 71).  Therefore, in this context and under these circumstances, 
the term “suicide” is an inaccurate description of this form of violence.  Rather, the terms 
martyr, self-martyrdom, or martyr operations (several terms in Arabic are used to 
describe this vanguard of violence: itishhad, mustahhid, and shahid (Ruthven, 2002, pg. 
xviii, xx, xxi)) more accurately capture the motivations and identity and subjectivity of 
the individuals and groups whom perform this specific terrorist act.  Martyr operations or 
self-martyrdom, from the Islamist extremist/terrorist perspective, are considered 
sacrificial forms of violence that are sanctioned by the Qu’ran and are a necessary 
dimension in their struggle against their perceived enemies: “the defense of religious 
freedom is the foremost cause for which arms may—and indeed must—be taken up or 
else, as in the concluding phrase of 2:251 ‘corruption would surely overwhelm the earth’” 
(Ruthven, 2002, pg. 49).  Ruthven goes on to cite a string of verses that substantiates and 
justifies the use of armed struggle and violence: “’And when the sacred months are over, 
kill the polytheists wherever you find them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and 
lie in wait of them in every stratagem of war’” (2002, pg. 49)[.]   Certainly, the folly of 
language is in its ability to be manipulated, perverted, exploited, and (mis)interpreted to 





context.   However, regardless of the malleability of language, and given the fact that 
many people who perform acts of terrorism and martyr operations are well-educated, the 
ideological mechanisms, conditioning, and indoctrination that are utilized to prepare 
individuals for martyr operations are very important. 
The success of a martyr operation is contingent on the level of commitment, 
strength of convictions, and depth of resolve of the individuals and/or small groups that 
perform this sacrificial form of violence.  However, the individuals or small groups that 
carry out these operations represent the “last link in a chain” (Laqueur, 2004, pg. 91).             
The Islamist candidates that are selected for and inaugurated into this extremist “culture 
of martyrdom” (Hage, 2003, pg. 72) are recruited from the Muslim diaspora, from 
countries comprised of a Muslim majority and countries with a Muslim minority (e.g. 
Muslims from England, “Muslims from France, Muslims from Germany, Bosnian 
Muslims, Chechnians, Filipino Moros, and others” (Israeli, 2004, pg. 81)).  The Islamist 
candidates who are recruited for martyr operations are generally between the ages of 
sixteen and twenty-eight and are almost always male.  Although groups in Palestine and 
Algeria have used females to perform martyr operations, groups like Al Qaeda only 
recruit males (Laqueur, 1999, pg. 142).   
The Islamist recruits who are selected to perform the martyr operations “gather 
their forces, their passion, and deep commitment around charismatic leaders like Osama 
Bin Laden who usually have an impeccable record of simplicity, modesty and honesty, 
shun extravagance and waste, and provide their followers with a model of populistic 
sincerity, paternal devotion and concern, and scholarly wisdom and knowledge” (Israeli, 





of commitment that is necessary for these individuals to perform their carefully crafted 
martyrdom operations.  Although the Islamist leaders and “people who guide the [self-
martyrs] have their political agenda” (Laqueur, 2004, pg. 91), the arguments proffered for 
performing this violent form of sacrifice are usually framed within a theological 
context—a potent vehicle for justifying and substantiating the necessity of this ultimate 
sacrificial operation. 
The ideological indoctrination of the Islamist recruits selected for martyrdom 
operations usually begins by dividing individuals into “relatively small and closeted 
cells” (Atran, 2004, pg. 77)—a physically, psychologically, and emotionally tight and 
devoted fraternity or brotherhood.  These individuals and groups/cells are revered, 
extolled, and aggrandized as a corps d’elite: morally and spiritually superior to others 
and, therefore, “deserving of the ultimate form of training in preparation for their 
supreme act of devotion” (Israeli, 2004, pg. 83).  Upon being inaugurated into the 
group/cell, the individual experiences a figurative death: 
the individual succumbs to the organization and there is no room for 
individual ideas, individual identity [and subjectivity], and individual 
decision-making.  As a result, the individual fuses with the terrorist 
organization, bonded by common goals and beliefs, and in doing so gains a 
sense of power and belonging from the group while losing a sense of personal 
responsibility for the actions of the group of which he is a member.  
(Speckhard et al, 2004, pg. 322) 
 
Moreover, according to Islamist terrorists who have been interviewed22, “[…] a sense of 
collective consumes individuality and members [appear] unable to distinguish between 
personal goals and that of the group” (2004, pg. 322).  The Islamist martyrdom 
groups/cells, in effect, undergo a transformation and function and operate as an organic 
                                                 
22 Speckhard et al cites findings made by Post et al regarding 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists who 
were interviewed in an effort to establish an understanding of their psychology and decision-making in 





unit, collectively supporting and nurturing one another as they move toward their 
ultimate objective. 
 As Raphael Israeli details in his text Islamikaze23—a term Israeli uses to codify 
the individuals who engage in martyrdom operations because of their close correlations 
with the Japanese Kamikaze pilots of World War II—there are three elements that are 
utilized to incrementally construct the ideological commitment of the individuals and 
groups selected to perform martyrdom operations: “identifying the enemy; strengthening 
the value of jihad24 in particular and doctrinal conviction in general against the identified 
enemy; and then instigating the [self-martyr] to show personal valour and self-sacrifice 
for the attainment of the prescribed goal” (Israeli, 2004, pg. 89).  By using these 
“elements” or ideological mechanisms, not only are the self-martyrs’ depth of conviction, 
commitment, and resolve enhanced and permanently ingrained into their identity and 
subjectivity, these mechanisms “emasculate the fear of death” (2004, pg. 85) that the self-
martyrs may experience during the performance and execution of their particular 
operation.  The success of the indoctrination methods is evinced through the myriad 
martyrdom operations that have been successfully perpetrated against a multitude of 
targets around the world, most notably the attacks of September 11, 2001: “the 
indoctrination survived years of exposure to the temptations of Western civilization” 
(Laqueur, 2004, pg. 94).  This seemingly impervious ideological commitment and 
devotion illustrate the strength of the convictions and resolve of the Islamist 
                                                 
23 Another term that could be used to describe individuals who participate in suicide operations/martyrdom 
operations is zealot, which, according to Ask Oxford.com, refers to “a fanatical or uncompromising 
follower of a religion or a policy” (www.askoxford.com).  
24 Jihad is defined by Malise Ruthven, in his text Fury for God, as: struggle – a term used for holy war; the 
“greater jihad is sometimes used to refer to the struggle against one’s own evil tendencies, while the “lesser 






extremists/terrorists selected to perform this ultimate form of sacrificial violence—self 
sacrifice is the absolute and definitive expression of the identity and subjectivity of the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist subject.   
According to Laqueur, martyrdom operations have been an effective strategy and 
tactic because of the level of physical damage and destruction martyr operations cause, 
the long-term psychological impact of this type of terror on the direct and indirect 
victims, the relative ease of planning these operations because of the level of commitment 
of the martyr and the difficulty in stopping them (2004, pg. 91).  Correspondingly, 
according to Pape, one of the most striking aspects of recent suicide terrorist campaigns 
“is that they are associated with gains for the terrorists’ political cause about half the 
time” (Pape, 2005, pg. 64).25  Pape continues, “of the thirteen suicide terrorist campaigns 
that were completed during 1980-2003, seven correlate with significant policy changes 
by the target state toward the terrorists’ major political goals” (2005, pg. 63).  As Pape 
later asserts, “even a 50 percent success rate is remarkable: international military and 
economic coercion generally works less than a third of the time, and is especially rare for 
groups with few other options” (2005, pg. 65).  Moreover, “contemporary suicide 
terrorism [—martyr operations—] are conducted with the desire of appearing in the lens 
of the worldwide media with the promise of an immediate social impact” (Speckhard et 
al, 2004, pg. 316)—the performance of martyrdom is a violently devastating message that 
                                                 
25 Of the thirteen suicide campaigns that were completed between 1980-2003, seven are attributed to 
significant policy changes by the target state toward the demands of the terrorists’ major political goals. 
Hezbollah achieved total U.S/French withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983; in three cases, the terrorists’ 
territorial objectives were partially achieved (Hezbollah and Israel, 1983-1984; Hamas and Israel, 1994, 
and Hams and Israel, 1994-1995); in one case, the target government entered into sovereignty negotiations 
with the terrorists (LTTE and Sri Lanka, 1993-1994 and 2001); and in one case, the terrorist organizations 
top leader was released from prison (Hamas and Israel, 1997) (Pape, 2005, pg. 64-65).  With respect to the 
current Al Qaeda campaign, which is being waged against the United States and its allies, the outcome is 





can induce a perpetual state of panic and fear because anyone, in any place, at any time 
can become a victim of an invisible army and phantom menace.  Within the spatiality of 
the culture of martyrdom emerges “asymmetric warfare par excellence” (Laqueur, 2004, 
pg. 96): it has no limits or boundaries.                 
 I have attempted to demonstrate how one might interpret the identity and 
subjectivity of an Islamist extremist/terrorist subject who no longer is situated in a 
cultural space that is over 'there' e.g. the Middle East, South Asia, North Africa, 
Southeast Asia, but occupies a liminal cultural Thirdspace that is 'here' (the United 
States).  I have suggested that the Islamist terrorist Other occupies a liminal cultural 
Thirdspace that is positioned within and without the Dominant/Other dichotomous 
binary, resulting in a hybridized identity and subjectivity that enables the construction of 
a double self, indeed a third self. By occupying this liminal cultural Thirdspace, the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist subject uses mimicry as a mechanism for temporarily 
assuming the identity and subjectivity of an authorized version of otherness.  By 
exhibiting the qualities and traits of the Dominant, the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject 
tactically deceives and strategically conceals himself from the watchful gaze of the 
Dominant.  While concealed and camouflaged, the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor 
reverses the gaze and observes the Dominant. 
 In effect, the Islamist extremist/terrorist subjects exists on the borders and in the 
margins of society; however, through occupying this marginal position, the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist subject can more easily penetrate and infiltrate the political, cultural, 





 Using the Butlerian concept of performance, I attempted to convey the idea that 
the identity and subjectivity of the Islamist terrorist subject is a performance and that the 
real identity and subjectivity of an Islamist terrorist only emerges in the instant of a 
violent terrorist act.  Furthermore, I suggested that the violence of the Islamist terrorist 
act operates as the voice and language of individual Islamist terrorist and that of the 
Islamist terrorist group.  In order to remain a clandestine, unrecognized Islamist terrorist 
Other, the terrorist subject must remain effectually silent.  However, the silence of the 
Islamist terrorist is not imposed by the Dominant but is willfully accepted.  For the 
terrorist, silence functions as a weapon and tool of empowerment.  Through violence, the 
silence of the Islamist terrorist actor is broken, and the identity and subjectivity of the 
Islamist terrorist Other emerges in his/her true form—a visible enemy. 
 Lastly, I argued that the ultimate and absolute expression of the identity and 
subjectivity of an Islamist terrorist actor is illustrated and realized through the sacrificial 
violence of martyrdom operations.  This mode of self-sacrifice reflects and reveals the 
depth of resolve and strength of the convictions of the Islamist terrorist subject, and is an 
indication of an ideological indoctrination process that inspires a level of commitment 
beyond the physical and psychological manacles imposed by the self.  The absolute 
identity and subjectivity of the Islamist terrorist subject reaches its apotheosis in the act 
of self-immolation, a concept not readily and easily understood by ideological 
apparatuses that constitute the West in general and the United States in particular.  
 Terrorists are redefining the terrain and contours of the battlefield.  No longer are 
Islamist extremists/terrorists readily identifiable or codifiable subjects.  Islamist 





itself.  Consequently, we cannot engage the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject with 
preconceived notions of culture and their identity and subjectivity.  New theories and 
modes of analysis must be developed that operate as interpretive mechanisms for, at least, 
understanding the hybrid identities and subjectivities of these transnational actors as they 
exist in Western culture and society. 
 In the next movement, I examine the significance of the landscapes of terror(ism) 
that have emerged as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the 


































  Landscapes of Terror(ism) and the Contours of the Symbolic 
 
Sometimes a landscape seems to be less a setting for the life of its inhabitants 
than a curtain behind which their struggles, achievements, and accidents take 
place.  For those who, with the inhabitants, are behind the curtains, landmarks 
are no longer geographic but also biographical and personal. (Berger, 1976, 
pg. 13) 
 
A terrorist attack is not only calculated to have an immediate devastating and 
destructive impact on the selected target and its audience, but it is designed to generate a 
long-term disruption in the political, economic, social, and cultural systems of 
governance that are characteristic of the target country, region, or city/urban 
environment.  In some cases, depending on the severity of a terrorist attack and the extent 
of the collateral damage, a terrorist attack may permanently alter the physical and 
psychological landscape of a nation, region, and/or city/urban environment.   
 Landscapes, both as a geographical and spatial entity, are not just inert, static, 
passive, neutral containers of human praxis and physically and materially posit(ion)ed 
objects, but are dynamic and active places and spaces that influence as much as embody 
political, cultural, social, and economic activities, behaviour, and relations (Williams, 
2003, pg. 276): “’[l]andscape does not simply mirror or distort “underlying” social 
relations, but needs to be understood as enmeshed within the processes which shape how 
the world is organized, experienced and understood, rather than read as its end product’” 
(Robertson & Richards, 2003, pg. 8).  That is, landscapes influence and produce various 
social relations and activities as much as they are constructed and produced by social 
relations and activities.  In effect, landscape—both the material (physical) and the 
psychological (symbolic)—and its inherent geography and spatiality, constitute an 





 Don Mitchell conceptualises landscape as something that “works” in the service 
of individuals and human groups not only with respect to social relations but individual 
and group identity and subjectivity construction, formation, articulation, and maintenance 
(Brace, 2003, pg. 121).  This conceptualisation of landscape is supported by W.J.T 
Mitchell who argues that one can only “understand the relationships between landscape 
and identity if we change the word landscape from a noun to a verb—an ‘object’ word to 
a ‘doing’ word.  This makes us ask not just what landscape is or means but what it does.  
It stops us from seeing landscape as an object or text, and makes us see it as a ‘process by 
which social and subjective identities are formed” (Brace, 2003, pg. 123).   
 The material and symbolic codes “enmeshed” and “embedded” in a landscape 
communicate myriad political, cultural, economic, and social values, principles, and 
sensibilities—the ideologies—that frame and formulate the identity of a particular place, 
region, or nation, and the individual actors and social groupings of actors who inhabit a 
specific space—international, national, regional, or local.  Given the diverse range of 
processes, activities, and relationships that the landscape embodies, one can 
conceptualize the landscape as a multi-layered system of signification that is subject to a 
multiplicity of interpretations, which are contingent upon the perspectives of the 
interpreter (Robertson & Richards, 2003, pg. 12).  For example, depending upon an 
individual or group’s gender, sexuality, race/ethnicity, class, religion, and political 
ideology, cultural customs, geographical location, and the political and cultural milieu in 
which they operate, their interpretation and understanding of the physical and symbolic 
landscape, and its inherent processes, will vary.  Moreover, their interpretation and 





and/or groupings of actors understand, imagine, and define themselves and invariably 
how others understand, imagine, and define them.  Therefore, in effect, “multiple identity 
positions are performed in and through landscape” (Till, 2004, pg. 349), whether at the 
international, national, regional, or local scale.   
The multiple identity positions that are performed in and through landscape reveal 
not only the multi-dimensional elements of landscape and its attendant processes, but the 
“polyvocal” and “polyvisual” interpretations of landscape and the complex array of 
identities, subjectivities, and positionalities produced and articulated through landscape 
(Robertson & Richards, 2004, pg. 6).  For instance, the “security barrier” currently being 
constructed to separate Israel from the Palestinian Territory could be interpreted by 
Israelis as a symbol of safety, security, and defense against the perceived campaign of 
terror of Hamas and the Palestinians.  On the other hand, the Palestinians may interpret 
the security barrier to represent the perceived political, economic, cultural, and 
sociological oppression and geopolitical expansionism of Israel.  The result of multiple 
identity positions and the subsequent situated polyvocal and polyvisual interpretations of 
landscape is that landscape, under certain conditions and depending on the actors 
involved, becomes an active medium/site through which various identity positions are 
contested and where conflict, resistance, and subversion are performed and 
communicated. 
 As Till (2004) suggests, individual actors and groups “may construct symbolic or 
material landscapes, or use the landscape in ways, to alter or question existing social, 
political, [and cultural] relationships” (pg. 349), or claim and challenge political and 





September 11, 2001 and the subsequent Post-9/11 epoch are striking examples of how 
extremist/terrorist groups use landscape and its attendant spatiality to physically and 
symbolically challenge and subvert contemporary political, cultural, and socio-economic 
processes, activities, relationships, and ideological authority.  The permanent alteration of 
the physical and psychological landscape that resulted from the attacks exemplifies the 
“work” that landscape “does” in constructing, formulating, articulating, maintaining, and 
extending the identity and subjectivity of Al Qaeda and the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
constituency. 
 By examining the symbolic significance of landscape/cityscape, the militarization, 
citadelification, and the authoritarian tendencies that have emerged in the physical and 
psychological landscape of the United States, and the politicization of places and spaces 
that has occurred as a result of the production of landscapes like Camp X-Ray, 
Guantanamo, Cuba, I argue that landscape produces, extends, and articulates the identity 
and subjectivity of Islamist extremism/terrorism.        
The Cityscape/ Urban Landscape and the Emergence of Terror 
 As Williams (2003) asserts, “terrorism grimly highlights the spatiality of politics 
and political values.  Chiefly, terrorism affects the spaces in which we live our lives, the 
places that ground our meaningful experiences and the scales by which we organize our 
world(s)”(pg. 281).  Examples of this include the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in 
New York City, the Okalahoma City bombing, the train bombings in Madrid, the recent 
attacks in London, England and Sharm el-Sheikh and Naama Bay, Egypt.  Although acts 
of terrorism could conceivably occur anywhere in any space, contemporary Islamist 





examples indicate, the cityscape/urban landscape.  One probable explanation for this is 
that the cityscape/urban landscape “offer rich targets that are highly accessible to 
terrorists” (Swanstrom, 2002, pg.137).  However, in addition to providing a multitude of 
rich targets of opportunity such as transportation nodes and densely populated public 
spaces e.g. restaurants, businesses, hotels, water treatment facilities, power-generating 
facilities, the cityscape/urban landscape also provide myriad targets that possess 
politically, economically, militarily, and culturally important symbolic capital (Williams, 
2003, pg. 282).  Indeed, the targeting of the cityscape/urban space is strategically 
important as it virtually guarantees the disruption of people’s lives and attendant spatial 
practices and activities and the material and symbolic communication and articulation of 
their political and cultural positionality and values.                
 Cityscapes/urban spaces are magnificent structures that encompass a complex, 
interwoven system of political, economic, social, environmental, and cultural processes.  
In effect, the cityscape/urban landscape (re)produces and reflects, represents, and 
symbolises the values, principles, sentimentality, institutions—indeed the dominant 
ideology—of the inhabitants that live and work in the city, and the region and nation in 
which a cityscape/urban landscape is situated and constructed.  Therefore, as one surveys 
a particular cityscape/urban landscape, one is inundated with a multitude of objects and 
symbols, comprised of numerous places, spaces, buildings, monuments, human praxis, 
etc., that communicate a dominant ideology.  As Black (2003) states, “[…] landscapes 
can transform ideologies into concrete visible form” (pg. 23).  Therefore, as Black 
continues, “landscapes can serve to naturalise asymmetrical power relations and cultural 





suggests in The city as text: the politics of landscape interpretation in the Kandyan 
Kingdom, "landscapes are communicative devices that encode and transmit information" 
(1990, pg. 2).  However, the nature and significance of the information that is 
communicated through a landscape is contingent upon the symbols in which the 
information is encoded and how those symbolic codes are interpreted.  Furthermore, 
within the context of the cityscape/urban landscape, and depending upon the political and 
cultural context, certain buildings (objects), places, and spaces can be more "significant" 
than others, whether that be because of their physical or symbolic (my focus) attributes or 
the types of activities and processes that occur in and through a particular space.   
 In order to reach an understanding of how landscape functions as a symbolic 
system, I will now turn to the symbolic method employed by Cosgrove and Daniels.  
Cosgrove and Daniels use an iconographic mode of analysis to read, decode, and 
interpret "landscape."  In its broadest terms, the concept of iconography is defined as “the 
theoretical and historical study of symbolic imagery" (Cosgrove & Daniels, 1988, pg. 1).  
Furthermore, according to Cosgrove and Daniels, "the iconographic approach seeks to 
conceptualize pictures (landscapes) as encoded texts to be deciphered by those cognisant 
of the culture as a whole in which they were produced" (1988, pg. 2).  Therefore, in order 
to interpret a landscape (my focus is on the Post 9/11 US landscape) one must understand 
the underlying processes out of which the landscape was produced and constructed.   
According to Cosgrove and Daniels, "landscapes are cultural images, a pictorial 
way of representing, structuring, or symbolising surroundings" (1988, pg. 1).  Moreover, 
the idea of landscape can be conceived in the following terms, which I quote at length: 
While landscape obviously refers to the surface of the earth, or a part thereof, 





than merely the visual and functional arrangement of natural and human 
phenomena which the discipline can identify, classify, map and analyse.  
Landscape shares but extends the meaning of 'area' or 'region' [(to this I 
would add 'nation')], both concepts which have been claimed as its 
geographical equivalents.  As a term widely employed in painting and 
imaginative literature as well as in environmental design and planning, 
landscape carries multiple layers of meaning.  Commenting on the poet 
Gerard Manley Hopkins's neologism, inscape, W.A.M Peters has commented 
that the suffix 'scape' "posits the presence of a unifying principle which 
enables us to consider part of the countryside or sea [or city] as a unit and as 
an individual, but so that this part is perceived to carry the typical properties 
(ideologies) of the actually undivided whole. 
 
That unifying principle derives from the active engagement of a human 
subject with the material object.  In other words landscape denotes the 
external world mediated through subjective human experience in a way that 
region nor area immediately suggest.  Landscape is not merely the world we 
see, it is a construction, a composition of that world.  Landscape is a way of 
seeing the world. (Cosgrove, 1984, pg. 13) 
 
However, "landscapes are constructed linguistically as much as they are visually" 
(Duncan, 1990, pg. 13).  Some landscapes are constructed via the language (governing 
ideology) of the Dominant.  Although the visual landscape is comprised of physical 
objects, places, and spaces, these same objects symbolise a particular set of ideologies—
political, cultural, social, and economic.  In effect, landscape is (re)produced by and 
(re)produces the hegemonic dictum of the Dominant.   
Hegemony serves as an orienting trajectory, a "political and social code" (Burke, 
1954, pg. 23), that conditions and influences individuals and society as a collective whole 
to interpret and understand landscape from a particular perspective: "he was conditioned 
not only as regards what he should and should not do, but also as regards the reasons for 
his acts.  When introspecting to find the explanation for his attitudes, he would naturally 
employ the verbalisations of his group--for what are his language and thought if not a 





socialized I mean to suggest that it is not "natural" and must be maintained in order for it 
to continue to exert power and authority over the masses: "hegemony is not universal and 
"given" to the continuing rule of a particular class [or society].  It has to be won, 
reproduced, sustained" (Davis & Schleifer, 1998, pg. 661). 
The cityscape/urban landscape serve as a powerful medium of expression for the 
(re)production and reinforcement of hegemony.  Specific spaces and material constructs 
serve as visual symbols of cultural, political, economic, and social hegemony e.g. the 
White House, the Security Wall separating Israel and Palestine, the Eiffel Tower, the 
Sears Tower, the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia, the Pentagon, the Hague and the ICC, the 
Statue of Liberty, embassies and consulates, museums (Louvre), and other related 
buildings and objects that symbolise and represent embedded institutions, systems, 
ideologies, values, etc.  Hegemony assumes its maximum force when it is embedded in 
physical forms because it provides a tangible object through which the subject can 
interact with and experience specific dominant ideologies. 
As particular physical features (objects) of the cityscape/urban landscape assume 
greater symbolic importance, the greater the potential that it will become an 
extremist/terrorist target.  The same symbols that (re)produce and reinforce the 
hegemonic dictum of the Dominant domestically also transmit and communicate this 
information internationally through foreign policy, including diplomacy, development, 
trade, and military operations.  The consequence of this is that (Islamist) 
extremist/terrorist actors/groups identify and interpret particular spaces—including 
nations and various objects and structures—as the physical manifestation of the 





means/medium through which they can attack and subvert the hegemonic constructs of 
their enemy.  Therefore, if (Islamist) extremists/terrorists target and attack specific 
physical spaces within the cityscape/urban landscape, they are effectively rendering an 
assault on the very ideologies that underpin, support, and (re)produce them.  In a North 
American context, the apotheosis of this type of assault was realized through the 
devastating attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. 
Developing an understanding of the symbolic cityscape/urban landscape can 
provide an illuminating and incisive perspective on the motivations for (Islamist) 
extremist/terrorist target selection, and can help one to understand why particular places 
and spaces resonate with or become landscapes of terror(ism).  In my opinion, it is 
undeniable that historical and contemporary (Islamist) extremist/terrorist attacks and 
activity have been informed by a geographical and spatialized mind.  This assertion is 
demonstrated through the litany of Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks that have taken 
place in various locations around the world in the last two decades: the 1993 World Trade 
Centre bombing in New York; the 1995 bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, 
Pakistan; the destruction of the World Trade Centres and attack on the Pentagon in 2001; 
the Bali night club bombings in 2002; the attack of the housing compound in Riyadh in 
2003; the bombing of the English Embassy in Turkey in 2003;  the train explosions in 
Madrid in 2004; the continued Al Qaeda-led extremist/terrorist insurgency in Iraq; the 
recent attacks on the transportation systems in London, England in July, 2005; and the 
July, 2005 attacks on the Red Sea resorts in Egypt    In all of these cases, the places and 
spaces that were targeted were carefully selected not only because of their geographical 





in Terrorists' Target Selection," Drake states: "in practice […] attacks by non-state 
terrorist groups are rarely indiscriminate.  Target selection is instead determined by a 
number of factors, and the terrorists' ideology is central to this process, not only because 
it provides the initial dynamic for terrorists' actions, but because it sets out the moral 
framework with which they operate" (1998, pg. 53).  Therefore, in order to understand 
the motivations behind terrorist target selection and the significance of the symbolic 
coding contained within the cityscape/urban landscape, it is important to understand their 
ideological framework and the other factors that contribute to their decision-making 
processes. 
The ideology of Islamist extremist/terrorist actors is deeply rooted within 
theology, irrespective of how perverted and comprised the interpretation of the religious 
doctrine.  For these extremist/terrorist groups, extremist/terrorist acts are "committed not 
just for a strategic political objective but as part of a religious mission.  In many cases, 
the perpetrators see themselves as soldiers in a spiritual army, engaged in a great cosmic 
war.  These religious warriors hope that their victory will usher in a new epoch and a new 
religious kingdom" (Juergensmeyer, 1997, pg. 16).  Religion serves as a valuable 
ideological vehicle because it not only motivates, legitimises, and substantiates the 
existence the extremist/terrorist actor/group, it supplies the "glue that makes that 
[terrorist's] community [and network] of support cohere (brackets are my inclusions)" 
(1997, pg. 17).  In a terrorist's vision of a world gone mad, "what most of us regard as 
ordinary politics, [economics, and culture], is viewed as the enemy of religion" (1997, pg. 
18).  And as the enemy of religion, or, put more accurately, "the satanic enemy of Islam" 





justified and "mandated by God" (1997, pg. 18).  The importance of religion in providing 
the ideological framework within which Islamist extremist/terrorist groups operate cannot 
be given enough emphasis as, to reiterate what has been stated previously, it plays a 
central role in Islamist extremism/terrorism as a whole, and in particular the motivations 
for target selection.  However, some of the other factors that contribute to Islamist 
extremism/terrorism are worth mentioning, if only to convey the complexity of the 
motivational forces of extremist/terrorist activity. 
 In the article entitled "Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 
Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists," Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny 
attempt to reveal the motivational forces behind individuals joining a terrorist 
organization and actively engaging in terrorism.  I will briefly outline some of the 
findings.  According to the terrorists interviewed "the major influence was the social 
environment of the youth.  As one terrorist remarked, “Everyone was joining.”  
Individuals from strictly religious Islamic backgrounds were more likely to join Islamist 
groups, while those who did not have a religious background might join either a secular 
or a religious group.  The peer group was of much greater influence, and in many cases, it 
was a friend or acquaintance in the group who recruited the subject" (2003, pg. 173).  The 
authors later indicate that the Islamist group members social environment was 
"dominated by the mosque, religious organizations, and religious instruction" (2003, pg. 
173).  Again, this indicates the importance of the role of religious indoctrination in 
Islamist extremism/terrorism.  Another important factor was the role of the family: 
"clearly families that are politically active socialized their sons to the movement at an 





findings of the authors suggest that many of the extremists/terrorists initially became 
involved in extremist/terrorist organizations because of the sense of community and 
belonging.  For those who felt disenfranchised, disaffected, dispossessed, dislocated, and 
disenchanted, the terrorist organization provided an environment of purpose, 
collectivism, vision, and meaning (2003, pg. 175-176).   
 Ideology is vital to target selection (Drake, 1998, pg. 54).  An “[…] important 
effect of ideology is that it transforms people or objects into representative symbols” 
(1998, pg. 59). When one surveys the landscape of contemporary Islamist 
extremist/terrorist acts, one feature/factor appears to recur: "in virtually every recent 
example of terrorism, the general space or place and/or the actual physical structure that 
has been targeted has had a symbolic significance" (Juergensmeyer, 1997, pg. 19).  And 
it is to this symbolic significance that I will now direct my attention. 
 As I have mentioned previously, the symbolic significance of a landscape—
cityscape/urban landscape—and its inherent processes are subject to polyvocal and 
polyvisual interpretations.  Obviously, the ideology that informs and motivates the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist subject will have a significant impact on the way Islamist 
extremist/terrorist actors conceptualize, comprehend, and interpret a landscape—
cityscape/urban landscape—and the symbolic codes and representative symbols that 
function in and through a particular landscape.  An example of the effect of Islamist 
extremist/terrorist ideology transforming the landscape into representative symbols and 
an encoded system that communicates an ideology contrary to their political, cultural, 
economic, and social values and beliefs is manifested in the Islamist (Occidental) 





 The Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology is about an idea: an idea, almost a vision, 
about the West/Occident in general and the United States in particular (Baruma & 
Margalit, 2004, pg. 9).  The Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology and the ideas it 
propagates and promulgates envision, indeed imagine, the West/Occident and the United 
States as “a mass of soulless, decadent, money-grubbing, rootless, faithless, and unfeeling 
parasites” (2004, pg. 10) that have attempted to replace the world of God (Allah) with an 
impure world of Man (2004, pg. 18).  Nowhere are these characteristics more prevalent 
than in the Western/North American cityscape/urban landscape. 
 According to Buruma and Margalit (2004), the Western/North American 
cityscape/urban landscape symbolizes hubris, greed, godlessness and spiritual pollution, 
rootless cosmopolitanism, selfish individualism, corruption, depravity, secularism, 
empire building, and global capitalism (pg. 16, 21, 39).  These conceptions and ideas of 
the Western/North American cityscape/urban landscape are echoed in the observations 
and impressions of Sayyid Qutb, the very influential Islamist intellectual and architect of 
contemporary Islamist extremism/terrorism whom I describe in Chapter 1, who visited 
New York City and various mid-Western rural communities e.g. Greeley, Colorado, in 
the late 1940s.  As Buruma and Margalit state: 
When Sayyid Qutb arrived in New York from his native Egypt in 1948, he 
felt miserable in the city, which appeared to him as a “huge workshop,” 
“noisy” and “clamouring.”  He longed for a conversation that was not about 
“money, movie stars or car models.”  In his letters home, Qutb was 
particularly distressed by the “seductive atmosphere,” the shocking sensuality 
of daily life, and the immodest behaviour of American women. (Buruma & 
Margalit, 2004, pg. 31-32) 
 
Similarly, when Qutb attended a church dance in rural Colorado, the dance struck him as 





experiences in the United States solidified his prejudices against the West and reinforced 
his ideal of a spiritual community and society that was devoid of the temptations and 
sordid improprieties reflected in the landscape and its attendant human praxis.  This 
fantasy of a pure spiritual community contained the “seeds of violence and destruction” 
(Buruma & Margalit, 2004, pg. 32) that Qutb would later espouse as strategies and tactics 
necessary to provoke change.  A dramatic illustration of the rejection of the West and an 
attempt to (re)produce a cityscape/landscape of religious/spiritual purity is Afghanistan 
under the rule of the Taliban: 
The aim of the Taliban’s assault on Kabul was to turn it into a City of God.  
All signs of Westernization, such as “British and American hairstyles,” had to 
be erased.  Women were banned from work and hidden from public view.  
The religious police decreed that “women going outside with fashionable, 
ornamental, tight, and charming clothes to show themselves … will be cursed 
by Islamic Sharia and should never expect to go to heaven.  Music was 
banned, and so were television, kite flying, chess, and soccer.  Adultery 
would be punished by stoning, and drinking alcohol by whipping. The only 
law was Sharia, or religious law. (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, pg. 44-45) 
 
Furthermore, a symbolic act of purification “was the torture of former leftist president 
Najibullah.  The Taliban cut off his testicles and dragged his battered body behind a jeep.  
Then they shot him and hanged his corpse from a street lamp.  As a sign of his citified 
debauchery and corruption, the ex-president’s pockets were stuffed with money, and 
cigarettes were pressed between his broken fingers” (2004, pg. 44).  Correspondingly, the 
religious impulses and political and cultural sensibilities of Osama bin Laden and 
Mohammed Atta (one of the Islamist extremists/terrorists who violently “sacrificed” his 
life during the September 11, 2001 attacks) curdled into a violent and destructive force 





symbolically attack New York, America, the idea of America, and the West it represents 
(2004, pg.14). 
 The ideology that informs the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor has transformed 
the Western/American cityscape/urban landscape into symbols that represent everything 
they purportedly detest, oppose, resist, and revile.  The landscape, or in this case the 
cityscape/urban landscape, serves an ontological and epistemological function, enabling 
the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject to define who they are by physically and 
symbolically representing and (re)producing what they believe they are not and what they 
resist.  In effect, the interpretation of landscape is a reflection of the mind and the mind is 
a reflection of the landscape.  Therefore, extremist/terrorist actors physically and 
symbolically utilize landscapes and particular spaces and places to violently represent, 
express, and communicate their ideology and construct, project, and extend their identity 
and subjectivity.  Moreover, the Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology and the imaginings 
it produces e.g. how they conceptualize and understand the West, the United States, and 
cities that populate the Western and American landscape, will undoubtedly inform and 
influence the targets they select and the symbolic value they attribute to particular spaces 
and spatial activities and behaviours.            
I believe that the immediate and enduring level of impact on the targeted society 
is proportional to the symbolic significance or symbolic capital of the target selected: "in 
showing the vulnerability of a nation's most stable and powerful entities, movements that 
undertake these acts of sabotage touch virtually everyone in a nation's society" 
(Juergensmeyer, 1997, pg. 19).  For instance, the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 





London, England will have undoubtedly caused people in the United States, Spain, and 
London, England, and all people around the world who feel that their country in general 
and/or particular cityscape/urban landscape is susceptible or vulnerable to attack, to 
question the stability and safety of the places and spaces of their spatial activities and 
behaviours.  The resulting consequence is that Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks and the 
physical and psychological scars they have leave on cityscape/urban landscape have 
created a symbolic landscape of terror(ism) engendered by fear and paranoia.    
 When powerful political, cultural, economic, and social symbols and icons—
physical and symbolic constructs of hegemony—are targeted and damaged or destroyed, 
"the power and legitimacy of society itself" (1997, pg. 20) are challenged.  One of the 
most compelling and profound examples of a powerful symbol being destroyed and the 
political and cultural hegemony of a nation subverted and its legitimacy challenged is the 
events of September 11, 2001.  The symbolic duality of the cityscape/urban landscape at 
the World Trade Centre site serves as a valuable case study with regards to understanding 
the targeting of symbols within the cityscape/urban landscape and the processes that 
contribute to the (re)production of symbols and encoded systems that help a nation 
imagine and define itself.   
 The destruction of the World Trade Centre and the future construction of the 
"Freedom Tower" and the “Reflecting Absence” memorial on the same site, in a sense, 
represent a symbolic duality or a double narrative: "the narrative, advanced not only by 
the terrorists and their sympathizers but also by many on the left in the USA and around 
the globe, that blames the US cultural imperialism and economic [and political] 





version that casts the US democracy and freedom as the innocent target of Islamic 
madness” (Petchesky, 2002, pg. 40).  Furthermore, this symbolic duality and double 
narrative demonstrate the "vulnerability of American cities to terrorists, but the attack and 
aftermath also illustrate the strength and resilience of our (US) cities [and nation]" 
(Briffault, 2002, pg. 564).  I will first analyse the symbolic significance of the attack on 
the World Trade Centre and will then proceed to provide an analysis of the symbolic 
significance of the yet to be constructed "Freedom Tower” and “Reflecting Absence” 
memorial. 
 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 “devastated one of the nation's most 
visible urban symbols” (Barron & Frug, 2002, pg. 583).  The World Trade Centre 
(WTC), geographically located in the financial district in one of the largest and most 
cosmopolitan cities in the world, not only symbolized and represented the economic and 
financial hegemony and economic system of governance of the United States—
capitalism, globalization, and the free-market system—but symbolized “a whole Western 
value-system and a world order” (Baudrillard, 2002, pg. 41), whether real or imagined.  
In addition to the unprecedented and devastating physical and economic toll the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist attacks had on New York: "2, 823 people killed; 1, 721 unidentified 
victims; 1.8 million tons of debris; 3.1 million hours of labour spent on cleanup; a 
countless number of American souls rattled to the core" (Verchick, 2002, 557); and “a 
total economic loss to New York being estimated at $83 billion” (Briffault, 2002, pg. 
563), the symbolic destruction may be much greater: “certainly the terrorists’ attack on 





battlefield was far more devastating in terms of achieving their global aspirations” 
(Butterfield, 2002, pg. 15).  As Baudrillard states,  
the towers, for their part, have disappeared.  But they have left us the symbol 
of their disappearance, their disappearance as symbol.  They, which were the 
symbol of omnipotence, have become, by their absence, the symbol of the 
possible disappearance of that omnipotence—which is perhaps an even more 
potent symbol.  Whatever becomes of that global omnipotence (hegemony), it 
will have been destroyed here for a moment. (2002, pg. 51-52)   
 
The absence of the World Trade Centre in the New York cityscape/urban landscape and 
skyline will continually serve as a reminder of the victims of September 11, 2001.  
Furthermore, the absence of the WTC will perpetually and irrevocably symbolize the 
vulnerability of the United States to terrorist attacks, the fact that terrorists can strike 
anywhere at any time, violence and tragedy, the illusory nature of safety and security, and 
resistance, contempt, conflict, and the counter-hegemonic presence of terror.  In other 
words, the former WTC site will permanently symbolize, communicate, and resonate 
with a landscape of terror(ism) and the threat to safety and security terrorism embodies.    
 The absence of the World Trade Centre and the symbolic import of this absence 
have caused the cityscape/urban landscape to signify "a place of danger and ambient fear" 
(Barron & Frug, 2002, pg. 587). Consequently, the ramifications of the destruction of this 
towering symbol have resulted in the temporary and permanent alternation of both the 
physical and psychological cityscape/urban landscape and its attendant spatial practices 
and behaviour.  For example, a recent debate has been ignited about the danger and fear 
engendered by density and the highly concentrated spatiality of the cityscape/urban 
landscape and the perceived relative safety and security of the deconcentrated and 
decentralized peripheral spaces of these landscapes.  As Barron and Frug (2002) suggest, 





ideological structure that presents the urban center as a place of danger and fear” (pg. 
587).  Baron and Frug continue, “indeed, one commentator expressly linked the new 
reasons to fear the central city to the old ones.  ‘We may see the beginnings of what we 
saw in the 1960’s and 1970’s.  The reason people left cities was the crime wave.  This is 
a sort of crime wave in a different way” (pg. 287).  Although a mass exodus of people 
and businesses has yet to be witnessed from urban centers and the lower Manhattan area 
is rebounding, employment in the area remains down, businesses displaced by the attack 
have relocated many of their employees to peripheral spaces, many businesses are 
currently seeking new locations outside of the city, some people have left, and others 
contemplating moving to the city have decided not to come, and area residents and 
businesses have to cope with the anxiety of the potential for another extremist/terrorist 
attack to occur as well as coping with increased security measures. (Briffault, 2002, pg. 
565).  Certainly, the current debate surrounding the perceived character of particular 
spaces and places is influencing land-use policies and practices, and the relationships that 
exist in and through landscape(s).  Not only is this evinced through the change in peoples 
spatial practices and behaviours but, as I will discuss in the next section of this chapter, 
through the overt presence and use of repressive state apparatuses and related 
authoritarian measures to control spatial practices and behaviours at the national, 
regional, localized, and site specific scales. 
The destruction of the World Trade Centre and the plethora of Islamist 
extremist/terrorist attacks that have taken place in particular spaces and places around the 
world since this spectacular event occurred have caused, as previously alluded to above, a 





135).  As well, I believe a related question that has emerged is: Are terrorism and 
urbanism at war?  Perhaps the answer to these questions can be found in the following 
assertion made by Swanstrom: 
Cities are not only target rich; they are highly accessible.  In the Middle Ages, 
cities had walls that offered their citizens protection from marauding thieves 
and pillaging armies.  Cities are now unwalled, and that is a source of both 
their strength and their vulnerability.   
Cities are basically heightened access--to people, to jobs, to ideas, to culture.  
Open accessibility makes cities vulnerable to terrorist attacks.  New York 
City is the quintessential unwalled city. (2002, pg. 136) 
 
How does one maintain an open and accessible city while providing safety and 
security to its citizenry, businesses, and visitors?  Should cities be militarized and become 
veritable citadels and Bastilles or panopticons of surveillance and scrutiny (Marcuse, 
2002; Graham, 2002; Warren, 2002)?  If the cityscape/urban landscape is to maintain its 
attractiveness and vibrancy as a space of political, cultural, and socio-economic practices, 
activities, and opportunity, people will have to be convinced that these landscapes are 
relatively safe and secure.  Therefore, visible changes to the cityscape/urban landscape 
will have to be made if priority is to be given to the deterrence, prevention, and detection 
of extremist/terrorist threats.  However, in addition to enhancing security of 
cityscapes/urban landscapes through overtly fortifying these spaces, the redevelopment 
and reconstruction of spaces affected by extremism/terrorism play an equally important 
role in creating a space that physically and symbolically communicates safety and 
security and, in some cases, defiance, hegemony, and power.                       
 As has been mentioned above, the Islamist extremist/terrorist attack on the WTC 
and the proposed redevelopment and reconstruction of this space represents a symbolic 





the Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology, the reconstruction of the WTC site is an 
articulation of the dominant ideology of the United States. In early November of 2001, 
New York state Governor Pataki and New York City Mayor Giuliani established an 
authority comprised of a combination of state and city officials and appointees to plan 
and oversee the development of lower Manhattan and the adjacent spaces affected by the 
attack.  This authority, the Lower Mahattan Redevelopment Corporation (LMRC), will be 
required to work closely with the Port Authority, who owns the site, and developer Larry 
Silverstein, who acquired a 99-year lease on the site shortly before its destruction.  
Additionally, the LMRC will seek federal cooperation and assistance in redeveloping the 
site and will attempt to devise strategies to entice businesses and residents to return to the 
redeveloped and reconstructed space (Langdon, 2001, pg. 3). 
 The rebuilding and (re)development of the space is to include six design 
principles that serve a utilitarian and symbolic function.  The following is a distillation of 
the six design principles:  
• Make connections.  Create rational pathways for Lower Manhattan, which has what 
New Visions describes as “the densest mix of trains, subways, ferries, roadways, and 
walkways in the world.” 
• Create diverse uses. “Plan for a balanced mix of commercial, residential, cultural, and 
recreational sites to develop a true 24-hour community.” 
• Allow for growth.  “Create synergies with planned development in other parts of the 
city.” 
• Improve environmental quality.  Restore the viability of affected neighbourhoods 





Leverage cultural resources.  Use cultural and historical resources as “major nodes of 
circulation pathways, neighbourhood definition, and urban growth.” 
• Honour the sacrifices.  “Plan a memorial process that is inclusive and gives meaning 
to the rebuilding of Lower Manhattan” (Langdon, 2001, pg. 5). 
 After receiving many proposals and engaging in dialogue with various stakeholders and 
interest groups, including a coalition of families representing the victims of the 
September 11, 2001 attack, the redevelopment of the space is supposed to include a new 
tower—the “Freedom Tower”—and a WTC memorial entitled “Reflecting Absence.” 
   The Freedom Tower, offering "70 occupied floors topped by a cable 
superstructure and a spire reaching 1, 776 feet"(Glanz, 2004, section 2, pg.1), has been 
selected as the primary edifice to occupy the space currently empty at perhaps, "scariest 
address on earth" (2004, section 2, pg. 1).  Additionally, “a light that can shine vertically 
or horizontally will sit at the top of the antenna to further promote the building’s image as 
the new beacon for downtown Manhattan” (Joshi, 2005, pg. 1).  The Freedom Tower 
“takes after the former Twin Towers in many ways: its base is 200 by 200 feet and its 
observation deck stands at 1, 362 feet, while its railing rises to 1, 368 feet—the same 
height as each of the old Twin Towers” (2005, pg. 2).  David Childs, the primary 
architect and designer of the Freedom Tower, states, “in a subtle but important way, this 
building recalls—but in a new shape—those buildings that were lost” (Joshi, 2005, pg. 
2).  However, rather than design and resurrect a building that is unassuming, thereby 
reducing its symbolic capital and significance, a building unparalleled in its design and 
structural features will dominate the New York skyline, much like the former World 





The former WTC space will also include a memorial entitled “Reflecting 
Absence.”  The “Reflecting Absence” memorial will include a “tree-studded plaza with 
two reflecting pools above subterranean corridors that would house artefacts and victim’s 
remains in alcoves set aside as shrines” (Cockfield, 2004, pg. 1).  According to Michael 
Arad, the designer of the memorial, and Pete Walker, the landscape architect, “this 
memorial proposes a space that resonates with the feelings of loss and absence that were 
generated by the destruction of the World Trade Center and the taking of thousands of 
lives on September 11, 2001” (Arad & Walker, 2005, www.wtcsitememorial.org).  As 
Arad and Walker continue, “the surface of the memorial plaza is punctuated by the linear 
rhythms of rows of deciduous trees, forming informal clusters, clearings and groves. […] 
Through its annual cycle or rebirth, the living park extends and deepens the experience of 
the memorial” (Arad & Walker, 2005, www.wtcsitememorial.org).  Moreover, “the 
memorial plaza is designed to be a mediating space; it belongs both to the city and to the 
memorial.  Located at street level to allow for its integration into the fabric of the city, the 
plaza encourages the use of this space by New Yorkers on a daily basis.  The memorial 
grounds will not be isolated from the city; they will be a living part of it” (Arad & 
Walker, 2005, www.wtcsitememorial.org).  As an accessible “living” space, the 
“Reflecting Absence” memorial is designed to be an integrated, active, dynamic, and 
engaging landscape that (re)produces and shapes the consciousness of memorialisation 
and much as it is produced and shaped by the consciousness of memorialisation. 
 Landscapes and/or spaces of memorialisation “strive to turn loss (either private or 
public in magnitude) into gain, sorrow into consolation and the tragic past into 





juxtaposition of the of the “Reflecting Absence” memorial and the “Freedom Tower” are 
a spatialized and dialectical montage of symbols that simultaneously reflect and articulate 
human suffering, lamentation, and tragedy as well as renewed strength, power, resilience, 
fortitude and the enduring ideal of freedom.  This landscape of memorialisation is a 
process through which loss is transformed into gain, absence is transformed into 
presence, sorrow is transformed into solace, and the tragic past is transformed into a 
vision of the present and the idealized future (Howard, 2003, pg. 48).  However, the 
“dialectical temporality” and the “contradistinctions” this landscape symbolises both 
permit and limit the ability of New Yorkers and the United States populace to imagine an 
other place and time beyond the present imperfect world engendered by human conflict, 
complication, contestation, violence and destruction, and competing ideologies. (Howard, 
2003, pg. 53-54). 
  The “Reflecting Absence” memorial and the “Freedom Tower” symbolically 
permit people to connect to the tragic past and to the idealized future, but, also physically 
limit and position people in an inescapable present, one constructed by and produced 
through the real and imagined threat of terror(ism).  Although the construction of the 
“Reflecting Absence” memorial and the “Freedom Tower” is an attempt to cathartically 
reconcile the past and reassert the political, cultural, and economic omnipotence of New 
York and the United States, as well as serve as a vehicle through which people can move 
beyond the spectacle of terror of September 11, 2001, the redeveloped and rebuilt 
landscape will irrevocably and perpetually resonate with a present characterized by 
terror(ism), the threat of terror(ism), and the fear of terrorism.  In effect, this redeveloped 





and symbolically embodies the identity and subjectivity of Al Qaeda—the group that 
permanently changed the physical and psychological topography of the New York 
cityscape/urban landscape and the United States nation-space.                 
 While the full psychological, physical, economic, and geographic and spatial 
consequences of the Islamist extremist/attacks on New York city, Washington D.C, 
London, Madrid, Bali, Riyadh, Casablanca, and other cityscapes/urban landscapes around 
the world that have been targeted by Islamist extremists/terrorists are yet to unfold, and 
ultimately how these attacks will shape the fabric of human praxis in and through 
cityscapes/urban landscapes has yet to be realized (Sawislak, 2002, pg. 599),  what 
appears to have changed are the practical and symbolic importance and roles of the 
cityscape/urban landscape.  As Verchick (2002) suggests, while historically cities have 
stood on the front line of politics, culture, jurisprudence, economics, ecology, and social 
movements, etc., “what appears to have changed since September 11, 2001, is the 
opening of a new front line on which American cities [and other cities affected by and 
vulnerable and susceptible to acts of terrorism] will be expected to prominently and 
permanently serve homeland security” (pg. 558).  As a result, (Islamist) terrorism has and 
is altering the physical and psychological landscape of not only cities and urban spaces 
but the nation-space as a whole. 
Militarization, Citadelification, and the Use of Authoritarian Measures 
The imprint of (Islamist) extremism/terrorism on the physical and psychological 
landscape can be profound as has been demonstrated not only through the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, but through the threat and security environment that has emerged in 





on selected targets around the world, and the threat of future acts have generated a 
physical and psychological landscape of fear with international and national implications.  
The creation of fear, uncertainty, and paranoia among the general population is not only 
altering how nations conduct themselves internationally and nationally, but the activity 
patterns and behaviours of groups of people and/or individual people, “with widespread 
social, political, and economic effects” (Cutter, Richardson & Wilbanks, 2003, pg. 2).   
Clearly, the security implications of the 9-11 Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks 
go well beyond the United States “War on Terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Indeed, “a 
variety of global and regional security arrangements not directly related to the terrorizing 
spectacle of 9-11 are being reshaped and reproduced by responses to those attacks 
(Hershberg & Moore, 2002, pg. 5) e.g. India’s renewed assertiveness with respect to 
Pakistan (particularly over Kashmir), Russia’s aggressive pursuit of its objectives in 
Chechnya, the renewed fervour of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the draconian measures 
used or being implemented to apprehend and detain suspected extremists/terrorists or 
suspected extremist/terrorist sympathizers in Saudi Arabia, Germany, Pakistan, Yemen, 
Indonesia, England, the United States, and Canada.  In each of these cases, the real or 
imagined battle “has become a more potent currency in domestic political affairs than 
was the case prior to September 11, 2001” (Hershberg & Moore, 2002, pg. 5).  The result, 
as has been demonstrated by the United States and more recently England, has been the 
development and implementation of aggressive legislation that empowers governments to 
use authoritarian measures to “protect” its citizens.  Furthermore, the threat of Islamist 
extremism/terrorism serves as a vehicle for legitimizing repressive strategies and tactics, 





nation’s citizens from an extremist/terrorist attack and/or prevent an extremist/terrorist 
attack.  Consequently, the events of 9-11 and the responses to the attacks have provoked 
and influenced a change in the spatial imagination of the nation-space, the 
cityscape/urban landscape, and its citizens, and the spatial practices and behaviours 
therein. 
Just as there is a spatial dimension to the Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon, 
so to is there a spatial dimension to how anti-terrorism operates and functions.  As 
Williams asserts (2003):  
there is a spatial dimension with regard to how both terrorism and anti-
terrorism operates.  Both use strategies and counter-strategies, techniques and 
counter-techniques to achieve their goals—all of which occur across the 
landscape and cityscapes.  In short, they occur in space.  However, insofar as 
terrorism and anti-terrorism occur in space, they also occur by means of 
space—and, indeed, have an influence on the production of space itself. (pg. 
274) 
 
In response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government, 
operating at the national, regional, and local levels, implemented policies designed to 
create and (re)produce, what one urban planner calls, “defensible spaces” (Maben, 2001, 
pg. 12).  Although some urban planners, architects, and policy practitioners advocated the 
design and construction of spaces that remained “open” and “friendly” for public use and 
enjoyment, and resisted the temptation to build “walls, erect gates, and harden targets” 
(Maben, 2001, pg. 12), the decisions associated with constructing and (re)producing 
“defensible spaces” and the authoritarian measures used to support “defensible spaces” 
were impaired by fear and subsequently an imbalance between safety and security and 
civil liberties.  According to Warren (2002), the “actions and policies pursued in the War 





and echoed in the mass media, of ‘everything has changed’ and the ‘world will never be 
the same’” (pg. 614).  Furthermore, as Warren continues, these statements contain 
subtexts that suggest the (Islamist) extremist/terrorist threat will take years to eliminate 
and “that violations of civil rights and international rules of warfare (Geneva 
Conventions) by the US may be legitimate responses to the unique conditions of fighting 
terrorists who are organized networks rather than nations and whose identity cannot 
always be known” (pg. 614).  The physical and psychological manifestations of 
(re)producing and (re)constructing “defensible spaces” are evident in the militarization 
and citadelization of cityscapes/urban landscapes and the use of authoritarian measures to 
actively scrutinize and control access to spaces and the human praxis that functions in 
and through these spaces and landscapes. 
 As the attacks of September 11, 2001 have demonstrated, as well as the recent 
Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks on the transportation systems in London, 
“transnational forces—Islamist extremism/terrorism—are rendering [physical and] 
political boundaries less useful at protecting its citizens from external influences” 
(Williams, 2003, pg. 279).  Islamist extremism/terrorism and the purposeful and 
calculated selection of soft targets signals that “there are no safe zones for civilians or 
non-combatants.  The public-private spatial structure, so much a hallmark of Western-
style liberal democracy, provides no physical protection from violence.  Individuals are 
not safe in their homes or businesses, and they are not safe in public spaces and 
buildings” (Williams, 2003, pg. 283).  Consequently, given the relative and apparent 
porosity of boundaries that Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks exploit, the normative 





international and intranational entities, public/private spaces and related human praxis, 
citizen/non-citizen and the rights associated with citizens/non-citizens are being redressed 
(Williams, 2003, pg. 279). 
 In effect, terrorism and anti-terrorism policies and techniques have caused a new 
quotidian normalcy and normativity to emerge at the international, national, regional, and 
site-specific scales (Williams, 2003, pg. 274).  Indeed, the physical and psychological 
landscape has been (re)shaped, (re)produced, and transformed in the United States and 
other countries to address and bring into force this new quotidian normalcy and 
normativity with varying affects on the spatial activities, behaviours, and practices of 
citizens and non-citizens alike.  A visible example of a new paradigm emerging is, as I 
have previously mentioned, the (re)construction and (re)production of “defensible 
spaces” in the cityscape/urban landscape. 
 As part of (re)constructing defensible spaces, “security, surveillance, and 
monitoring practices in around western, and particularly US cities, have been 
dramatically intensified” (Graham, 2002, pg. 589).  In the US and England, “cities and 
urban flows are being scrutinized through military perspectives so that the inevitable 
fragilities and vulnerabilities they display can be significantly reduced.  Massive new 
institutional complexes supporting Homeland security are being built up with 
extraordinary speed under the highest political mandate.  As a result, for the first time 
since the height of the Cold War issues surrounding international, military, and 
geopolitical security now penetrate utterly into practices surrounding the governance, 
design, and planning of cities and urban regions” (Graham, 2002, pg. 589).  





revision of military urban doctrine since the end of the Cold War” (pg. 615).  As he 
continues,  
it is now assumed by the United States and its allies that their military presence in 
cities, in humanitarian, peacekeeping, policing and homeland security, as well as 
combat roles, will be unavoidable in the twenty-first century.  Probability alone will 
be a factor given the project increases in the number and size of urban areas and 
their importance as control centers.  It is expected that urban military action and 
presence will be required to deal with the aggression of ‘rogue’ nations, individual 
and networked acts of terrorism, and civilian riots and disorders. (pg. 615)   
 
Certainly the events of 9-11, the subsequent war on terror, and the continued Islamist 
extremist/terrorist attacks and threat of attack has given impetus to this doctrine.  The 
political mobilization of this doctrine and related policies have manifested and continue 
to manifest in various spaces and landscapes throughout the United States and most 
recently England.  
The following are examples of the mobilization and manifestation of militarized 
doctrine and policies.  Currently a battery of missiles and other counter-measures have 
been put in place on top of the White House.  Additionally, concrete barricades populate 
the cityscape/urban landscape around the White House and prevent unauthorized 
motorized vehicles from moving in and around the White House.   The Liberty Bell in 
Philadelphia is under guard twenty-four hours a day and access to the location is tightly 
controlled and monitored.  Similarly, events, meetings, or summits considered to be 
politically or culturally sensitive and important are subject to military-grade surveillance 
and control.  For instance, the various EU, G8, WTO, World Bank, IMF, and World 
Economic Forum summits and meetings held in Barcelona, Brussels, Davos, Genoa, 
Gothenburg, Los Angeles, New York, Quebec, Washington D.C, and St. Andrews, 





cityscape/urban landscape were temporarily suspended, and concrete barricades, steel 
fences, and military and polices formations were used to mitigate and diminish the 
capacity of political activists to effectively protest (Warren, 2002, 616).  Additionally, the 
2002 Super Bowl in New Orleans was classified as a National Special Security Event and 
consequently subject to policies in line with the war on terror.  Again concrete barricades 
and steel fences were erected all around the stadium, vehicular access to the site was 
banned, and ticket-holders were required to arrive hours before the event in order to be 
subjected to several searches and security clearances (Warren, 2002, pg. 617).   
More recently, the successful and failed Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks in 
London, England prompted city officials and the federal government, who are historically 
familiar with terrorism as a result of the IRA campaign, to react with draconian anti-
terrorist measures including high-visibility policing—approximately 6, 000 additional 
police officers were deployed—in various public spaces around London and the random 
interpellation of citizens who look “suspicious.”  The term “suspicious” of course is 
rhetorically used as an innocuous term for “racial profiling.” As reported in the Globe 
and Mail, Joe Friesen recently interviewed an individual of Italian decent who looks 
Middle Eastern.  When asked about the current security environment the individual 
described being stopped several times in one week, under the authority of the Terrorist 
Act, and subject to a search of his person and his possessions.  In all instances, the 
individual was surrounded by police officers carrying machine guns (Friesen, 2005, 
August 8, pg. A10).  Although the overt and significantly enhanced police presence was 
designed to reassure the public, the result of the use and projection of force “drove home 





 In a related vein, spatial structures in the United States are being shaped by a anti-
terrorism discourse and its related militarized doctrine.  As Marcuse (2002) suggests, 
“development will be towards protected, secured citadels, to internalize and shield the 
activities critical to the top tiers of global and national businesses” (pg. 600).  In fact, as 
Marcuse (2002) maintains, “the trend towards citadelization already exists, but will be 
modified and accentuated.  The new form will be citadels within buildings or fortified 
complexes, including more and more of the facilities necessary for daily life within the 
building itself” (pg. 600).  In essence, one will never have to leave the citadel, and access 
to the fortification will be highly controlled through security checkpoints and other 
counter-measures.  The result has been and will be the virtual “barricading of segregated 
spaces” (Marcuse, 2002, pg. 600).   
Although the “barricading” and “citadelization” of the cityscape/urban landscape 
will potentially provide some citizens with a sense of safety and security, these 
militarized tendencies and actions reflect the how space is being negatively (re)shaped 
and (re)produced as a result of the real and/or imagined fear of Islamist extremist/terrorist 
threats: public space will become and is becoming less public and publicly accessible 
spaces will and are becoming virtually inaccessible (Marcuse, 2002, pg. 601).  For 
example, severe restrictions have been placed on assemblies and other public uses of the 
spaces in front of City Hall in New York City (Marcuse, 2002, pg. 601).  Moreover, 
public spaces that do remain “open”—city streets, parks, public transit terminals, city 
squares and plazas, public libraries, and court houses—will be subject to pervasive and 
invasive forms of surveillance.  This form of panoptical surveillance is already being 





The expansion and increasing visibility of military-style surveillance and control, 
reminiscent of the USSR and current authoritarian regimes e.g. North Korea, Iran, Syria, 
Burma, Saudi Arabia, etc., in cityscapes/urban landscapes has been accompanied by a 
well-orchestrated and coordinated strategy to use the War on Terror to substantiate and 
legitimize the temporary and/or permanent suspension of the political and cultural values 
and principles that provided the foundation for an “open,” “free,” and “democratic” 
socio-spatial and politico-spatial system (Warren, 2002, pg. 617).  Therefore, “security 
becomes the justification for measures that threaten the core of urban social and political 
life, from the physical barricading of space to the social barricading of democratic 
activity” (Marcuse, 2002, pg. 602).  Although the full extent of the militarization and 
citadelization of the cityscape/urban landscape has yet to unfold, the new quotidian 
normalcy and normativity of surveillance and spatial control that has emerged as a result 
of the War on Terror and the continued threat of Islamist extremists/terrorist attacks are 
transforming the physical and psychological landscape of the US, its allies, and others 
who have been targeted by Islamist extremism/terrorism. 
 The broader geographical and spatial implications of anti-terrorism policy and its 
associated militarized doctrine, practices, and activities are evident in the passage of 
legislation that is not only shaping and influencing the spatiality of the cityscape/urban 
landscape but the nation-space as a whole.  In response to 9/11, the United States 
government ratified two pieces of legislation that significantly increased the authority and 
subsequent ability of the government to prevent future extremist/terrorist attacks on the 
nation-space and serve as a vehicle for re-establishing the order of the “Homeland.”  As a 





United States government introduced the Homeland Security Act and the USA PATRIOT 
Act.    
The Homeland Security Act presaged a state of emergency that required the 
suspension of and departure from the values and principles to which the denizens of the 
United States have become accustom.  According to Pease (2003), the Homeland 
Security Act “tore to the ground the democratic institutions—freedom of speech, 
religious tolerance, formal equality, uniform juridical procedures, universal suffrage—
that had formerly nurtured and sustained the national peoples” (pg. 6). Moreover, the 
Homeland Security Act is supra-territorial in its design insomuch that the dislocation of 
the Homeland by external forces necessitates the pursuit of its enemies outside of the US 
nation-space.  As Pease (2003) states:  
the emergency state is marked by absolute independence from any juridical 
control and any reference to the normal political order.  It is empowered to 
suspend the articles of the Constitution protective of personal liberty, freedom 
of speech and assembly, inviolability of the home, and postal, telephone, and 
Internet privacy.  In designating Afghanistan and Iraq as endangering the 
Homeland, Operations Enduring Justice and Iraqi Freedom simply extended 
the prerogatives of the domestic emergency state across the globe. (pg. 7) 
 
A concomitant piece of legislation that is (re)shaping and (re)producing the physical and 
psychological landscape of the United States and other areas around the world is the USA 
PATRIOT Act. 
 The Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act—the USA PATRIOT Act—passed on 
October 26, 2001 is rhetorically presented as a critical step forward in the War on Terror 
and the reordering of the US nation-space.  The USA PATRIOT Act has been described 





to fight the war at the borders and here at home’” (Coleman, 2003, pg. 90).  These new 
weapons include roving surveillance and search of anyone at any time, in any place, and 
under any circumstances and conditions; expedited arrest, detention, deportation, and 
extradition, without judicial oversight and constitutional review; the authority to withhold 
information from the detainee and legal representatives; and the authority to secretly 
search homes and property (Coleman, 2003, pg. 90, 97; Williams, 2003, pg. 287).  
Additionally, Attorney General Ashcroft modified the guidelines pertaining to the 
surveillance of public meetings: FBI agents can now infiltrate public meetings without 
any prior basis of suspicion.  Moreover, Attorney General Ashcroft also reduced any 
special protection for religious or political meetings (Heymann, 2003, pg. 103).  
Although the consequence of these modifications to the guidelines may appear relatively 
benign, people attending one of the 1, 200 Mosques in the Untied States or pro-
Palestinian meetings “will be deeply concerned about what they say if they believe that 
an FBI agent may be present” (Heymann, 2003, pg. 103).   
The USA PATRIOT Act “effected the most dramatic abridgement of civil 
liberties in the nation’s history.  This emergency legislation subordinated all concerns of 
ethics, human rights, due process, constitutional hierarchies, and the division of power to 
the state’s monopoly over the exception” (Pease, 2003, pg. 7).  For example, operating 
under the aegis of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has 
detained more than “1,000 Middle Eastern and South Asian males since the 11 September 
2001.  Although some have been released and many deported, hundreds remain 
imprisoned—indefinitely, and without bail or official legal counsel” (Coleman, 2003, pg. 





Prime Minister Tony Blair has proposed amendments to their anti-terrorism legislation 
that would empower the government and its various apparatuses to arrest, detain, and 
deport anyone suspected of not only being a terrorist, but supporting or propagating 
extremist/terrorist perspectives and ideologies through public and/or private meetings.  In 
certain instances in England, Imams and clerics, considered to espouse extremist 
ideologies, have been arrested and deported.  In Canada, the highly publicized Arar case 
is an example of an innocent individual being detained, deported, and tortured as a result 
of the draconian measures being employed against an unsuspecting citizenry under the 
auspices of anti-terrorism and related security policies.    
The Homeland Security Act and the USA PATRIOT Act have bestowed upon the 
United States security apparatuses the power and the authority to (re)shape and 
(re)produce the physical and psychological landscape of the US nation-space.  In effect, 
these anti-terrorism legislative instruments have simultaneously caused a rebordering and 
debordering of the socio-spatial and politico-spatial practices that occur in and through 
the US nation-space.  One the one hand, in an effort to reassert the territoriality of the 
Homeland, these legislative instruments are focused on the territorial borders and 
boundaries of the US nation-space: “implementing order concerns fortifying borders” 
(Coleman, 2003, pg. 90).  In addition to physically fortifying and barricading borders, 
thereby (re)establishing a clear distinction between the outside and the inside, inclusion 
and exclusion, and controlled space and uncontrolled space, the rebordering of the US 
nation space and its desired anti-terrorism effect also involve other spatial dimensions 
and consequences.  These other spatial dimensions and consequences include, but are not 





controlling access to airports; controlling the ports of entry into the US via 
the US Border Patrol and Coast Guard, as well as via the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service; the strengthening of relevant government agencies by 
providing more resources through the Enhanced Border Security and Visa 
Entry Reform Act; and the creation and future use of tamper-resistant visas 
and passports. (Williams, 2003, pg. 284)     
 
Additionally, non-citizens may be fingerprinted and photographed and, as required by the 
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, all foreign students residing in the 
US will be tracked and entered into a notification system.  Furthermore, all persons 
wishing to enter the United States may be arrested, detained, and questioned if suspicion 
arises (Williams, 2003, pg. 284-285).  All of these rebordering anti-terrorism measures 
are designed to both control and monitor movement and actions within the nation-space, 
and the controlling and monitoring of access to place.  In effect, the rebordering of the 
nation-space determines who is “out of place” and “who belongs in the landscape” (Till, 
2004, pg. 356). 
 The debordering effect of the Homeland Security Act and the US PATRIOT Act 
involves the dissolution and disintegration, as alluded to above, of the boundaries 
between public and the private spaces.  Although certain violations of privacy are 
considered accepted norms of behaviour and policy e.g. conceding to searches at airports 
and certain public buildings, the militarized and authoritarian approach to combating 
Islamist extremism/terrorism, both at the international and national (domestic) scale, 
which has heralded a new quotidian normalcy and normativity of spatial activity and 
behaviour, does not recognize the distinction between public and the private space(s).  As 
the public/private spatial structure is reconfigured, an ironic value system has emerged 





professes to be protecting and securing, are the very rights, values, principles, and 
sentimentality that are being undermined and suspended by the US administration. 
 The reconfiguration of the public/private spatial structure and the suspension of 
privacy and relative anonymity are symptomatic of Islamist extremism/terrorism and the 
corresponding clandestine and surreptitious strategies and tactics employed by Islamist 
extremist/terrorist actors.  As Islamist extremists/terrorists can be almost anywhere at any 
time, planning, supporting, or ready to perpetrate an attack, both the public and the 
private space have come to be associated with danger, fear, chaos, and disorder (D’Arcus, 
2004, pg. 362).  Consequently, in response to the potential danger, disorder, and threat 
the public and private space represent, the US Administration instituted anti-terrorism 
policies and spatial strategies that enabled the state to regain spatial control, order, and 
conformance through rendering all domestic space effectively borderless and subject to 
intrusive roving surveillance and authoritarian violation.  In effect, the US government 
has rendered all space and its attendant spatial activities and behaviours subject to its 
gaze and authority, thereby ensuring that all spatial activities and behaviours, whether in 
a “public” and “private” place, are authorized, lawful, regulated, and do not constitute the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist threat against which state power has (re)defined itself.  For, 
the body politic and its special articulations must be protected against deviant anti-
citizens and outside agitators who George W. Bush, in his eloquent cowboy rhetoric, 
referred to as the ‘forces of evil’ (D’Arcus, 2004, pg. 368). 
For the United States, “the world has changed dramatically since September 11, 
2001” (Heymann, 2003, pg. 38).  As Heymann (2003) states:  
we no longer feel secure, although we cannot measure the extent of the 





sense of security.  In the meantime, being less secure means that we have to 
take a variety of steps to reestablish safety.  Some of those steps involve 
reducing the harmful consequences of any attack; some involve the 
psychological sense of enhanced security and autonomy that comes with 
effective retaliation. (pg. 38)  
 
As a result of the landscape of fear, paranoia, and terror that has been created by 9/11 and 
the declared state of emergency that followed, the physical and psychological landscape 
of the United States has been reshaped, reproduced, and reconstructed by an “all 
encompassing [militarized] definition of reality” (Lutz, 2002, pg. 286).  Although this 
militarized reality and militarized landscape may provide an enhanced sense of safety and 
security for the citizens and body politic of the United States, the new quotidian normalcy 
and normative spatiality, engendered by anti-terrorism security protocols, policies, and 
procedures, are actually generating and (re)producing spaces and landscapes of terror. 
 As previously mentioned, just as landscapes are shaped by consciousness, 
landscapes shape consciousness.  As people act in and through the militarized and 
citdelized cityscape/urban landscape and nation-space, the threat and fear of Islamist 
extremism/terrorism and its potentially devastating and destructive capacities are 
continually articulated through the symbols and underlying spatial activities of anti-
terrorism that are embedded in the landscape.  When one is confronted with the symbols 
and activities of anti-terrorism, one is immediately confronted with the symbols and 
activities of extremism/terrorism.  In effect, the construction and production of spaces 
and landscapes of anti-terrorism result in the reconstruction and reproduction of spaces 
and landscapes of extremism/terrorism. Similarly, the real or imagined safety and 
security that the anti-terrorism landscape creates and communicates is inescapably 





extremism/terrorism.  Therefore, the physical and psychological landscape that has been 
shaped and produced by anti-terrorism, and the associated authoritarian reconfiguring of 
socio-spatial and politico-spatial structures and systems, unwittingly recreates, 
reproduces, and articulate the “terror” it seeks to erase and eliminate. 
“Honourbound to Defend Freedom”: The ‘War of Terrorism’ 
and the Politicization of Space 
 
Rasul was the last one processed, and by the time he got to his cage it was 
dark.  First he was stripped naked and, still wearing his goggles and chains, 
was given a piece of soap and told to shower.  When his goggles were finally 
removed, he peered through the tropical night at the cacti and razor wire and 
low scrubby hills beyond.  Mosquitoes buzzed and bit.  ‘I looked around and 
thought, what the hell is this place.’ (Rose, 2004, pg. 6-7) 
 
In December 2001, the Pentagon began devising plans for a detention facility for 
the prisoners the United States would take captive in the declared War on Terror and the 
ensuing military operations in Afghanistan and its other operational theatres (including 
direct operational involvement and/or proxy operations).  In selecting a space for the 
construction of the detention facility, the Untied States had three options: a foreign 
sovereign country, the United States or some other American territory, and Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba.  U.S. military and intelligence officials ruled out a foreign sovereign country 
because of concerns of access, while the United States or a US territory was ruled out 
because of fear of attracting further extremist/terrorist attacks and detainees would be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. federal courts and its related legal policies and 
procedures. “That meant that any detainee who wished to challenge an aspect of his 
treatment, his denial of Geneva rights, or his continued incarceration, could have brought 
a federal Habeas Corpus action, the ‘judicial review of the detention of a person to 





Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a space technically belonging to Cuba, despite the indefinite 
U.S. lease, provided the United States with the means to circumvent both domestic and 
international legal procedures and responsibilities: “’Gitmo is a unique piece of property, 
owned by Cuba but controlled by the U.S. under a perpetual lease […].  It minimized 
foreign relations concerns and domestic security concerns … since the property belonged 
to Cuba […]’.  Far from being the least worst place, ‘Gitmo was the best possible place’” 
(Rose, 2004, pg. 32-33)—a stateless space or extra-territorial landscape that exists 
beyond the vanishing point of national and international legal and political (sovereign) 
structures and related spatial policies and procedures—a legal and political “black hole.”  
The name ascribed to this stateless space and extra-territorial landscape is “Camp X-
Ray.” 
 The construction and production of Camp X-Ray as a stateless space and extra-
territorial/extra-juridical landscape is considered a necessary counter-measure given the 
extraordinary character of the War on Terror and omnipresent threat of Islamist 
extremism/terrorism.  According to the U.S administration, given that the War on Terror 
is not an “ordinary” or “conventional” war, the detainees and/or prisoners at Camp X-Ray 
are not subject to the laws, rights, and conventions afforded to politically and legally 
recognized Prisoners of War (POWs).  As Butler outlines, on 22 January 2002, Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld explained why the detainees at Camp X-Ray should not be 
designated Prisoners of War: “For the United States, these are not POWs, because this is 
no ordinary war; it is not primarily a battle between recognizable nation-states or, in 
parlance of the Geneva Conventions, ‘High Contracting Parties’ (Butler, 2002, pg. 3).  





“unlawful combatants,” designations that position and situate the detainees/prisoners at 
Camp X-Ray in a politically and legally unrecognizable policy space that exists in a 
liminal gap between national and international political and legal systems of governance.   
The detainees/prisoners at Camp X-Ray are legitimate illegitimate actors who, acting 
outside of the state-centric “conventions” of war, are not subject to the provisions 
governing the treatment of prisoners of “conventional” war. 
 Under Article Four of the Geneva Convention, combatants entitled to legitimate 
Prisoner-Of-War status “include the organized armed forces of a state and also members 
of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized 
resistance movements, belonging to a party to conflict” (Thornberry, 2003, pg. 19).  
Furthermore, conditions are applied to those that qualify for Prisoner-of-War status: 
“there must be a command structure; arms must be carried openly; and operations must 
be conducted in accordance with the laws of war” (Thornberry, 2003, pg. 19).  As Article 
Four demonstrates, the conventions governing armed conflict and violence are biased 
towards regular armed forces that are acting directly or indirectly on behalf of a 
recognized sovereign nation-state.  Therefore, armed conflict and violence waged by 
individuals or groups not representing or directly or indirectly acting on behalf of a 
nation-state are illegal and illegitimate and are not guaranteed the protections of the 
Geneva Conventions (Butler, 2002, pg. 4).  Certainly, the fact that Al Qaeda and its 
ideological affiliates operate regionally, nationally, and/or transnationally through 
systematically effacing themselves from public detection and function in a surreptitious 
and clandestine fashion are anathema to the conventional conception of war.  As such, 





practices that have shaped and produced Camp X-Ray, are relegated to a position on the 
margins and in the interstices of national and international mechanisms of political, 
judicial, and spatial governance and territorial belonging. 
 The signifiers “extremism/terrorism” and “unlawful combatants” have assumed 
an important function in the U.S War on Terror and its associated political, juridical, and 
spatial discourse.  These signifiers become the rhetorical codes through which 
distinctions are drawn between legitimate violence and illegitimate violence, authorized 
armed conflict and unauthorized armed conflict, citizen and non-citizen, legitimate state 
actor and illegitimate non-state actor, civilized and misanthropic, and inside the law and 
outside of the law.  Moreover, to be codified as an “extremist/terrorist” or an “unlawful 
combatant,” and therefore a non-state actor and illegitimate practitioner of violence, 
suggests that these non-state actors are “pure vessels of violence” and “do not become 
violent for the same kinds of reasons that other politicized beings do, that their turn to 
violence can make no sense historically, or cannot make sense the way conventional wars 
make sense, and that their violence is somehow groundless and infinite, if not innate and 
constitutive” (Butler, 2002, pg. 7).  Therefore, if one follows this line of reasoning, the 
actions of “extremists/terrorists” and “unlawful combatants” have no political goals, “or 
cannot be understood politically.”  Extremism/terrorism and unlawful combatants emerge 
from the irrationality of fanaticism do not espouse a point of view or coherent 
perspective, and, therefore, “do not have a part in the human community” or inclusion in 
the boundaries of civilization (Butler, 2002, pg. 7).  The consequence of which is that the 
construction and production of spaces like Camp X-Ray are deemed necessary by the 





illegitimate combatants and stateless violent actors.  As Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld has stated in response to mounting international criticism and scrutiny of Camp 
X-Ray in January 2002:  
“these people are committed terrorists […].  We are keeping them off the street and 
out of the airlines and out of nuclear power plants and out of ports across this 
country and across other countries […].  They [are] the most dangerous, best-
trained, vicious killers on the face of the earth. […] We were able to capture and 
detain a large number of people who had been through terrorist training camps and 
had learned a whole host of skills as to how they could kill innocent people, not 
how they could kill other soldiers.  We’ve got a good slug of those folks off the 
street where they can’t kill more people.” (Rose, 2003, pg. 8). 
 
Although the veracity of Donald Rumsfeld’s prognostications have been indirectly 
challenged and/or undermined through the observations and opinions of both a guard at 
Camp X-Ray and a senior Pentagon official with extensive knowledge of Guantanamo: 
according to the guard at least 200 of the detainees were not terrorists and were relatively 
harmless and, according to the senior Pentagon official, “at least two thirds of the 600 
detainees held as of May 2004 could be released without hesitation immediately” (Rose, 
2003, pg. 42), the hyperbolic sentiments conveyed by Rumsfeld provide the “mytho-
logic” (Pease, 2003, pg. 14) that render the U.S Administration exempt from legitimate 
critical scrutiny and empower the U.S Administration to shape, create, and produce a 
physical and psychological space/landscape in and through which they enact their 
eschatological version of realpolitik and its attendant spatiality.   
 In January of 2002 the first of the approximately 750 detainees who would 
eventually enter this liminal anti-terrorism space began arriving at Camp X-Ray (Rose, 
2003, pg. 9).  One of the most salient images of the War on Terror is that of detainees 
being escorted shackled hand and foot, wearing orange jumpsuits, black-lense goggles, 





this landscape of anti-terror.  For a population and Administration still reeling from the 
shock and horror of the 9-11, these images were particularly poignant and important both 
materially and symbolically.  Materially, the images produced tangible evidence that the 
declared War on Terror was experiencing relative levels of success, justice was being 
administered, and that the virtual invisibility of the Islamist extremist/terrorist threat and 
unlocatability of the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor was being rendered “visible” and 
“locatable:”   
By exhibiting the images of detainees at Camp X-Ray, the security apparatus 
reinstates its control over, and through, by means of, the visible.  Indeed, what is 
visible in the images is not so much the detainees themselves (they are vague, 
indeterminate figures, whose identifying features are deliberately concealed; it is 
merely their abstract being, the “species essence” as terrorists, that is on display, 
while their individual identities are guarded from view), as the spectacle of the 
state’s power over them. (McClintock, 2004, pg. 154) 
 
In effect, the images of the detainees signified the ability of the state to locate, dominate, 
subjugate, and control the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject and the threat and violence 
these actors and groups represent.  Correspondingly, the images of the detainees at Camp 
X-Ray have a significant symbolic register.  The images of the detainees and by 
extension the landscape produced by Camp X-Ray symbolise the restoration of safety, 
security, order, and the “will to redemption” (Arnault, 2003, pg. 155) in the American 
popular imagination.  
The events of 11 September 2001 and the horror the attacks inspired violated the 
physical and psychological landscape of the United States and destabilized the conceptual 
norms and fundamental moral and ethical prescriptions of the U.S body politic.  





the violation provoked, the logic of redemption became an attractive tool in order to 
restore or redeem that which was violated (Arnault, 2003, pg.171).  As Arnault states: 
during or after the experience of horror, we tend to be attracted to the logic of 
redemption because horror signals violation—the fact that the world is not as we 
think it should be.  As creatures who are committed to things existing in the way we 
conceive them to exist, when our expectations are violated, we want to see things 
set or made right.  Committing ourselves to the prescription that the future will 
redeem the past is one way of expressing our resolve to see the world (Islamist 
extremists/terrorists are my focus) conform to our universalizing prescriptions. 
(2003, pg. 157) 
 
The images of the detainees and the penitential landscape of Camp X-Ray symbolically 
represent a redemptive present and future where the past, namely the events of 11 
September 2001, and its related transgressions and violations of conceptual norms and 
moral and ethical prescriptions will be resolved and conformity restored.  In effect, the 
images of the detainees and the Camp X-Ray landscape represent sites of inscription and 
act as an expressive medium through which the United States can figuratively inscribe 
and communicate its hegemonic dictum.  However, just as the images of the detainees at 
Camp X-ray serve an important material and symbolic function for the American popular 
imagination, the images of the detainees also serve an important material and symbolic 
function for the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency. 
 The images of the detainees, in conjunction with the repeated reports of physical 
and psychological torture, the suspension of international and national political and 
juridical policies and procedures, the violation of human rights, and the purported 
desecration of the Qu’ran have caused Camp X-Ray to become a landscape in which and 
through which people become politicized.  For the detainees and their families, which 
include individuals from Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, 





Sweden, Syria, Yemen, among other countries totalling approximately 40 nations 
(McClintock, 2004, pg. 161), Camp X-Ray has become synonymous with despair, 
anguish, pain, humiliation, oppression, torture, “the shattering of innocents’ lives, and for 
detainees’ families, an indeterminate sentence of uncertainty and loss” (Rose, 2004, pg. 
133).  As Rose later suggests the pain, suffering, humiliation, and despair experienced by 
the detainees and the detainees families has been replicated across the Muslim diaspora 
and has tapped and created new currents of anti-American rage (2004, pg. 135).  
According to Dr. Tim Winter, a lecturer in Islamic Studies at Pembroke College, 
Cambridge, “’the guy with the crew cut, the club and the crucifix, standing over the 
detainee in goggles and chains, symbolizes not only American oppression of the Third 
World, but also the oppression of governments friendly to America inside Muslim 
countries’” (Rose, 2004, pg. 135).  The consequence of this perceived humiliation, 
despair, suffering, and oppression is that Camp X-Ray, like the Palestinian conflict, the 
war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, the grotesque and sadistic abuse of prisoners at Abu 
Graib, and the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula—“sacred” 
territory that Osama bin Laden identifies as a primary reason for the jihad being waged 
against the United States and its “Coalition of the Willing”—has become “’a focal point 
for anger and political action’” (Dr. Tim Winter quoted in Rose, 2004, pg. 135).  In short, 
Camp X-Ray has become a landscape through which individuals and/or groups within the 
Muslim diaspora are politicized, perhaps even radicalized, and moved to “action.”  
Certainly, “action” does not solely refer to perpetrating acts of extremism/terrorism.  
“Action” can also include providing funding to various Islamist extremist/terrorist 





transnational movement, providing safe haven for Islamist extremists/terrorists either 
physically or through silence, logistical support, or propagating, promulgating, and 
espousing the Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology on websites, in Mosques and/or 
community centres, or through literature disseminated throughout various communities 
and media outlets. 
 The effects of Camp X-Ray as a landscape that “works” as a mechanism of  
politicization has manifested in various forms.  For example, Guantanamo/Camp X-Ray 
was cited by Osama bin Laden in a communiqué he issued on 24 November 2002 entitled 
“Letter to America.”  In this communiqué Osama bin Laden outlines the hypocrisy of the 
actions taken by the United States in the War on Terror to undermine the very human 
rights they extol and claim to protect: 
“You (the United States) have claimed to be the vanguard of human rights, 
and your Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues annual reports containing 
statistics of those countries that violate any human rights.  However, all 
these things vanished when the Mujahideen (Al Qaeda) hit you, and you 
then implemented the methods of the same documented governments that 
you used to curse.  In America, you captured thousands of Muslims and 
Arabs, taking them into custody without reason or court trial, not even 
disclosing their names.  You issued newer, harsher laws. 
 
What happens in Guantanamo is a historical embarrassment to America 
and its values, and it screams into your faces, you hyprocrites: “What is 
the value of your signature on any agreement or treaty?” 
 
What we call you to do is to take an honest stance with yourselves—and I 
doubt you will do so—to discover that you are a nation without principles 
or manners, and that to you values and principles are something to be 
merely demanded from others, not that which you yourself must adhere 
to.” (Marlin, 2004, pg. 70-71) 
 
Through turning U.S exceptionalism and moral relativism against itself, Osama bin 
Laden attempts to render any counter-arguments to Al Qaeda’s and their ideological 





moral and ethical authority of the United States.  Consequently, reciprocal actions 
become justified and substantiated in the mind of Osama bin Laden and those that 
subscribe to his particular Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology.  This particular belief is 
expressed in a communiqué Osama bin Laden issued on 12 November 2002 entitled “As 
You Kill, So Shall You Be Killed,” “reciprocal treatment is part of justice” (Marlin, 
2004, pg. 53).  Therefore, to add to the warning issued by Osama bin Laden, “You will be 
killed just as you kill, you will be bombed just as you bomb” (2004, pg. 55).   
Further examples of the politicizing effect Guantanamo/Camp X-Ray landscape is 
having on the Muslim consciousness is demonstrated through editorials being published 
in Muslim newspapers.  As one editorial states in Britain’s politically moderate Muslim 
News, “’out of the window has gone any regard for the norms of international law and 
order … with Muslims liable to be kidnapped in any part of the world to be transported to 
Guantanamo Bay and face summary justice’” (Rose, 2004, pg. 136).  Moreover, as Rose 
identifies, “on Islamist websites and in the Arab Press, Guantanamo is cited time and 
again as a rallying point for jihad, as a justification for creating more suicide “martyrs”” 
(2004, pg. 2004).  As one senior Defense Intelligence Agency official stated: “’it’s a 
public relations disaster.  Maybe the guy who goes into Gitmo does so as a farmer who 
got swept along and did very little.  He’s going to come out a fully fledged jihadist.  And 
for every detainee, I’d guess you create another ten terrorists or supporters of terrorism’” 
(Rose, 2004, pg. 136).  One of the most dramatic examples of the politicization occurring 
as a result of the Camp X-Ray landscape was the epiphenomenona of decapitations that 
occurred both in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.  In these cases, both before and during their 





detainee uniforms at Camp X-Ray (Rose, 2004, pg. 136).  More recently, feverish and 
vociferous anti-American protests were ignited in Afghanistan, Egypt (Muslim 
Brotherhood), Libya, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Palestine (including Hamas), Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, and Sudan in response to the alleged desecration of the Qur’an at  
Camp X-Ray.  Although the United States Administration denied these allegations, the 
report further fuelled the feelings of humiliation, rage, and anger within the Muslim 
diaspora (AlJazeera.Net, Saturday 14 May 2005). 
 By constructing and shaping an anti-terrorism landscape at Camp X-Ray, the 
United States has not only produced a space that actively politicizes, but has physically 
and symbolically created a landscape that situates the United States Administration and 
by de facto the U.S populace on the margins of the very political and legal system the 
War on Terror is supposed to uphold and protect.  In effect, the marginality of Camp X-
Ray, advertently or inadvertently, has introduced a nuance to the “War on Terror.”  The 
“War on Terror” has now become the “War of Terror.”  Although ideologues like Osama 
bin Laden and other members of the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency have 
historically imagined this to be the case, the Camp X-Ray landscape, and the images 
associated with the Camp X-Ray landscape, have posited the “War of Terror” perspective 
into the consciousness of the Muslim diaspora and elevated anti-American sentiment 
within the Muslim Umma in general and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency in 
particular.   
 In the Post 9-11 epoch, the contours of the United States anti-terror nation-space 
and cityscapes/urban landscapes, and its concomitant spatial practices and behaviours, 





Butterfield notes: “Baudrillard, scandalous as ever, hands the symbolic victory of the war 
on terror to the terrorists, all but crediting them with recent economic, political, and 
psychological “recessions” in the West, and with the fact that “deregulation has ended in 
maximum security, in a level of restriction and constraint equivalent to that found in 
fundamentalist societies” (Butterfield, 2002, pg.16).  Although these “recessions” may be 
considered necessary in order to effectively and efficiently wage the War on Terror, the 
very existence of anti-terror measures and the consequent recessions in the physical and 
psychological landscape the recessions generate, (re)produces the terror they are trying to 
combat.  Therefore, the rebuilding and redevelopment of the spaces directly affected by 
the Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks, the broader militarization, citadelization, and use 
of authoritarian measures in cityscapes/urban landscapes and the U.S. nation-space, as 
well as the construction and production of anti-terror spaces and landscapes like Camp X-
Ray, serve as an extension of the identity and subjectivity of Islamist extremism/terrorism 
by creating a physical and psychological landscape of terror.  The landscape shaped by 
the consciousness of anti-terrorism recreates and communicates the consciousness of the 
extremism/terrorism it is attempting to prevent and destroy.       
         
    
                                                         
                            








 Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to illuminate three interrelated 
geographical and spatial dimensions of the Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon: the 
diffuse transnational structure of Islamist extremism/terrorism and the imaginings, forces, 
and technology that make it possible to maintain and sustain this decentralized and 
deterritorialized system of behaviour and organization; the liminal cultural thirdspace that 
Islamist extremist/terrorist groups, cells, and/or individual actors occupy, especially upon 
penetrating and infiltrating the cultural fabric of nations that are alien to their own; and 
the function of landscape in extending not only the identity and subjectivity of the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist subject, but their goals and objectives as well.  Cumulatively, I 
believe that these geographical and spatial dimensions of the Islamist extremist/terrorist 
phenomenon provide a composite of the geographical and spatial imaginings of Islamist 
extremism/terrorism.  Furthermore, through inductively developing an understanding of 
the geographical and spatial imaginings of Islamist extremism/terrorism, I believe that 
greater insight into this phenomenon has been achieved through revealing and explaining 
some of the complexities and dynamics of how these diffuse transnational actors organize 
themselves, how they understand themselves, how they understand their actions, and how 
they understand the world in which they inhabit. 
 In the first movement, through using Anderson’s Imagined Communities and 
Canetti’s Crowds and Power as a theoretical framework and interpretive mechanism, I 
believe that I was able to penetrate and elucidate some of the complex and dynamic 
geographical and spatial relationships and forces that make constructing and sustaining a 





possible.  Furthermore, I believe that generating an understanding of how Al Qaeda and 
the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency exist in an internationalized imagined 
community can also help to explain how these groups function and maintain their sense 
of unity on a national or regional scale.   
Future research into the diffuse transnational network structure of the Islamist 
extremist/terrorist constituency could explore possible links and cooperation between 
Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and non-Islamist extremist/terrorist groups e.g. Al 
Qaeda and LTTE, Jemmah Islamiah and the LTTE, Al Qaeda and the FARC, Al Qaeda 
and the Basques, etc.  Additionally, one could explore the possible links and cooperation 
that may exist between Islamist extremists/terrorists and organized crime syndicates and 
how these relationships support the diffuse transnational network structure of these 
Islamist extremist/terrorist groups.  Another area of inquiry that is important to 
understanding how Al Qaeda and other groups organize themselves is understanding 
which landscapes are ideally suited for or are conducive to supporting these transnational 
actors.  For instance, what is the relationship that exists between groups like Al Qaeda 
and failed or failing states?  With respect to the effects of globalization, one could 
explore the mass-movement of capital that globalization allows and the use of off-shore 
banking to move capital and finance various Islamist extremist/terrorist operations.  As a 
more comprehensive understanding of how groups like Al Qaeda organize themselves 
and imagine themselves is established, policies can be developed that effectively target 






 In the second movement, I believe that the theoretical tools provided by Soja’s 
Thirdspace, Bhabha’s Location of Culture, and Butler’s Gender Trouble enabled an 
analysis not only of the cultural “space” the Islamist extremist/terrorist group and/or 
individual actors occupy upon infiltrating a target society, but the versatility, adaptability, 
and malleability of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject, and their conscious control of 
their own spatiality.  Moreover, these theoretical tools allowed for an analysis of the 
relationship that exists between the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject and violence: 
violence is the medium through which the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject is realized 
and actualized.  In effect, who the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject is, is what the 
Islamist extremist/terrorist subject does. 
 How do extremists/terrorists prepare and train for operations in foreign cultures 
and spaces? Who are the individuals and or groups selected to carry out covert foreign 
operations?  Are their particular demographics that are more suitable to carry out foreign 
operations than others?  As certain operations can take years to execute, how do these 
individuals that are subject to foreign cultures and related accoutrements able to sustain 
their level of resolve and conviction over prolonged periods of time?  Are liberal 
democracies more prone to extremist/terrorist attacks because of their pluralistic “open” 
societies?  Investigating these questions in future research could contribute to furthering 
one’s understanding of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject and could possibly lead to 
policies that would prevent individuals from infiltrating target societies, provide 
information that would help various governmental apparatuses identity potential Islamist 






 In the third and final movement, my examination of the relationship that exists 
between Islamist extremism/terrorism and landscapes (including cityscapes/urban 
landscapes) is important as it reveals the short and long-term ramifications of Islamist 
extremism/terrorism and its consequent impact on the physical and psychological 
landscape of target societies in general and the Untied States in particular.  Moreover, my 
examination reveals an insight into the motivational forces behind target selection and the 
politicization that can result from the construction and development of places and spaces 
that are designed to prevent and/or mitigate future extremist/terrorist attacks.                 
As Islamist extremism/terrorism continues to proliferate, which to date has shown 
few signs of subsiding, the need to demystify and decode this transnational phenomenon 
has become paramount if international, national, and regional stability, safety, and 
security are to be maintained in certain areas and achieved in others.  Therefore, it is 
incumbent upon both academics and policy practitioners alike to continue to cast light 
into the darkness that shrouds this area of inquiry.  Although terrorism and political 
violence have received a substantial amount of academic analysis, large information gaps 
pervade the corpus of terrorism research: "terrorism, one of the most widely discussed 
issues of our time, remains one of the least understood" (Laquer, 1987, pg. 1).  In the 
article, "The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism," 
Andrew Silke suggests that "terrorism quite simply is not a topic that is easily researched.  
Or at least, it does give the impression on first inspection.  The central actors involved in 
this phenomenon are difficult to access—and extremely difficult to access in a systematic 
manner" (2001, pg. 2).  Silke goes on to state, "terrorism itself is an emotive subject and 





neutral in how they view the subject and its perpetrators" (2001, pg. 2).  Although it can 
be argued that absolute objectivity is unattainable and that all forms of analysis and 
examination are subject to the provenance of the researcher, I believe that geography and 
by extension geographers are in a unique position to make significant contributions to 
this subject area. 
The importance of Geography as a discipline of study is indispensable to 
understanding and combating the Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon.  As a 
discipline of diversity and integration, under whose rubric geographers study and analyse 
processes, systems, behaviours, patterns, distributions, diffusions, circulations, 
interactions, juxtapositions, and other phenomena that have spatial expression, 
geographers are in a position to transgress disciplinary boundaries and develop modes of 
analysis that provide unique insight into the interconnectivity and interactivity of the 
physical and human worlds (Blij, 2005, pg. 8).  Therefore, as Islamist 
extremism/terrorism is as much a geographical and spatial phenomenon, as it is a political 
phenomenon, geographical and spatial inquiry is a necessary component of deciphering 
the Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon and developing the knowledge necessary to 
successfully engage these actors in their physical, psychological, and social spaces and 
environments. 
 However, especially in the United States, geographical and spatial knowledge and 
literacy seems to be on the decline: “an American student might go from kindergarten 
through graduate school without ever taking a course in geography—let alone a fairly 
complete program” (Blij, 2005, pg. 13).  In contemporary America, geography has 





schools like Harvard and Yale for over half a century (Blij, 2005, pg. 15).  Although the 
ramifications of the relative decline of geographical knowledge is difficult to apprehend 
and measure, the geographical and spatial isolationism and provincialism of the US 
collective imagination will undoubtedly influence and impact the positionality of the 
United States in international diplomacy, defence, and development.  As the country who 
is on the forefront of the War on Terror, a comprehensive and robust reservoir of 
geographical and spatial knowledge, awareness, and understanding would appear to be 
one of the requisite dimensions for achieving geosecurity for both the United States 
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